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FOREWORD 
The study reported here occupies a distinctive place in the development of 
our ability to amass knowledge about the political world. 
Methodologically it represents the latest (but probably not the last) step in 
a generation-long development of the application of survey research tech- 
niques to the study of institutional bodies, and of legislative bodies in par- 
ticular. At the same time, it draws on knowledge accumulated from similar 
prior studies and from a wide range of theoretical and methodological litera- 
ture, especially as concerns problems of conceptual equivalence, to make the 
data elicited by the surveys relevant to the substantive research concerns. 
And it casts the comparative net more widely than have any previous studies 
of similar scope and kind, producing the broadest possible generalizations. In 
all these respects it constitutes a substantial step down the road of methodo- 
logical development begun over twenty years ago. 
The precursor of this study was, of course, V. 0. Key's pioneering exami- 
nation of politics in the American south, made through interviews with the 
politicians of the region. Most custodians of the then-prevailing paradigms 
of political research advised against the study, assuring Key that most pro- 
spective respondents would make themselves inaccessible for interviewing, 
and that the rest would be far less than candid in their responses. That 
Southern Politics, based heavily on numerous such interviews successfully 
completed by Key and Alexander Heard, made a landmark contribution to 
our political knowledge did not, however, immediately establish the respect- 
ability of this mode of research.' Early legislative studies of Vermont legisla- 
tors by Garceau and Silverman, of United States senators by Donald R. 
Matthews, and of legislators in four states by Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and 
Ferguson as well as others, encountered similar warnings while in progress. 
These warnings were couched partly in terms of fears that higher level public 
officials might be less accessible than Key's southern politicians, and partly 
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on rejection of the "behavioralist" notion of interviewing to obtain systematic 
and quantitative data about respondents' attitudes and behavior in the sys- 
tems where they ~ p e r a t e d . ~  Later proposals for similar study of European- 
and Western-style parliaments and politicians-for example, Hunt's con- 
cerning French parliamentarians-encountered the objection that systematic 
interview research might perhaps work with American representatives, whose 
culture socialized them to accept such procedures, but would surely be 
rejected by MPs and public officials brought up in cultures where those 
procedures were supposedly a1ien.j Nevertheless, over the almost thirty years 
following the earliest interview-based studies of representative bodies, in- 
creasing numbers of systems have been subjected to such examination-for 
example, Argentina, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, and Japan, to 
name the most p~ominent.~ 
A perhaps surprising feature of the developments sketched above is the 
relative paucity of genuinely comparative studies, as distinguished from 
discrete studies of particular systems. For, as students of methodology are 
repeatedly told, generalizations and cumulation of knowledge are promoted 
hardly at all by unrelated idiosyncratic case studies, and proportionately 
little even by series of case studies addressing common questions of theoreti- 
cal importance. Where the object is generalization about political systems 
and where the unit of analysis is the political system itself, comparison of at 
least several systems is essential. Yet the genuinely comparative studies of 
legislative bodies or of legislators-e.g., Eulau and Prewitt, Putnam-are 
still far outnumbered by studies of single representative bodies in single poli- 
tical  system^.^ 
In addition to the obvious logistical and financial difficulties of mounting 
such studies across more than one political system, comparative studies have 
encountered the major obstacle of ensuring conceptual equivalence in the 
design and analysis of the research. This problem confronts all crosscultural 
research, but none more squarely than survey-based crosscultural studies, 
where the problem must be dealt with on at least two levels. 
At the lowest level, which might be called empirical conceptual equiva- 
lence, the problem is translating words and concepts in one given culture 
into words and concepts of any other, in use as well as in the grammatical 
and semantic sense. At a higher level, which might be called analytical con- 
ceptual equivalence, the problem involves the researchers' definition and 
theoretical understanding of the analytic concepts which they themselves 
relate to observed political behavior, events, and institutions in the culturally 
diverse systems under study. 
The choice of political systems as geographically, historically, and culturally 
diverse as Kenya, Korea, and Turkey confronted the authors of this study 
with problems of conceptual equivalence as formidable as any yet tackled in 
this type of research. Social scientists will find it especially rewarding in 
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reading the chapters that follow to see the forms these problems took in 
each country, and to see the ways in which the authors have operationalized 
their key concepts and translated these operationalizations into question-and- 
response terms in the various survey instruments that have been developed. 
It is especially in these respects that the present study constitutes a methodo- 
logical culmination of preceding survey studies of representative bodies. 
One other aspect of this study is noteworthy with respect to the study's 
place in the annals of representation-research development, namely, its gen- 
eration of systematic data on important classes of political actors in addition 
to the data generated on the main targets, the legislators themselves. Hunt 
earlier interviewed political party counterparts of the French MPs questioned 
in his study.6 And the path-breaking study of representation by Miller and 
Stokes utilized survey data from citizens in a sample of U.S. Congressional 
districts, rolkall records of congressmen and survey-based data about con- 
gressmen's policy preferences.' Patterson, Hedlund, and Boynton combined 
the kinds of data used in the Miller-Stokes study with survey data about 
individuals in selected local political elites in their study of representation in 
Iowa.* In this study the authors go beyond these and earlier analyses of mul- 
tiple subpopulations by increasing the number of parliamentarians sampled, 
expanding the scope of constituent-population and local notable samples, 
and refining the techniques for identifying these samples. 
While this glimpse of the study's methodology from a historical perspective 
may be helpful in providing a framework for better understanding the sub- 
stantive information presented in the following chapters and may be of 
interest to specialists in problems of research methodology or in the sociology 
of social science disciplines, it is, nevertheless, the substance of the subject 
matter, and not the method of studying it, which will be of primary interest 
to the nonspecialist reader. Here again, awareness of where this study and its 
objectives stand in relation to the line of comparative representation studies 
preceding it should prove helpful. 
The earliest of these studies, and many of the later ones, were primarily 
descriptive mappings of particular portions of hitherto unexplored legislative 
terrain. Garceau and Silverman, for example, were concerned with pressure 
groups in the legislative process; Matthews concentrated on senators' con- 
ceptions of unwritten rules of the legislative game; Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, 
and Ferguson explored legislators' role orientations in several key dimen- 
sions. including those orientations involved in what Matthews had studied 
under the heading of informal rules? This is not to say that such works were 
journalistic or  historical accounts, but only that their theoretical reach was 
relatively limited, both in terms of the legislative and representational domain 
on which they focused and in terms of their attempts to relate findings to 
broader questions about the wider political system and the place in it of the 
representational phenomena being researched. 
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Very few predecessors match the study which follows in ambitiousness of 
aim, generality of research questions, or clarity with which important theo- 
retical questions are addressed. The most notable exceptions are perhaps 
Putnam and Eulau and Prewitt.Io Putnam examined the ideological concep 
tions of British and Italian MPs in order to study the nature and dynamics of 
social conflict and operative ideals in democratic systems. Eulau and Prewitt 
interviewed members of seventy-two city councils in the region around San 
Francisco Bay, but the theoretical interest of these researchers was not in the 
councilmen as individuals but in the councils as decision-making bodies and 
in what might be learned from them concerning the level and resolution of 
political conflict in representative bodies. (It is worth noting that it is not 
accidental that these two studies, as noted earlier, were also exceptional in 
their genuinely comparative research design.) 
The selection of the systems to be studied and compared places the present 
research within the theoretical context of the politics of "developingw societies. 
"Political development" as such, however, is not the focus of this research. 
Since "developed" societies are not included among the systems studied, 
genuine comparative analysis of developmental problems is impossible. Nor 
were the questions asked of MPs, notables, or constituents designed to elicit 
data directly bearing on developmental processes. However, that political 
development is a major, if not the central, theoretical concern is apparent 
from the fact that the concluding chapter deals with the legislature and poli- 
tical development. The point to note is that the research on representatives 
and representation was conceived and completed with a concern for the 
process of political development in mind. Accepting and maintaining this 
theoretical orientation constitutes a significant step forward in representation 
research. 
But theoretical problems to which the research is explicitly directed are of a 
different order of abstraction. These problems fall in three general categories, 
and their treatment, here again, represents in each case a continuation and 
extension of important lines of investigation begun in predecessor studies. 
The first category of theoretical problems, discussed in chapters 4,5, and 6, 
deals with the nature, function, and dynamics of representation in political 
systems with elected representative bodies. Discussed under this category 
are legislative roles (e.g. Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson), linkages 
between representatives and the citizen body in general (e.g. Patterson, 
Hedlund, and Boynton), and the internal "legislative culture" within which 
representatives work (e.g. Matthews)." 
The second theoretical focus is one which has been nominally the concern 
of much legislative research in the past, but which has rarely benefitted from 
very careful conceptualization: the policydecision functions of representative 
bodies. Here the concern is not merely with the mechanics of the decision 
process or with explaining why certain decisions were made in certain cases 
(see chapter 7, e.g.). The authors also discuss how the process of making 
decisions and the nature of those decisions affect resource allocation for the 
society. Chapter 8 breaks new ground in dealing with these questions. 
The third theoretical target area is one central to the important problem of 
political stability: public support for the legislature. Since David Easton's 
explication of the general concept, support for the political system has been 
a major object of political scientists' attention.'* Consistent with Easton's 
formulation of the general concept of "the political system," however, such 
research has generally focused on attitudes of individuals as members of a 
mass public toward the system as an entity, or toward analytic components 
of the system as a whole (community, regime, authorities, policies). The 
research here, results of which are reported in part 1V (chapters 9-1 l), builds 
on the important beginnings made by Patterson, Hedlund, and Boynton 
(1975)') and aims at uncovering attitudes and behaviors of the public (both 
as individuals and as members of various elite segments) toward specifically 
the representative body and the representatives themselves, ascertaining the 
dynamics of support for the legislature and its role in the dynamics of support 
for the political system as a whole. 
In summary, then, this book can best be understood in light of its relation- 
ship to the generation-long series of comparative representation studies which 
precede it. An appreciation of the extent to which it constitutes further prog- 
ress in the methodology of representation research will help the reader under- 
stand both the power and the limitations of the data on which the analysis 
rests, and the extent to which the knowledge it claims to add can be adjudged 
reliable and valid. Those additions, to repeat, relate mainly to three areas of 
interest, variously addressed by predecessor studies: the mechanics and dy- 
namics of linkage between the members of the representative body and the 
body of the citizens they represent, the dynamics of policy determination (at 
least in its legislative aspects) in a key area (resource allocation), and the 
dynamics of support for representatives and representative bodies. All three 
of these topics relate directly to the central concern of the study: the nature 
of representation in political systems with representative bodies. Beyond 
these principal concerns, the study seeks to speculate and hypothesize, at 
least in tentative and general terms, about the implications of the findings for 
our understanding of still broader, more basic questions, questions having to 
do with political stability and political development. 
Readers can judge for themselves how well the authors have succeeded in 
amplifying our understanding of such problems as these, as well as how 
much they add to our understanding of more everyday aspects of politics and 
government in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey. To make a significant contribution 
to the present stock of such knowledge is clearly a major accomplishment for 
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any complex research project. But a further test of the success of such an 
intellectual venture must wait for another thirty years or so: what studies of 
still more basic importance, based on what still more valid and reliable kinds 
of data, will stand on the shoulders of this research effort? A familiar Biblical 
commandment is perhaps appropriate here as a wish for the results of the 
authors' intellectual labor: "Be ye fruitful and multiply!" 
John C. Wahlke 
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Part I 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 
LEGISLATURES, LEGISLATORS, AND 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
This book seeks to determine the nature and significance of the legislative 
process in developing countries. As such, it is a volume devoted to the 
analysis of a phenomenon that is often not a factor in the political life of 
these societies. When the legislative process is a factor, the form it takes, the 
behavior of the actors involved, and the significance of the process are very 
different from those found in the industrial democracies of the West. One 
purpose of this volume, therefore, is to determine why, and in what ways, the 
legislative process in developing countries differs from that found in industrial 
societies; why variations exist among the patterns of legislative behavior in 
different types of developing societies; and why the legislative system has 
evolved into a component of the political systems in some of these countries, 
but not in others. 
In seeking to determine the nature and significance of the legislative pro- 
cess in developing countries, this volume also attempts to bridge the distance 
that has emerged during the past two decades between two groups of political 
scientists: (1) those concerned with problems of political economy and de- 
velopment in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and (2) those concerned with 
the function and operation of the major political institutions in the Western 
industrial democracies. All too often, these two groups of scholars have con- 
ducted their respective investigations in isolation from each other, and have 
neglected each other's work. As a result, students of political development, 
especially those who have devoted their efforts to the formulation of macro- 
systemic theories of political change, have rarely given serious consideration 
to the role and signficance of legislative behavior in the overall process of 
political development.' Conversely, students of legislative behavior, particu- 
larly students of legislative institutions in the Western industrial democracies, 
have rarely conducted their inquiries from a developmental perspective.* 
141 THE LEGISLATIVE CONNECTION 
This volume seeks to bridge the literatures of these two groups of scholars 
by examining the parameters of the legislative process in Kenya, Korea, and 
Turkey from two perspectives rather than one. The first perspective is that 
which regards the legislative process as a dependent variable-the phenom- 
enon to be explained. This perspective has been the point of departure for 
most scholarly studies of legislative behavior, and is the point of departure 
for this study as well. In addition to this long-standing approach to the 
subject, this volume also considers the legislative process as an independent 
variable-the process which, at least in part, determines the shape of another 
phenomenon, in this instance, the systemic process of political change and 
development as it transpires within three developing countries. By addressing 
itself to the developmental consequences of the legislative process, this study 
pursues a line of inquiry which has largely been ignored both by students of 
the legislative process in the industrial democracies of the West and by 
students of political change in the context of Third World societies. 
This volume falls within what might appropriately be termed the main- 
stream approach to the developmental process. The authors have largely 
accepted the conceptualization of political development formulated by the 
members of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) Committee on 
Comparative Politics during the mid-1960~,~ and later expanded upon by 
Samuel P. Huntington in his widely read book, Political Order in Changing 
Societie~.~ We refer to this conceptualization of political development as the 
mainstream approach because it has dominated the literature for almost 
twenty years5 Its basic thesis is that the process of political development 
consists of five closely related attributes or "subprocesses": ( I)  Differentia- 
tion, the process through which the political institutions of a society become 
more structurally complex, more specialized, and more autonomous in re- 
spect to the functions they perform. (2) Equality, the process through which 
political rights and obligations are extended to all members of a society over 
which a given political system asserts its authority, so that all may become 
full citizens of that system. (3) Participation, the process initiated in response 
to the extension of political equality, which results in a progressively larger 
proportion of society's members seeking to determine the content of public 
policy. (4) Capacity, the increasing ability of a society's political institutions 
to respond effectively to, "or contain the increase in participatory and distri- 
butive demands generated by the imperatives of equality,"and the ability "to 
innovate and to manage continuous ~ h a n g e . " ~  (5) Institutionalization, the 
process through which the organizations and procedures for responding to 
and reconciling competing demands for public policy become valued by those 
advancing these demands, and by the public at large, to the point that they 
evolve into lasting mechanisms for resolving political conflict. 
The mainstream conceptualization of political development focuses exclu- 
sively on those aspects of political change that transpire within the national 
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political system. As such, it stands in sharp contrast to the neo-Marxist or 
"dependency" model which seeks to explain political and economic change in 
Third World societies in terms of the unequal economic relationships which 
exist between those societies and the advanced capitalist countries of the 
West. Despite the significance of these external relationships to the process of 
development and underdevelopment, we have pursued our inquiry within the 
framework of the mainstream approach because the legislative processes in 
the societies under study are fundamentally internal phenomena not directly 
impinged upon or  determined by the factors of dependency which are the 
principal concern of those who employ the dependency model. Put differ- 
ently, the legislative processes in the three countries examined in this study 
exist in the form they do for reasons other than the degree to which the 
political economies of these countries exist in a dependent relationship vis-it- 
vis the center of the international capitalist system. For our purposes, the 
neo-Marxist or  dependency model is simply less relevant to the topic under 
consideration than the mainstream approach, deficient as the latter might 
be.' 
Although we accept the notion that political development is a process 
which involves the increasing differentiation and capacity of central political 
institutions and the extension of political rights and obligations to all mem- 
bers of society, it is important to note that political development need not, 
and often does not, involve the growth of such institutions alone. As will 
be discussed at length below, political development involves not only the 
expansion of central political institutions to embrace those residing on the 
periphery of the political system, but also the reaching upward by those on 
the periphery and their representatives to link their local institutions with 
national institutions at the center. Moreover, the extent to which central 
political institutions become valued by members of the general public is in 
large part a function of the extent to which linkages are established from the 
periphery to the center as well as from the center to the periphery. It is in the 
linkage aspect of the developmental process that the roles played by legis- 
lators and the legislative process are most significant in Kenya, Korea, and 
Turkey. 
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Legislatures do not exist in roughly half of the developing countries of 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and where they are found their form and 
significance are quiet different from those in the West. Legislatures in both 
Western and non-Western countries often appear to have only an insignificant 
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role in the making of public policy. In the industrial democracies of the 
West, the decline of the legislature as an institution for decisionmaking can 
be partly explained by the growth of the welfare state and by the prominent 
role these policies play in world affairs. But these explanations are not rele- 
vant in the developing countries where such conditions rarely exist. In the 
developed countries, legislatures have repeatedly delegated their authority to 
make public policy to the executive and administrative arms of government 
as the issues to be decided have become more numerous, pressing, and tech- 
nically c o m p l e ~ . ~  In contrast, legislatures in developing countries have either 
never exercised a decision-making authority, or have had that authority taken 
away by an executive seeking to monopolize political power. 
The suppression of the legislature by the executive in many less developed 
countries-whether by a periodic reduction of the legislature's authority 
to make policy, the intimidation and/or detention of individual parliamen- 
tarians, or the suspension or abolition of the institution itself--can often, 
though not always, be explained in terms of the basic socioeconomic struc- 
ture of these societies. With few exceptions (of which Korea is one), un- 
derdeveloped countries are  extremely poor and rural in character. Most 
inhabitants of the countries reside in the countryside and are engaged in 
subsistence level farming and/or in the production of nonedible cash crops 
for export overseas (e.g., cotton, rubber, sisal, tea). This combination has 
rarely resulted in a significant measure of economic development in the rural 
areas of the less developed countries. Indeed, during the past decade the level 
of development in the rural sector in many of these countries has actually 
declined. In contrast, the rate of economic growth in the urban service and 
industrial sector in most countries has proceeded at a respectable annual 
average of 6 to I5 percent. From an economic standpoint, therefore, the 
rural areas in most developing countries are stagnant. and the disparity be- 
tween the standard of living in the rural and urban sectors continues to grow. 
These conditions often result in a pattern of political conflict that is char- 
acterized by intense competition between sectional, or geographical, interests. 
Sectional interests dominate the politics of most developing countries because 
the undifferentiated structure of the agrarian economies of these countries 
rarely gives rise to either a multiplicity of specialized interest groups or  to a 
well-defined and articulated set of class interests. In the absence of such 
sources of differentiation, which are not tied to any specific locale, people 
tend to discriminate between one another on the basis of where they live. 
This is particularly true in peasant societies, where most people are rooted to 
a specific piece of land on which they depend for their livelihood and through 
which they relate to their past and obtain a large measure of their identity. 
Such geographical or spatial distinctions are reinforced and exacerbated 
when overlaid by distinctions of language, ethnicity, and/or religion. It is for 
this reason that geographical distinctions are a frequent source of political 
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conflict in agrarian societies which are not divided by language, ethnicity, or 
religion, and within socially homogeneous areas of societies that are divided 
by these phenomena. 
When the centrality of sectional distinctions is combined with the basic 
fact that most governments in developing countries have limited resources 
to dispense, the political process often degenerates into a volatile zero-sum 
game between competing regional interests none of which is willing to accept 
defeat. Because the capacity of the state to manage such conflict is limited, 
and because the state does not have the means to respond adequately to the 
sectional demands which are the substance of the political process, those 
who control the state often view political institutions which articulate the 
demands of regional interests as institutions which must be suppressed. 
It is for these reasons that the legislature in many developing countries is 
so vulnerable to attack. As an institution whose members are selected to 
represent the residents of a series of discrete geographical units, the legislature 
is the political institution most likely to define political issues, and policies to 
resolve those issues, in sectional terms. The legislature is also perceived by 
executive decisionmakers as a body which lacks the expertise necessary to 
properly consider complex issues, and as a threat. 
The extent to which the pressures of sectional conflict weigh upon the 
regimes of developing countries varies with the specific conditions in each. 
Generally speaking, these pressures will be greater where the percentage of 
the population living in the rural areas is higher, where the extent of land- 
lessness among peasants is higher, and where the per capita GNP is low. As 
noted above, sectional conflict is also exacerbated by ethnic and communal 
distinctions. This is particularly true where a large majority of the population 
is divided among a small number of large groups, in contrast to a situation 
where the population is either homogeneous (or nearly homogeneous) in its 
ethnic composition, or  is highly fragmented into a large number of small 
groups of roughly equal size. Measured by these variables, sectional conflict is 
a more prominent feature of political life in Kenya than in Korea or Turkey. 
As discussed in chapter 3, Kenya's level of development is substantially lower 
than that of Korea or Turkey. Almost 90 percent of Kenya's population lives 
in the rural areas, compared to just under half of the populations of Korea 
and Turkey. Kenya is also highly heterogeneous in its ethnic composition, 
whereas Korea and Turkey are not. 
Because the legislature is the institution within which sectional conflict 
finds its greatest expression, it is not surprising that the Kenyan National 
Assembly was kept on a short leash by President Jomo Kenyatta during the 
first fifteen years of Kenya's independence, and that it continues to have little 
opprtuni ty to determine the content of public policy under Kenyatta's suc- 
cessor, Daniel arap Moi. In contrast, the Turkish National Assembly had a 
greater impact on the policymaking process prior to the military coup of 
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September 1980, because sectionalism was no longer the cutting edge of 
Turkish politics. On the other hand, the Korean National Assembly was a 
weak institution during the regime of President Park Chung Hee even though 
the Republic of Korea has not been particularly subject to sectional conflicts 
inside its borders. However, as discussed in chapter 3, South Korean domestic 
politics are greatly affected by the Communist threat from North Korea. This 
external pressure is a factor that overrides those conditions existing within 
South Korea that would otherwise contribute to the development of an in- 
dependent legislative institution. As a result, the Korean National Assembly 
was under constant scrutiny by the government of President Park Chung 
Hee prior to his assassination in October 1979. Opposition parties were barely 
allowed to exist and the range of what was regarded as legitimate political 
discourse was kept purposely narrow. 
THE LINKAGE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL 
LEGISLATORS 
If the legislature in most developing countries is either not permitted to 
exist o r  not permitted to exercise a significant and independent role in the 
making of public policy, what functions does the legislature perform in these 
political systems? What are its prospects for survival as an institutionalized 
part of these political systems? And what, if any, is the significance of these 
powerless organizations for the developmental process? 
To answer these questions, and other questions raised at the beginning of 
this chapter, we shall depart from what has been the usual approach to the 
study of legislative institutions. Instead of focusing on the process of collec- 
tive decision making within the legislature, we are primarily concerned with 
the activities pursued by individual legislators outside the legislative chamber. 
We make this shift because of the relatively insignificant role the legislature 
plays in the policy-making process of these countries. Rather than dwell on 
the largely symbolic and legitimating functions which transpire within the 
legislature, in lieu of policy making, we think it more fruitful to concentrate 
our analysis on the relationship between the legislature and the general public 
as forged by the activities of individual legislators vis-a-vis their constituents. 
In this study, the legislative process is therefore broadly defined to include 
not only the familiar activities of interest articulation, policy deliberation, and 
lawmaking, but also those activities through which legislators, by virtue of 
their formal status as elected members of a national government, contribute 
to the five principal attributes or subprocesses of political development noted 
in the first section of this chapter: Differentiation, the spread of political 
equality and participation, the growth of institutional capacity, and the pro- 
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cess through which the organizations and procedures for resolving political 
conflict become valued and lasting features of the political system. Defined in 
this manner, the legislative process includes much more than lawmaking. 
Indeed, in the context of developing countries, lawmaking is an insignificant 
part of the legislative process. 
At this point, the reader might well ask whether what we have defined as 
components of the legislative process in developing countries can be appro- 
priately labeled as such, or whether many of these activities are of a nonlegis- 
lative nature, or only marginally related to the legislative process as tradi- 
tionally defined. Our response is that we have included within the definition 
of the legislative process all activities of legislators that constitute a distinctive 
contribution either to the overall development of the political system or to 
the development of the legislature as an independent institution within the 
political system. Whereas the process of political development involves many 
actors other than legislators, and institutions other than the legislature, one 
of the guiding hypotheses of this study is that legislators play distinctive and 
sometimes unique roles in this process. To the extent that they do, it is 
logically impossible to exclude the activities connected with this role from 
what is labeled as the "legislative process" in the less developed countries. 
What then, is the nature of the roles played by legislators in the sub- 
processes of political development? As suggested above, the contribution 
legislators make to the process of political development is to be found in 
their various activities outside the legislative chamber which affect the legis- 
lature's relationship with other central political institutions on the one hand, 
and with members of society on the other. From a conceptual standpoint, all 
such activities fall under the general rubric of linkage development-the 
establishment of networks for communication and the exchange of resources 
between the core and periphery of the political system. 
Concern with the development of political linkages between the core and 
the periphery of the political system is a recurring theme in the literature on 
the politics of developing areas9 It draws attention to the fact that, among 
other things, the process of political development in the new states is a spatial 
phenomenon involving the extension of institutions of a national political 
system from one or more urban locations into rural hinterlands. Although 
the integration of the core with the periphery is invariably viewed as princi- 
pally a "topdown" and "center-out" process, we would submit that it is also 
a "bottom-up" and "periphery-in" process involving the expansion of local 
rural political areas to the point where the boundaries between central and 
local institutions intersect, and those institutions become part of a single 
political domain. 
When political development is so conceived as a dual phenomenon involv- 
ing the expansion of both the center and the periphery, the importance of the 
efforts legislators make to create linkages between the center and the periph- 
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ery becomes clear. Three types of actors contribute to the development of 
such linkages in new states. By far the most numerous are government civil 
servants whose mission is to extend the authority of the center into the 
periphery. The expansion of the center, and the control of the periphery 
by the center, is also the mission of party cadres in those few developing 
countries-usually those which have recently experienced wars of national 
liberation-where viable party organizations function. In contrast, only legis- 
lators link the locality on the periphery of the political system to the central 
political institutions which constitute the system's core. While civil servants 
and party cadres often function as "feedback" mechanisms to apprise the 
center of the concerns of those on the periphery, the interests of these cadres, 
and their source of rewards, remain those of the center. In contrast, legislators 
are formally charged with representing the interests of the periphery at the 
center. And, where the electoral process still functions, legislators are held 
accountable by those who reside on the periphery. 
It is from this dual perspective of the process of political development and 
the importance we attach to the distinctive role legislators play in this process, 
that we begin our analysis of legislators and political development in Kenya, 
Korea, and Turkey. We will determine the parameters of the legislators' roles 
by concentrating our analysis on three basic types of linkage activities: first, 
those activities concerned with establishing effective representation of the 
periphery at the center, a condition without which neither political equality 
nor participation can be achieved; second, those activities which directly and 
indirectly influence the allocation of resources, and ability of the center to 
respond to demands for change by interests on the periphery; third, the 
activities through which legislators contribute to the support or legitimation 
of the legislature and other central political institutions as valued and inde- 
pendent bodies. 
The first of these three basic types of linkage activities is discussed in 
chapters 4 through 6, following brief presentations of the research design 
employed for this study, and the historical and political contexts within which 
our field work was carried out in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey. Chapters 7 and 
8 are devoted to an examination of legislators and resource allocation, while 
chapters 9 through 12 consider legislators and public support. Before pro- 
ceeding with our discussion, however, let us first define representation, re- 
source allocation, and support, so that the reader may better know the course 
of analysis to follow. 
THE LEGISLATOR AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
In considering how the representational role of the legislator contributes 
to the development of linkages from the periphery to the center, we focus our 
attention on those activities by legislators which communicate the opinions 
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and demands of the citizens of a political system to those who have the 
authority to make public policy. As defined by Hanna Pitkin, representation 
is that relationship through which 'the people of a nation are present in the 
actions of its g~vernment." '~ Being present in the actions of government 
does not, of course, mean that the people of a nation necessarily participate 
in such actions, but rather that they are present and that their presence is 
known by those who do participate. As such, representation is a process 
comprised of at least two, and perhaps three, distinct components or stages 
which exist in hierarchical relationships to one another: (1) The process of 
creating the linkages through which the people of a nation become present in 
the central institutions of the state, where the decisions which allocate the 
state's resources are made; (2) the process by which the people of a nation, 
after achieving entry into the central institutions of the state, make their 
presence known by articulating their demands to those with the authority 
and power to make allocative decisions; and (3) the process through which 
the people of a nation, having established and articulated their presence in 
central political institutions, then participate in the policy decisions these 
institutions make. 
These three components of the process of representation are manifested in 
a variety of institutional settings, of which the legislature is but one. Our 
concern with the way in which the legislators in developing countries create 
and maintain linkages on behalf of those on the periphery of the political 
system to the center is therefore a concern with how this small group of 
political actors engages in the first and second stages of representational 
behavior. While other types of political actors engage, or claim to engage, in 
representational behavior, it is our contention that this form of behavior is 
what usually distinguishes legislators from other participants in the political 
process who develop linkages between the center and the periphery of these 
political systems. 
THE LEGISLATOR A N D  RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Chapters 7 and 8 consider the roles legislators play in the process of re- 
source allocation-the decisionmaking process which determines the content 
of public policy. Recognizing that the legislature in most underdeveloped 
countries is a weak institution that plays only a marginal part in the making 
of public policy, and consistent with our decision to focus on the activities of 
individual legislators outside the legislative chamber, instead of on the col- 
lective activities within, we shall conceive of resource allocation as a two- 
stage process. The first is a stage we shall call general resource allocation, the 
process whereby legislators, acting collectively, produce policy outputs which 
deal with broad issues of national concern rather than with local interests. 
The second stage we shall call specific resource allocation, the process where- 
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by the decisions to allocate state resources to a given set of problems are 
implemented. Allocation is accomplished through bureaucratic and political 
action involving administrative institutions and personnel on the one hand, 
and lobbying by individual legislators and the representatives of special 
interests on the other. 
In most developing countries, where sectional conflict frequently permeates 
the political process, where state resources are limited, and where the level of 
technical expertise among legislators is low, substantial discretionary author- 
ity is granted to administrative decisionmakers on the assumption that they 
can make specific allocations of scarce resources on both a more rational and 
less emotive basis than can legislators. While there is much truth to this 
proposition (indeed, it is one which legislators themselves often believe to be 
true), the net effect is to provide further impetus for a shift in activity away 
from the legislature. 
The same factors that lead legislators to play representational roles by 
forging linkages from the periphery to the center, result in their playing allo- 
cative roles, which consist mainly of lobbying with civil servants on their 
constituents' behalf. For example, the location of a new hospital or school, 
the funding for which has already been provided by an executive-level deci- 
sion to make expenditures in the general field of health or education, becomes 
grist for the legislator's mill. Denied significant participation in the process 
of general resource allocation, legislators turn their attention to the specific 
questions of how many hospitals or schoolsare to be built, where. and when. 
That such considerations of specific resource allocation become the focus of 
much legislative activity is indicative both of the overall structure of develop 
ing political systems, and of the great effort legislators devote to the general 
task of constituency service. The significance of this pattern will be discussed 
at length below. 
LEGISLATORS AND SUPPORT 
Chapters 9, 10, and 1 1  consider the broader question of support for the 
legislature as an institution. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, a 
central component of political development is the process of institutional 
differentiation, of which the establishment of an autonomous legislature is 
part. For legislative institutionalization to occur, the activities of the legisla- 
ture must be valued both by the legislature's own members and by those 
external to the organization, in this instance, members of the public, members 
of locally based elites, and those members of the nation's ruling elite who 
determine what the substance of legislative activity shall be. 
Following Huntington, we therefore view the legislature in most under- 
developed countries as an organization that is still in the process of becoming 
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an autonomous institution. It is an organization that requires some critical 
degree of external support if it is to survive and flourish, whether in its 
present form, or in the more conventional sense of an institution for collective 
decisionmaking. 
The concept of political support was developed by David Easton and has 
been elaborated by him in a number of his writings. Easton has spoken of 
support for three political objects or units of analysis: (1) the political com- 
munity as a whole; (2) the regime and its political institutions; and (3) the 
authorities, or individual actors who are members of these institutions. He 
has also distinguished between what he calls specific and diffuse support.'' 
Specific support is a short-term phenomenon, based on the "perceived out- 
puts and performance of the political authorities," and it is extended only to 
the political authorities.I2 Diffuse support is more durable in nature, and is 
independent of short-run outputs and performance of the political system. It 
is not only directed to particular political leaders and institutions, but it "is 
support that underlies the regime as a ~ h o l e . " ' ~  
We are primarily concerned with the level of diffuse support for the regime 
and its political institutions, and more specifically for the legislature. Our 
goal is to assess the long-term prospects for the legislative process in the 
political systems of the three countries in this study. We have attempted to 
measure the level of support among members of the public and local elites 
for the legislative institution, and we have also sought to determine how 
clearly the legislature is recognized and how accurately it is perceived by the 
public. We are interested in determining to what extent the level of support 
to the legislature is based on short-run factors, such as satisfaction with its 
performance or a favorable image of its members, and to what extent it is 
based on more enduring factors, such as a belief in the legitimacy and value 
of the legislative institution. We are also interested in determining how much 
the activities of individual MPs can contribute to a favorable impression of, 
and support for, the legislature. Finally, we wish to gain some insight into 
the relationship between support for the legislature and for the political sys- 
tem as a whole. Though we lack hard evidence on this question, we will 
speculate about the ways and extent to which support for the legislature may 
be transformed into support for other institutions and for the regime as a 
whole. 
Our analysis in chapters 9 through I 1 begins with an examination of public 
support for the legislature and proceeds through discussions of public expec- 
tations for both individual and collective performance, the extent to which the 
public and elite groups are aware of the legislature's activities, the levels of 
public satisfaction with legislative performance, and the variety of factors that 
affect public and elite salience, satisfaction, and support for the legislature. 
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SUMMARY 
The discussion which follows examines the significance of the legislative 
process for what we have termed the mainstream understanding of political 
development. Our basic hypothesis, and point of departure as we begin our 
analysis, is that while the legislature is a weak organization in most under- 
developed countries, the legislative process when broadly defined encom- 
passes unique and distinctive activities which are not found elsewhere in the 
political systems of these countries. Chief among these are activities per- 
formed on an individual basis by legislators outside the legislative chamber. 
Such activities are significant because they establish linkages for communi- 
cation and exchange between the periphery and center of the political system 
for the primary purpose of serving the interests of the periphery. 
Legislators have the opportunity to play critical roles in the processes of 
representation, specific resource allocation, and the generation of support for 
the legislature as a whole. To the extent that they actually do perform these 
functions, MPs contribute to the development of the political system by 
raising the level of institutional differentiation, accelerating the spread of 
political equality, and enhancing the capacity of these systems to respond to 
the demands made by their citizens. 
In the chapters to follow we shall attempt to determine the extent to which 
these propositions are valid, and the conditions under which they are most 
likely to occur. Our discussion shall be based on a series of crossnational and 
intranational comparisons of the relationships between legislators and their 
constituents in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey in 1973 and 1974. In presenting 
this data we shall pay particular attention to the determinants of these re- 
lationships which are the same in all three political systems. We are as much 
concerned with "within systemsw variations that are replicated in three coun- 
tries of very different character as we are concerned with "between systems" 
variations that result from basic differences among the three countries. We 
hope to present our findings in a manner that draws attention to the factors 
which shape the legislative process and determine its significance for political 
development throughout the developing world, not merely in the three coun- 
tries which have served as the locations for this study. 
Before presenting our analysis of the data, it is desirable for the reader to 
understand the research design for this study and the peculiar conditions 
which existed in each of the three countries at the time our field work was 
carried out. It is to a brief, preliminary discussion of these topics that we now 
turn. 
Chapter 2 
RESEARCH DESIGN A N D  ORGANlZATION 
We seek to determine the role of legislative institutions in three developing 
societies in three principal activities: representation, resource allocation, and 
support generation. Our decision to employ a role perspective is based on 
our research interest in the linkages between the legislative institution and 
the society in which it exists. More specifically, we are interested in the nature 
of relationships between the legislature and the larger political system of 
which it is a part. A role perspective provides a useful vantage point because 
it forces us to examine the legislature in its interrelationships rather than in 
isolation. 
The role perspective adopted in this study also defines our basic research 
strategy. It requires us to study not only what the legislature or its individual 
members do in pursuit of their official duties, but'also the expectations and 
actions of other relevant actors involved in the legislative process. Such actors 
include constituents and local notables in the legislator's district, leaders of 
his political party, leaders of interest groups, and civil servants. Most previous 
studies of the legislature focused on the role of the legislature from a single 
perspective, that of legislators. This is clearly a limited vantage point, because 
it fails to account for the beliefs and acts of relevant "others" who are integral 
parts of the legislative process. 
The basic approach of our study is a crossnational comparison. We seek to 
identify similarities and differences in the ways in which the three legislatures 
and their members perform several key functions. How do the legislatures in 
each country handle the problem of representation? What roles do they play 
in allocating scarce governmental resources? How do they contribute to gen- 
erating public support for the legislative institution itself, and for other gov- 
ernment institutions? Our ultimate theoretical objective is, on the basis of 
our answers to these questions, to formulate crossnationally valid generaliza- 
tions regarding the role of legislatures. In the pages that follow we discuss 
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the methodological considerations that were particularly important to us 
when designing this study: ( I )  the selection of research countries, (2) the 
collaboratory organization of the study, (3) the samples, (4) the field work 
and interviews, and (5) the analysis. 
THE SELECTION OF RESEARCH 
COUNTRIES 
Both theoretical and practical considerations have dictated our choice of 
research countries. Of the theoretical considerations, our foremost concern 
was the number of the research sites. We needed a broad data base of cross- 
national sort in order to establish the kind of generalizations that we wanted. 
However, we could not include as many developing legislatures as might 
ideally be called for in a truly comparative design because of the limited 
financial resources and research staff at our disposal. Our methodological 
dilemma was how to derive crossnationally valid generalizations from the 
data collected in a small number of countries. As we proceeded, we became 
convinced that this problem could be resolved by means of a comparative 
design based on the differences between the countries. 
"The most different systems designs," Przeworski and Teune argue, "elimi- 
nate factors differentiating social systems by formulating statements that are 
valid regardless of the systems within which observations are made. As long 
as these statements continue to be true in all systems, no reference to systemic 
characteristics is made." They go on to state that the most different systems 
design, "which seeks maximal heterogeneity in the sample of systems, is 
based on a belief that in spite of intersystemic differentiation, the populations 
will differ with regard to only a limited number of variables or  relation- 
ships."' In our three-country comparative study we have adopted the most 
different systems design. 
For the reasons stated above, we tried to build into our research as much 
country difference as possible. Our three countries-Kenya, Korea, and 
Turkey-are located at different corners of the developing world: one in 
Africa, another in East Asia, and still another in the Middle East. Not only 
are these three countries very different from each other in their culture and 
history, they also differ in the political milieux in which their legislatures 
functioned at the time of our field investigations in 1973 and 1974. Indeed, 
significant differences existed in their legislative histories, their party systems, 
their electoral systems, and the constitutional powers of their legislatures. 
Of the three countries under study, Turkey has the longest history of a 
legislature in its modern form, with its origin going back to as early as 1876. 
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Until the Turkish National Assembly was disbanded in September, 1980, by 
the National Security Council, consisting of military leaders, Turkey experi- 
enced a form of parliamentary rule for seventy of the previous seventy-two 
years. In Korea and Kenya the establishment of a modern legislature came 
at a much later date. The Korean National Assembly was created in 1947 by 
the first popular election in the nation's history. The Assembly functioned 
until May 1980, when it disbanded itself in the aftermath of the assassination 
of President Park Chung Hee and the assumption of power by Chun Doo- 
hwan. The shortest legislative experience examined was Kenya's, where the 
first popularly elected legislature did not come into existence until 1960. 
Party systems also varied greatly among our three countries. While Kenya 
was typical of the weak single-party regimes found in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Turkey and Korea were good examples of multiparty and a modified two- 
party systems, respectively. 
With respect to electoral systems, there was also wide variation. In Kenya, 
a single-member district is used, but in both Turkey and Korea, members of 
parliament were elected from multimember districts. 
The Turkish system combined elements of proportional representation and 
multimember constituency. Boundaries of electoral districts coincided with 
those of provinces, the basic administrative unit, the appropriate number of 
legislative seats being allocated to each province on the basis of its popula- 
tion. In each province, political partiesoffered their lists of candidates during 
the election, and the number of seats won by each party was determined by 
the proportion of the popular votes each received. 
The multimember districts in Korea were very different. Here, the bounda- 
ries of electoral districts were usually not coterminous with the boundaries of 
administrative units, and often cut across several such units. Two legislative 
members were elected from each district on the basis of plurality vote. In 
addition to the MPs elected directly from two-member districts, one-third of 
the members of the Korean National Assembly were appointed by the presi- 
dent with the approval of the National Conference for Unification. In design- 
ing our study we made an effort to ensure as much variation as we could by 
deliberately selecting countries which were different from each other in the 
several key political dimensions that we have discussed above. 
Considerations of feasibility also influenced our choice of the three coun- 
tries. From the outset, the objectives of this study required that it be a col- 
laborative effort involving scholars from different countries. We envisioned a 
study involving a series of large-scale interview surveys of the kind often 
regarded in developing countries as politically sensitive. The collaboration 
and participation of local scholars was thus essential for the success of the 
study. These scholars bring to the project not only expert knowledge of their 
countries, but also experience and associations critical to carrying out surveys 
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of the mass public and various elite groups. It is also important when con- 
ducting research overseas to establish ties with major universities or research 
institutes. Because the authors of this volume had previously enjoyed particu- 
larly close ties to scholars at such institutions in Kenya, Korea. and Turkey, 
these countries became the primary sites for our study. Following a series of 
consultations between those of us at lowa and our colleagues in Kenya. 
Korea. and Turkey. the three countries were selected as final sites for this 
study, and an international research team was formed. 
ORGANIZATION A N D  COLLABORATION 
This study was conceived and executed as a collaborative effort between 
American and non-American scholars. Overseas collaborators were involved 
at every phase of our research. The formulation of key research problems, 
the development of survey instruments. and the implementation of field work 
have all been carried out on a collaborative basis. 
This collaboration began in June 1973, with an intensive three-week con- 
ference held at the Comparative Legislative Research Center at the University 
of lowa. The participants in the conference included the principal collabora- 
tors from Kenya. Korea, and Turkey, and the scholars associated with the 
Center. We discussed the general theoretical orientations for the proposed 
research, considered the political context specific to each of the research 
countries, explored the basic concepts underlying the study design, and com- 
piled an inventory of data to be collected. Survey instruments were also 
agreed upon. as were the general sampling procedures to be employed in 
administering the survey parts of the study. The decision to use a common 
set of survey instruments in the three countries raised the important question 
of equivalence. 
Much of the field work was to be conducted in the languages of the coun- 
tries under study, and involved the task of translating questionnaires that 
were initially drafted in English. In order to ensure a measure of equivalence 
and to avoid the slippages that often arise in the process of such translations, 
our overseas collaborators translated the instruments into their own lan- 
guages before they left the planning conference, and later made arrangements 
to check these translations through a back-translation procedure employing 
others with the relevant native language competence. It was also agreed that 
the survey instruments developed at this meeting would be pretested in each 
country and that the results of such pretests would be incorporated into the 
final form of our survey instruments. In this manner, the basic design and 
fieldwork procedures of the study were worked out through close collabora- 
tion among the members of our research team. 
2. Research Design [191 
THE SAMPLES 
Parliamentarians are only one group of important actors in the legislative 
system. Other important groups may include the residents of the constitu- 
encies the MPs represent, local notables who are the best informed and most 
politicized residents in these constituencies, and who often serve as inter- 
mediaries between the government and the general population, and higher 
civil servants who staff key positions in the central government bureaucracy. 
We chose to concentrate on MPs, local notables, and constituents in this 
study because they appeared to be the most significant actors shaping legis- 
lative politics in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey. We also interviewed civil ser- 
vants in Korea and Turkey, and will report on the findings of that research 
e l s e~he re .~  
CONSTITUENCY SAMPLES 
Although there were some minor variations in the sampling procedures 
used in the three countries, the overall strategies were ~ n i f o r m . ~  In each 
country we selected twelve to fourteen electoral districts on the basis of several 
important characteristics: the degree of urbanization, the level of industriali- 
zation, the degree of party competition, geographical proximity to each 
nation's capital, and other cultural or ethnic characteristics relevant to each 
country. We tried to include as many electoral districts as practicable, being 
mindful of the fact that the districts selected in each country should be rea- 
sonably representative of all constituencies. We then proceeded to interview 
between 150 and 300 adult citizens in each district. Where possible, respon- 
dents were randomly selected from the voter registration lists. This procedure 
produced a sufficient number of cases in each district to analyze the nature of 
linkages between the constituents and their MPs in matched pairs. We inter- 
viewed the following numbers of constituents: 4128 in 14 districts in Kenya, 
2276 in 12 districts in Korea, and 2007 in 14 districts in Turkey. 
LOCAL NOTABLE SAMPLES 
Interviews with local notables were conducted after the completion of the 
constituency surveys. Local notables were influential and prestigious persons 
in their communities. Their prominence was often derived from the formal 
positions they occupied or from informal status based on wealth. family 
connections, or age. Local notables were drawn for interview by two different 
methods. First, we asked the respondents in our constituency survey to 
nominate those individuals whom they considered to be most respected and 
influential in their districts. Each respondent was allowed to give up to five 
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such names. A "reputational" method, relying on the frequency of nomina- 
tions by constituents, thus served as one basis of selecting local notables. 
We also identified local notables by using a "positional" method. Under 
this method, notables were selected primarily because of the formal positions 
they occupied in the local community. These included local party officials, 
heads of local administration, chiefs of police, school principals, religious 
leaders, leaders of mass media, and leaders of important social organizations 
such as veterans' associations, agricultural cooperatives, etc. 
The "reputational" and "positional" methods together yielded some forty 
to fifty names in each district. We conducted a total of 453 interviews of 
notables in Kenya, 465 in Korea, and 285 in Turkey. 
PARLIAMENTARIAN SAMPLES 
A major focus of our study is the behavior patterns of the legislators them- 
selves, especially their interaction with constituents. local notables in their 
electoral districts, and senior civil servants in key government agencies. Inter- 
views with members of the parliaments as they existed in the three countries 
at the time of our field investigations were thus a crucial component of our 
study. 
The three legislatures were markedly different in size. The lower chamber 
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly had 450 deputies, making it the 
largest legislature in the three countries. The Kenyan Parliament was the 
smallest with 170 members, of which 158 were elected popularly and twelve 
appointed by the President. There were 219 members in the Korean National 
Assembly at the time of our fieldwork. Two-thirds were elected; the remain- 
der were appointed by the Executive. 
When selecting M Ps for interview, we began by first trying to interview all 
the MPs who represented districts where we had conducted surveys of con- 
stituents and local notables. We supplemented this sample with additional 
interviews of as many other MPs as possible. The interviews with the first 
group of M Ps were essential, because we wanted to match their attitudes and 
behavior with the expectations of their constituents. The M Ps included in 
our second group, those in whose districts we did not conduct mass surveys, 
were chosen on the basis of several considerations: their party affiliation, the 
method of their recruitment (elected or appointed), their leadership position 
(backbencher or frontbencher), the geographic location of their district, and 
finally, the level of urbanization of their district. We completed a total of 
twenty-eight MP interviews in Kenya, 119 in Korea, and 104 in Turkey." 
Although the total number of M P interviews varies a great deal from country 
to country, we were able to interview most of the MPs who represented 
districts where we surveyed constituents and local notables, and thus satisfied 
the essential requirement of our study design. 
2. Research Design 
FIELDWORK AND INTERVIEWS 
Fieldwork was conducted in the three countries in 1973 and 1974.5 It 
consisted of gathering three different types of data: interview data from our 
surveys, aggregate data, and documentary data relating to various aspects of 
legislative activity. The principal components of our field effort were the 
interview surveys, which required the most time and energy of our research 
teams. 
INTERVIEW PROCEDURES 
Our principal overseas collaborators served as the fieldwork directors or 
codirectors in their respective countries. They assembled their country teams, 
which included other local scholars who joined the project and groups of 
students who served as interviewers in the field. 
The student interviewers were recruited from both undergraduate and 
graduate departments of political science, sociology, and anthropology at 
local universities. These students were trained in a series of orientation ses- 
sions to be thoroughly familiar with the survey instruments as well as with 
their roles. In recruiting students, we gave preference to those who had some 
prior experience in interview surveys. Another consideration was students' 
familiarity with the region in which we planned to conduct the study. We 
therefore tried to make use of students from our sampled constituencies. All 
of this was designed to maximize the rate of successful interviews. 
In Kenya, we had to translate our instrument into ten different languages 
and obtain interviewers fluent in each. Language differences in Korea were 
not as great, although there were significant differences in regional dialects. 
Employment of students who spoke the dialect of the survey areas was essen- 
tial to securing reliable data in Korea. In Turkey all interviews were con- 
ducted in standard Turkish. 
Once selected and trained, the survey teams were led into electoral districts 
by the principal field director or other collaborating scholars. All interviews 
conducted by student assistants were supervised by the field director or col- 
laborating scholar. Field directors also had to explain the purpose of the 
survey to the community leaders or to the officials in charge of the area as 
well as obtain their cooperation. 
Interviewing elites required a different strategy. We decided against the use 
of student interviewers for our surveys of MPs and civil servants for several 
reasons. Elites are busy people and are not likely to grant personal interviews 
to undergraduates. The chance of obtaining an interview, as well as the relia- 
bility of the results are enhanced when interviewer and interviewee are of 
equal status. When interviewed by a university professor, elites are more 
likely to reflect seriously about the questions posed. Their answers can be 
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probed more deeply without offending their sense of self-importance. Student 
interviewers also tend to be too submissive when interviewing elites. All inter- 
views with members of parliament and civil servants were therefore con- 
ducted by either the principal fieldwork director or his collaborating scholars. 
The interview schedules or instruments used for different sample groups 
were essentially similar.6 We employed many identical items in all interviews 
in order to generate comparable data across nations and across sample 
groups. It took roughly one-and-one half hours to complete each interview. 
AGGREGATE AND DOCUMENTARY DATA 
We recognize the significance of the sociopolitical context in which both 
the legislature and its members function, and accordingly have made an 
effort to gather statistical data on both the social and political ecology of 
each constituency. We collected information on socioeconomic characteristics 
of electoral districts, including such factors as the degree of urbanization and 
industrialization, per capita income, and level of education. Also collected 
were data pertaining to political variables such as election turnout rates, 
partisan competition, and other relevant political tendencies. We tried to 
gather public policy data wherever possible, including per capita tax collec- 
tion, per capita government expenditure, and the like. This kind of aggregate 
data proved extremely useful in subsequent district-by-district data analysis. 
No less important than the socioeconomic characteristics of the districts 
are the structural characteristics of the legislature itself. We have gathered, 
from published documents as well as from official reports, information on 
procedural rules governing legislative behavior, committee organization and 
composition, leadership patterns, staff service and organization, the contents 
and origins of legislative bills, the verbatim record of debates, and biographi- 
cal backgrounds of all M Ps. This kind of data has helped us understand the 
institutional context in which MPs perform their duties. 
Before creating our data files in their final form, we also crosschecked 
selected characteristics of our samples, especially of the constituency samples, 
against the aggregate data that we had collected. In the Turkish constituency 
data, we oversampled the urban population as a result of the different sampl- 
ing procedure followed in Turkish cities. We weighted the Turkish sample to 
conform to the actual distribution of the population between urban and 
rural areas as reported in the 1970 census. 
Altogether our fieldwork in the three countries yielded twelve different 
data files: three constituency files, three local notable files, three MP files. 
two higher civil servant files, and one professional staff file. the data for 
which were collected only in Korea. These files provide our primary source 
of data analysis in this study. Given the theoretical concerns of this study, the 
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reader should also note that no attempt has been made to update the data 
base to account for the changes in regime that have occurred in Korea and 
Turkey after the surveys described above were completed. Historical events 
relevant to our interpretations of the survey data are, however, considered 
up through 1982. 
Chapter 3 
THE NATIONAL SETTINGS 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a brief back- 
ground of the political history of Kenya, Korea, and Turkey. Emphasis is 
on the circumstances of national independence, the geographic and socio- 
economic characteristics which have had a bearing on political life, the 
development of the political system, and the evolution and current status of 
the legislature in each country. The discussion which follows is but an over- 
view of these subjects, but one which the reader who is unfamiliar with one 
or more of the three countries will find useful as a prelude to an examination 
of how each nation's legislative process works. 
KENYA 
POLITICAL SETTING 
Kenya achieved its independence from Britain in 1963 after a period of 
seventy years of colonial rule. The transfer of power was hastened by the 
Mau Mau nationalist insurgency in the early 1950s, and was accomplished 
through a series of elections held between 1958 and 1963, through which the 
numbers of Africans elected to the Legislative Council was repeatedly in- 
creased until they constituted a preponderant majority of the legislature. 
This process, which Britain attempted to replicate in virtually all of her 
colonies during the 1950s and early 1960s, was one through which local 
political leaders were to be trained and gain experience in the workings and 
folkways of parliamentary government. What was at stake was not the mere 
transfer of the power to govern, but the transfer of British political institu- 
tions, which were regarded as both the cornerstones of democracy and the 
sine qua non of political development in those territories which had been 
under British rule. 
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Kenya was granted independence under a constitution which called for a 
set of institutions that closely resembled those at Westminster. These included 
a bicameral parliament, whose members were elected from single-member 
constituencies; a cabinet form of government composed of senior members 
of the majority party in the lower house of parliament and led by the party 
leader; a loyal opposition and shadow government; a politically neutral civil 
service which would loyally serve whatever party controlled the cabinet; and 
an independent judiciary. The constitution also provided for a regional or 
federal form of government through which power was to be shared between 
the national government and a series of regional entities having their own 
civil service and controlled by their own local assemblies. This departure 
from the Westminster model was written into the constitution at the insistence 
of the Kenya African Democratic Union, the opposition party at the time 
the constitution was drawn up, a party which drew most of its support from 
Kenya's smaller tribes on the Indian Ocean coast, in the Rift Valley, and in 
the far west. 
As is the case elsewhere in Africa, the transfer of British political institu- 
tions to Kenya has not been complete, primarily because the structure of 
politics in a plural and agrarian society such as Kenya is very different from 
that in a highly industrialized society such as the United Kingdom. The 
formation of political parties in Kenya, for example, did not take place as an 
expression of conflicting economic interests based on occupation or class, 
but as an expression of conflicting sectional interests based on tribe. The 
ethnic basis of Kenyan parties has also been particularly pronounced because 
of the way the British phased electoral politics into the country during the 
1950s. 
Following the declaration of the Mau Mau state of emergency in 1953, the 
Kenyan African Union (KAU) led by Jomo Kenyatta was banned and Afri- 
cans were not permitted to organize parties on a nationwide basis until 1960. 
Prominent African leaders with a nationwide following, such as Kenyatta, 
were also jailed. Thus in 1957 and 1958, when Africans were elected to the 
Legislative Council for the first time, parties were only permitted at the 
district or local level, to conform to the new legislative districts which were 
created for these elections. As these constituencies were coterminous with 
local administrative boundaries, which were in turn coterminous with ethnic 
boundaries, the local parties which formed were almost invariably homo- 
geneous in the ethnicity of their members. As such, the parties were rarely 
organizations which espoused a particular set of governmental programs, 
but were, rather, ethnic political machines created to secure the election of a 
particular individual as representative of the ethnic group. 
The result was that when nationwide party organizations were finally 
legalized in 1960 as a prelude to the elections for the first Africancontrolled 
parliament in 1961, the parties which formed were little more than coalitions 
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of the local machines that had emerged in the preceding three years. One 
coalition, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), was primarily an 
alliance of the political leaders of three of Kenya's four largest tribes-the 
Kikuyu, the Luo, and the Kamba, which respectively accounted for approxi- 
mately twenty-one, eighteen, and twelve percent of the population. The alli- 
ance also included the Embu and Meru which together comprise only six 
percent of the population, but whose peoples are linguistically and culturally 
related to the Kikuyu. KANU claimed to be the legitimate heir of KAU, and 
within a short time was able to draw on the political base of its predecessor. 
The other coalition was the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), 
which was basically a melange of all other ethnic groups in the country. 
One of these, the Luhya in the west, was numerically strong but historically 
divided among several subgroups. Compared to KANU, KADU's support 
was scattered. Its leadership was inexperienced in comparison to that of 
KANU, which had long been involved in nationalist politics. 
Ideologically, KANU and KADU were similar in that they both were 
nationalist organizations which demanded Kenya's independence, and both 
accepted the capitalist economy implanted in Kenya during the period of 
colonial rule. Both (especially KANU) wanted the return of European-owned 
land, but both were prepared to permit the continued residence in Kenya of 
the white settler community if they chose to stay. 
Indeed, the only major difference between the two parties was that KANU 
insisted on Kenyatta's early release from detention while KADU did not. 
KANU also preferred a unitaryform of government, while KADU favored a 
federal form designed to protect the interests of the smaller tribes. Were it 
not for the British, in fact, who believed that a multiparty system was essen- 
tial for the successful transfer of British political institutions, and for the 
settlers who feared that KANU and Kenyatta would nationalize their land, 
KADU would never have come into existence. 
Of the two coalitions, KANU was the first to organize, in May 1960. The 
organizational conference was attended by all of Kenya's ethnic bosses, and 
it was only after the leaders of smaller tribes failed to obtain positions of 
leadership in KANU that they formed a rival party. 
Given the distinctions between the two parties, or lack of them, it is not 
surprising that once Kenya became independent under a KANU government, 
members of KADU began to desert the opposition benches in parliament for 
the behches of the majority party. The prime task of an MP in the new 
system was not to follow his party's program (for in most cases there was no 
program), but rather to build a personal following and obtain resources for 
his district. Opposition MPs were at a decided disadvantage in pursuing 
these goals, and one by one they were lured across the parliamentary aisle and 
into the KANU fold by promises of rewards such as resources and appoint- 
ments to junior cabinet posts and boards of government regulatory agencies. 
3. National Settings 1271 
KADU's power in the House of Representatives was steadily eroded, as it was 
at the regional level where Kenyatta's government employed every method of 
delay at its disposal to forstall the implementation of the regional plan. 
By November 1964, KANU controlled sufficient majorities in both houses 
of the legislature to pass several constitutional amendments which provided 
for the dissolution of the regional form of government and the merging of 
the two chambers of parliament into a unicameral body. The latter was 
accomplished by providing each representative and senator with a seat in the 
new 170-seat National Assembly. The constitution was also amended to pro- 
vide for a republican form of government with a president (Kenyatta) and 
a vice-president, both of whom had to be elected members of the National 
Assembly. All of these changes went into effect on the first anniversary of 
Kenya's independence on 12 December 1964. Except for minor changes, the 
constitution has remained fundamentally the same ever since. 
Accompanying the constitutional changes of 1964 was the voluntary dis- 
solution of KADU "in the interests of national unity." In fact, the dissolution 
occurred because the party became an irrelevancy after a majority of KADU 
representatives joined the ranks of KAN U. With the exception of a three- 
year period between 1966 and 1969, Kenya was a de facto one-party state 
from 1964 until 1982 when opposition parties were formally banned by law. 
For the better part of Kenya's independence, therefore, Kenyan politics 
have been dominated by one party, KANU. It is more accurate, however, to 
describe Kenya in terms of its being a "no-party state," because the ruling 
party has remained a loose coalition of local political bosses and their per- 
sonal machines, and has virtually no organization worthy of the name. Party 
meetings, especially at the district branch level, are rarely, if ever held. The 
party's finances are nil. In parliament party discipline does not exist; the 
main line of cleavage is between the members of the front bench and the 
backbenchers who frequently vote against motions brought by the leaders of 
their party. 
As in several other African states, Kenya has regularly held parliamentary 
elections within a single party framework, but here again the framework is 
relatively loose. Whereas in Tanzania all candidates must be screened by 
the party's national executive and committed to the party's goals, and the 
number of candidates per constituency is limited to two, in Kenya there are 
no such constraints. Parliamentary elections, which were held in Kenya in 
1969, 1974, and 1979, resemble primary elections in the southern United 
States, where upwards of a half dozen or more candidates contest a single 
seat on a strictly individual basis. 
In such a system, the winners are usually those who command significant 
patronage and resources which they have committed to constituency service 
on a regular basis.' Thus, the main mechanism of control available to the 
party leader is his manipulation of the flow of patronage. Kenyatta was a 
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master at this, and was able to construct an elaborate network of political 
clients through which he maintained the loyalty of subordinates at the re- 
gional, national. and grass roots levels of the political system. It is mainly for 
this reason that he was content to let KANU fall into disuse rather than ex- 
pend his energy attempting to wield its diverse, and at times unruly, factions 
into a cohesive force.2 
Given the weakness of KANU and Kenyatta's penchant for controlling 
the political process through clientelist means, the day-today governance of 
Kenya has largely been carried out by the civil service, especially the Pro- 
vincial Administration. A creation of the British, the Provincial Administra- 
tion is the main mechanism of state control and state presence in the country- 
side. For 90 percent of the population, it is the only government. It consists 
of eight provincial commissioners (PCs) and their staffs, who are the supreme 
state authorities in their respective regions. The role of the PCS is probably 
most analogous to that of the French prefect. They are assisted by a group of 
district commissioners (DCs) who play a similar role in each of Kenya's 
forty-one administrative districts. The DCs and their immediate staffs are in 
turn assisted by a vast network of government chiefs who are their agents at 
the location and sublocation levels of administration. In contrast to the PCs, 
DCs, and their staffs, who are now men wi4.1 college degrees and who are 
posted to areas outside of those in which they were raised, the chiefs are 
usually men with no more than secondary education and are long-term resi- 
dents of the areas in which they work. 
Under Kenyatta the Kenyan system thus became progressively decentral- 
ized in respect to activities which were regarded as purely political, or repre- 
sentational, while they became increasingly centralized in respect to activities 
which were viewed as administrative in nature. Because the line between 
these two spheres was often blurred, it was inevitable that conflicts would 
occur between political leaders, especially M Ps, and senior members of the 
Provincial Administration. Since both regarded Kenyatta as "the father of 
the nation" and were dependent on his patronage. Kenyatta was able to 
resolve these conflicts, usually to the disadvantage of the M Ps. As Kenya's 
first president, Kenyatta was able to govern Kenya in a manner which led 
some observers to refer to him as "the last of the colonial governors." 
On 21 August 1978 Jomo Kenyatta died, and with his passing Kenya 
entered a new phase of its history. Kenyatta was succeeded by Kenya's Vice 
President Daniel arap Moi under a provision of the constitution. A non- 
Kikuyu, and a one-time leader of KADU, Moi had served as vice-president 
for twelve years. The new president attempted to rule Kenya in much the 
same manner as had Kenyatta, the major difference being an attempt at 
increasing administrative control by deemphasizing the role of the provincial 
commissioners and relying more on the senior administrator at the district 
level, the DC. 
3. National Settings 
Moi has also stated that the organization of KANU needs to be revitalized. 
Elections for party offices were held in 1979 for the first time in almost a 
decade, but whether the party will become a significant factor in Kenyan 
politics remains to be seen. 
Moi's ability to manipulate other political leaders through the control of 
patronage is also somewhat less than Kenyatta's. In addition to being a non- 
Kikuyu, the new president is not regarded with the sense of awe that was 
accorded his predecessor. He is also of the same generation as other leading 
political personalities. By necessity, his rule has been of a more collective 
nature than that of Kenyatta, one in which both KANU and the National 
Assembly play a greater role. 
GEOGRAPHY A N D  SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS 
Of the three countries considered in this study, Kenya is the most agrarian, 
and the least urbanized and economically developed. With a per capita in- 
come of $220 per year, her population is also the poorest. Kenya's land area 
is 219,788 square miles, about the same as that of France. In 1980, Kenya's 
population was 15.6 million. However, Kenya's annual rate of population 
growth, estimated to be between 3.9 and 4.1 percent, is the highest in the 
world, and poses serious problems for the years ahead. Half of the country's 
population is under fifteen years of age. Ninety percent reside in the country- 
side where they engage in small-holder agriculture, or agriculture-related 
activities such as petty trade. 
Kenya's topography and climate do not conform to the stereotypes of 
tropical Africa, but rather to those of southern California and neighboring 
areas of the southwestern United States. Except for a strip of land roughly 
ten miles wide along the Indian Ocean coast, Kenya has no jungle. Most of 
the country is semidesert which receives less than twenty inches of rainfall 
per year. A plain of scrub and dry grassland stretches westward for 300 miles 
from the coastal strip to Nairobi where it reaches an altitude of 5,000 feet. 
The area immediately west and north of Nairobi consists of highlands, 
some of which reach an altitude of more than 8,000 feet. This area is the 
home of the Kikuyu, Kenya's largest ethnic group. It runs approximately 
100 miles from north to south, and is thirty miles wide. The highlands are 
bounded on the north by Mount Kenya and the Abaderes Mountains (which 
are heavily forested and which were the sanctuaries for the Land Freedom 
Army during the Mau Mau Emergency), and on the south by the Masai 
plains. On the west lies the Rift Valley, a geological fault thirty miles wide 
which bisects Kenya from north to south and which stretches across eastern 
Africa from northern Ethiopia to Zambia. 
A second major highland area, and the primary site of European settle- 
ment, is located to the west of the Rift Valley. The extreme west of the 
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country consists of well-watered lowlands around Lake Victoria and Mount 
Elgon to the north. This area is one of the most densely populated in the 
country. The northern half of Kenya, like the eastern half, is semidesert. 
Kenya's population is 90 percent rural, but occupies only about 1 1 percent 
of the country's territory. Less than 2.8 percent of the country's land is arable 
or well watered. Another 7 to 8 percent is classified as "good" by the Kenyan 
government, meaning that it receives sufficient intermittent rainfall to sustain 
peasant agriculture. The net result is that there is only a combined average of 
0.5 hectares of arable and good land per person, an amount which is steadily 
declining as a result of rapid population growth. Moreover, because farmland 
is distributed unequally, more than a fifth of the rural households in Kenya 
are landless. 
Despite population pressure on the land, and despite the fact that Kenya 
possesses no mineral wealth to finance her development, the Kenyan economy 
is one of the healthiest in Africa, and achieved impressive rates of growth in 
some of its sectors after independence until 1978. Between 1964 and 1977 
Kenya's gross domestic product rose at an average annual rate of 6 percent 
at constant prices. As in most developing countries. the highest rates have 
been in the manufacturing sector where the average annual growth rate has 
been 9 percent. 
Of greater significance, however, is the commercial agricultural sector 
where the rate of growth during the nineteen seventies was 5.4 percent. 
Kenya is the leading African producer of both coffee and tea, which rank 
first and third as earners of foreign exchange. Unlike most African countries, 
Kenya is also virtually self-sufficient in food, and in years of high rainfall is 
an exporter of food to neighboring countries. In years of severe drought, 
however, such as 1980, Kenya must import cereals to meet the needs of her 
people. 
Only in the subsistence sector. where the average annual rate of growth 
between 1964 and 1976 was 3.14 percent, has Kenya's economic growth not 
kept pace with her increase in population. The marginal rates of growth in 
this sector, which are declining, are partly a function of the increasing popu- 
lation pressure on the land. More than a quarter of the population is still 
engaged in the subsistence sector, which is now the weak link in the Kenyan 
economy. The subsistence sector generates most of Kenya's unemployed, of 
whom there are 350,000 new members each year. 
The future of Kenya's economy thus lies in the continued expansion of 
manufacturing and commercial agriculture as well as in the country's service 
sector with its important tourist industry. Tourism is presently Kenya's second 
greatest earner of foreign exchange, a situation which permited Keyna to 
maintain a relatively even balance of payments until 1979 despite habitual 
deficits in her balance of trade. The rate of expansion in tourism, however, 
has declined since the late 1970s as the cost of air travel to Kenya has risen 
sharply, a result of the increases in world fuel prices. 
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Kenya's opportunities for rapidly expanding her manufacturing sector are 
also limited both by her small internal market and by unstable and deterior- 
ating economic conditions in neighboring countries. Finally, the high cost of 
petroleum, which now accounts for 30 percent of Kenya's imports, poses 
serious problems for Kenyan balance of payments. The fall in the world 
prices of coffee and tea which commenced in 1979 and accelerated in 1980 
has compounded this problem. Although generally regarded as a success 
compared to other African countries, Kenya's fragile economy remains vul- 
nerable to weather and other external factors it cannot control. 
THE LEGISLATURE TODAY 
The present form of the Kenyan National Assembly dates from the con- 
stitution of 1964 which merged the two houses of the legislature established 
before independence. The Assembly which resulted consists of 170 members, 
of whom 158 are elected from single-member constituencies, and twelve are 
nominated by the president. Of the twelve, one has always been Kenya's 
attorney general. 
The rules and procedures of the National Assembly are virtually identical 
to those of the British Parliament, and are set forth in the Assembly's Stand- 
ing Orders. As in Britain, the proceedings are presided over by the speaker, 
assisted by several parliamentary clerks (all of whom continue to wear the 
robes of office, though the use of wigs has largely ceased). Members of the 
government occupy the front bench to one side of the speaker. Because 
there is no opposition party, backbenchers scatter themselves throughout the 
remaining benches in the chamber. As in Britain, each session is officially 
opened by the recitation of prayers and the placement of the ceremonial mace 
on a bracket at the side of the table with the dispatch boxes. Until 1974 the 
language of debate was English, which remains Kenya's official language and 
continues to be used in the texts of all parliamentary bills. Between 1974 and 
1978 parliamentary debates were conducted exclusively in Swahili. Kenya's 
national language. Debate today is in both English and Swahili, and nowhere 
is the mix of colonial practice and African response better symbolized than 
in the Assembly when cries of "Bwana Spekaw fill the air. 
The work of the National Assembly is almost totally controlled by the 
government through the vice-president who is the official leader of govern- 
ment business. As the leader of government business, the vice-president is 
also the chairman of the Sessional Committee which sets the agenda of the 
House. Backbenchers, however, participate vigorously in Assembly debates, 
and as noted in the previous section, often vote against government-sponsored 
bills. Backbenchers also make full use of the question period which is held 
once a week when the Assembly is in session, and through which they closely 
cross-examine government ministers and assistant ministers on the operation 
of their ministries. 
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Bills introduced to the National Assembly must pass through three read- 
ings and be signed by the president before they become law. While the presi- 
dent does not have the formal power to veto a bill, his failure to sign is 
tantamount to a veto. Because of this provision, and because the government 
controls the Assembly's agenda, only one private members bill pwsed by 
backbenchers has been signed into law since 1969. Several private members 
bills have been beaten back by the government, occasionally through a curi- 
ous process of legislative cooptation whereby the government introduces a 
bill that is similar to a popular measure which has been previously introduced 
by a backbencher, and then passes the new bill instead of the original. A case 
in point is the Parlimentary Elections Act of 1974 which sought, among 
other things. to limit the possibilities of election fraud, and which had been 
passed by the House, but not signed by President Kenyatta. 
It is not surprising that backbenchers often feel frustrated by this situation. 
In fact, in recent years backbenchers have periodically attempted to do an 
"end-run" around the Government by passing resolutions to set up indepen- 
dent parlimentary commissions of inquiry to probe into issues with which 
they have been particularly concerned. Most notable among these was the 
formation in 1975 of a commission to investigate the assassination of J. M. 
Kariuki, a popular backbencher and leading government critic. Commissions 
have also been set up to investigate the spread of corruption within the civil 
service and the explosive issue of land distribution. The usual government 
response to such commissions has been to attempt to frustrate the work of 
such groups. Several backbenchers who were particularly critical of the gov- 
ernment and of the prime movers behind the commissions were detained, or 
became targets for legal harassment. However, following the ascension to 
power of Daniel arap Moi in 1978, the level of antagonism between back- 
bencher~ and the government declined. Calls for commissions of inquiry into 
governmental operations have largely ceased, and there are no longer any 
M Ps in detention. Several former legislators, however, were detained in 1982. 
The Kenyan National Assembly is normally in session for four to six 
months per year. As in Britain, parliamentary elections must be held every 
five years. The Assembly is called into session by the president, and he may 
dissolve it and call for new elections at any time. Because Kenya is a one- 
party state, elections have heretofore been held at the maximum interval of 
five years. In addition to the Sessional Committee mentioned above, there 
are six committees which deal with various aspects of parliamentary business 
from reviewing the annual budget of the government to running the cafeteria 
in the MPs' lounge. Of these, only the Budget Committee is important. 
In view of the government's control of the legislative process, it is clear 
that the National Assembly is not an important arena for public policy, but 
rather, an arena for the discussion and ratification of policies made elsewhere. 
Under Kenyatta policymaking was largely left to individual ministers who 
were heavily dependent on senior civil servants in their ministries, including 
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some expatriate advisors. The cabinet rarely met, as Kenyatta sought to 
orchestrate, on an individual and highly personal basis, the relationships 
between its members. In this context, the role of the M P increasingly became 
one of emphasizing constituency service in an effort to build one's local politi- 
cal base, and increase the value of one's support to the president at the 
center. Kenyatta encouraged this, and on several occasions made extensive 
public statements to the effect that this was what M Ps should do. 
In decentralizing the political process and letting the party fall into disuse, 
Kenyatta limited the power of the Assembly but at the same time allowed it 
to function as a free and well-publicized forum for debate. To date, President 
Moi has done the same, although the cabinet now plays a greater role as a 
collective decisionmaking body. The Kenyan National Assembly is thus still 
in the process of becoming a fully developed institution. After fifteen years it 
has established itself as a highly visible, and perhaps permanent, feature of 
Kenyan political life. But, the Assembly's ultimate role, and that of its mem- 
bers, have yet to be determined. 
KOREA 
POLITICAL SETTING 
The unconditional surrender of Japan to the Allied powers in 1945 marked 
the end of her thirty-five-year-long colonial rule over Korea. Japanese colonial 
rule in Korea was ruthless and despotic, and provided very little opportunity 
for Korean participation in any significant aspect of politics. It was the harsh 
rule of triumphant conquerors over defeated subjects and in many respects 
was even harsher than the colonial rules of the Western powers in Africa and 
A ~ i a . ~  
Although there were numerous resistance movements both inside and out- 
side the country, a majority of the Korean people did not have any real oppor- 
tunity to participate in politics or to acquire the experience of self-governance. 
By the time Korea was liberated from Japan, there existed neither a coher- 
ent leadership group emerging from the independence movement nor active 
citizens who could help create a democratic form of government. 
Compounding this problem was the development of conflict between the 
two victorious Allied powers-the United States and the Soviet Union- 
which ultimately resulted in the division of Korea. A general election was 
held in 1948 in the Southern half of Korea, under the supervision of the 
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to establish 
the first National Assembly. The National Assembly drafted and approved 
the nation's constitution, and South Korea soon joined the ranks of inde- 
pendent states, with Syngman Rhee as her first president. 
The mvernment created under the new constitution was a renuhlic that 
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contained a curious mixture of both the British parliamentary system and 
the American presidential ~ys tem.~  The constitution's full guarantee of basic 
individual rights and liberties has been interpreted by many to be an explicit 
attempt on the part of political leaders to establish a liberal democracy. 
Despite the earnest aspirations and hopes of those who helped draft the 
constitution, the new government quickly fell prey to Rhee's autocratic rule. 
Political opposition was ruthlessly suppressed, destroying any chance which 
might have existed for the development of a viable two-party or multiparty 
system. The legislature was overshadowed by the executive and became in- 
creasingly a rubber stamp organization. 
The Student Uprising of 1960 brought down Rhee's regime and ushered in 
a new political era. The Democratic Party, an ineffective opposition force 
under the Rhee's autocratic rule, emerged victorious in a national election in 
1960 and formed a new government. The Democratic Party's rule was riddled 
with factionalism and impotent, and was overthrown by a junta in June 1961. 
The rule of the Democratic Party was brief, and its ineffectiveness caused 
social and political disorder, but it was the most liberal and democratic period 
in the nation's postwar history. During the Democrats' rule, the legislature 
was the focal point of politics, and exercised a great deal of power as the 
constitution prescribed. Key policies were decided in the National Assembly 
rather than in the executive branch.> For the first time in the nation's history 
there was a real prospect of establishing a parliamentary democracy. How- 
ever, the successful military coup of 1961 put an abrupt end to this brief 
liberal period in Korea. 
The military junta ruled Korea for tyo-and-one half years, after which 
junta leaders decided to perpetuate their control by becoming politicians 
themselves. Leaders of the junta discarded their military uniforms and com- 
peted in the 1963 national election as members of the newly created Demo- 
cratic Republican Party (DRP). To no one's surprise, the party won a major- 
ity of the vote and formed a new government. This regime, while not directly 
controlled by the junta, was still a government by the soldiers in mufti. The 
executive gained enormous power under the Democratic Republicans, and 
the legislature and the judiciary were reduced to subservient roles. 
The political performance of the DRP regime is difficult to assess. The 
regime did not make any pretension that its primary goal was to establish a 
western style liberal democracy. It argued that because of sociopolitical con- 
ditions peculiar to Korea, Korean democracy must necessarily take a differ- 
ent, non-Western form. Korean democracy, as it was articulated in the 1972 
Revitalizing Reforms, was a democratic form of government adapted to 
the particular conditions and needs in Korea. These conditions and needs 
included the pressing problem of national security in the face of aggression 
from North Korea, rapid economic development by means of centrally di- 
rected plans, and the maintenance of political stability through consensus 
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building under government guidance. One important characteristic of the 
DRP regime was its exceedingly high concentration of political power in the 
executive and its administrative apparatus which was justified in terms of 
the enormity of the problems confronting the country. 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS 
Korea is a relatively small but densely populated country. In a territory no 
larger than that of Great Britain, Korea had an estimated population of 5 1 
million people in 1975. Of these, roughly 35 million live in South Korea. 
The Korean society has a long history, and a highly homogeneous culture. 
Unlike developing societies in south and southeast Asia and Africa, there are 
no significant cultural or ethnic cleavages in Korea. Korea has no important 
ethnic minorities nor are any major languages spoken other than Korean. 
Koreans are a highly literate people; their current literacy rate reaches well 
over 90 percent. Because free primary school education has been provided in 
recent years, there is virtually no illiteracy among the younger generations. 
Further, enrollment in secondary and postsecondary schools has rapidly ex- 
panded in the last three decades as Korean society has become more affluent. 
College degrees are intensely sought after, because they provide the most 
effective avenues for social mobility. The premium value placed on college 
education has resulted in an intense admissions process to select universities 
known as the "examination hell." The demand for college education has led 
to a rapid increase in the number of colleges and their enrollments. In 1975 
there were some 230,000 students enrolled in 1 16 colleges and universities in 
Korea. 
South Korea is rapidly becoming an urban society. More than half of 
South Korea's population lives in urban areas. In the two decades following 
the end of World War 11, urban growth proceeded at an explosive rate- 
averaging an annual increase of 5.2 percent between 1945 and 1965. This 
figure is considerably higher than the national population growth rate for the 
same period, and indicates that emigration to the cities accounted for a signi- 
ficant part of the increase. 
One important aspect of the urban growth relates to the disparate growth 
rates for cities of different sizes. During the postwar period, urban growth 
has been concentrated in a few primary cities such as Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, 
and lnchon. Seoul, the capital city, has shown one of the highest growth 
rates. Between 1955 and 1960 Seoul grew at a rate of almost 7 percent per 
year. Most smaller cities have not grown so fast, and some have even lost 
residents through migrations to larger cities. 
Expansion in communications and transportation facilities has reinforced 
the homogeneity of Korean culture. South Korea has a relatively compact 
territory. As a result of the construction of several arterial expressways during 
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the last decade, there is no longer any journey within Korea which cannot be 
made in a single day. 
Means of social communications have expanded rapidly. Telephones are 
widely used, even in many villages in the countryside. Radios are common 
household items everywhere. Television sets have become increasingly popu- 
lar, even in remote hamlets. As recently as 1965 there was approximately I 
television set per 1,000 persons; by 1974 there were 49 sets per 1,000. 
The impetus for these demographic and social changes was the impressive 
economic progress that occurred in Korea in the 1960s and 1970s. Until two 
decades ago, the Korean economy was barely recovering from the war of 
1950-1953. Burdened with high defense expenditures and with a predomi- 
nantly agricultural economy, the gqvernment found it difficult to achieve 
any substantial economic progress. The situation changed, however, in the 
1960s, when the new military regime came to power. With a singleminded I 
determination and careful management, the new government successfully 
implemented a series of industrialization plans which resulted in remarkable 
growth in the iron and steel, cement, mining, heavy machinery, shipbuilding, 
and electronics industries. Equally impressive were the regime's achievements 
in building economic infrastructure; extensive highway systems, multipur- 
pose dams, river basin development projects, and port facilities. The success 
of these programs was facilitated by a diligent citizenry and a favorable inter- 
najional market. 
Economic growth in Korea began to accelerate in the early 196ps, reached 
an unusually high annual rate of 17 percent in 1973, and averaged above 10 
percent from 1965 through 1975.jDuring this time, the Korean economy 
underwent a transformation from a predominantly agricultural economy to 
a more advanced industrial economy. Per capita income increased from 87 
dollars in 1962 to 53 1 dollars in 1975, the year after the data for this study 
were collected. The growth rates in industrial sectors and export industries 
were particularly large. Total exports in 1960 amounted to 32 million dollars; 
in 1973 they reached a level of 3.2 billion dollars. a one hundred-fold increase 
over their 1960 level. 
The government's role in these achievements has been crucial. It has 
selected strategic sectors of the economy for concentrated capital investment, 
employed tax and credit policies favorable to capital formation, implemented 
major public works to strengthen the infrastructure, and taken active part 
both in promoting trade and attracting foreign capital. These efforts have 
been and continue to be centrally managed by the Korean government 
through a series of comprehensive economic plans, and during the Park 
regime were proudly referred to as "the managed miracle." 
Koreans have undoubtedly achieved a measure of economic prosperity. 
But a crucial question remains for the future: how equitably should the fruits 
of economic progress be distributed among the population? 
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PARTIES, ELECTIONS, AND THE LEGISLATURE 
A multiparty system has been in operation in South Korea since 1948. 
In the first few years following the independence a multitude of political 
parties, often small and poorly organized, appeared on the Korean political 
landscape. According to one estimate, there were 344 such  organization^.^ 
Gradually, these groups disappeared or were absorbed into larger and more 
organized political parties. 
With the establishment of the Rhee regime in 1948, party politics evolved 
slowly into two basically cohesive groups, one in support of President Rhee's 
leadership, and the other opposed. This was the beginning of the loose 
two-party system which continues to exist in South Korea, and which en- 
compasses independent and minor opposition in addition to the two main 
organizations. 
In one sense the Korean party system may be characterized, to use Scala- 
pino's term, as the one-and-one-half party system.'Since 1948 no opposition 
party has attained power through elections. Although there have been three 
changes in government, all have been the result of military coups. In more 
than a dozen elections held since 1948, the government party has not failed 
to gain a majority of seats in the National Assembly. The dominance of the 
government party and the lack of opportunity for opposition parties to cap- 
ture power are the characteristics which define the one-and-one-half party 
system. 
The party situation in the National Assembly at the time of our field study 
was no exception to this pattern. Members of the government parties-the 
Democratic Republican Party and the Society for Revitalizing Reforms (a 
quasi party consisting of the Assemblymen appointed by the president)- 
together commanded a two-thirds majority in the legislature. The New 
Democratic Party, the main opposition party, controlled fifty-four seats. The 
remaining nineteen seats were divided among a minor opposition party and 
independents. 
The Society for the Revitalizing Reforms, one of the twin pillars of govern- 
ment strength, requires further comment. The party came into existence 
following a constitutional revision approved in a 1972 national referendum. 
The revised constitution, known as the Yushin (Revitalizing Reforms) Con- 
stitution, effected some drastic changes in the procedures for selecting mem- 
bers to the National Assembly. Under the revised constitution, two-thirds of 
the members of the legislature (146) were popularly elected from district 
constituencies. The remaining seventy-three members were appointed by the 
president, with only a nominal endorsement by the National Conference 
for Unification, a two thousand-member body under direct control of the 
president. 
The seventy-three appointed members banded together as a parliamentary 
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group, the Society for Revitalizing Reforms, and functioned for all practical 
purposes as an alter ego of the governing Democratic Republican Party. 
Thus, the government was assured a majority in the legislature because it 
had one-third of the Assembly seats before elections even began. 
Under the Yushin Constitution the National Assembly became an even 
weaker body than it once had been. The formal powers of the legislative 
branch enumerated in chapter 6 of the constitution included the rights of 
legislation, interpellation, concurrence to the conclusion of treaties and the 
declaration of war, and approval of government budgets. The offices in the 
legislature were organized to include a speaker, two vice-speakers (one of 
which was given by convention to the opposition party member), and the 
chairmen of thirteen standing committees and special committees. The com- 
mittee chairmanships have traditionally been occupied by the leading mem- 
bers of the government parties. The routine legislative work is performed by 
a relatively large staff in the secretariat. 
This legislative bureaucracy was headed by the secretary-general, an office 
of cabinet level rank with a staff of more than 1,000 persons. At the head of 
this staff were the senior counsellors, numbering between 30 and 40. The 
senior counsellors were the core of the professional staff, each being an expert 
in a legislative subfield. Senior counsellors were normally assigned to the 
standing committees, but occasionally to the special committees as well. They 
helped legislators to draft bills and provided expert counsel on various legis- 
lative matters. 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
During the DRP regime of President Park Chung Hee, the concurrent 
power of the president and government bureaucracy emasculated the other 
two branches of Korean government, the legislature and the judiciary. 
Although the National Assembly was empowered in the matters of legisla- 
tion, most bills originated in the executive branch, and their passage was 
almost always assured in advance due to the government's control of two- 
thirds of the legislative seats8 In this respect, the National Assembly could 
not be considered as exercising a full power in lawmaking. 
Yet the National Assembly was regarded as an important representative 
institution by the public. The public was relatively well informed about the 
legislature, and accorded it a high level of s u p p ~ r t . ~  The National Assembly 
was considered to be established and certainly an institution worth maintain- 
ing. This is probably one of the main reasons that regimes of the past did not 
dissolve the legislature and why the National Assembly was reconstituted 
after the coup of 1980. 
lndividual members of the Assembly, especially those elected popularly 
from district constituencies, could not ignore their representative duties. 
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District constituents expected their assemblymen to perform tasks which 
ranged from securing jobs to bringing public works projects to their home 
districts. Those who slighted their representative duties, and thus failed to 
meet constituents' expectations, were not likely to be returned in the next 
election. The incentive for representative behavior was derived, therefore, 
from the public's awareness of, as well as its expectations of, the legislature. 
These conditions existed and persist in Korea, engendered in part by the 
spread of a liberal political ideology during the last three decades, and in 
part by the increasing levels of education.I0 
Although the National Assembly did not usually take initiatives in law- 
making during the regime of President Park, it did attach a seal of legitimacy 
to the policies enacted by the executive. Moreover, the very existence of a 
legislative body and periodic elections provided a sense of participation for 
the public. This was very significant in a political setting like South Korea's, 
where other channels of citizen participation were not widely available. The 
legitimizing function of the National Assembly was critically important to 
the Park regime, and is a major reason why the regime and its successor 
under President Dwon have tolerated the legislative body. 
During the Park regime, the National Assembly also served as an impor- 
tant public forum. Since government exercised tight control over the news 
media, the legislature served as the only alternative arena for public debates 
on important issues of the day. To be sure, there were many constraints, both 
, 
legal and de facto, on the range of issues that could legitimately be discussed 
in the National Assembly. The Assembly was prohibited by law, for instance, 
from raising any issue so fundamental that it touched on the nature of the 
regime itself. Insofar as the issues did not challenge the legitimacy of the 
governmental structure established in accordance with the Revitalizing Re- 
forms, the National Assembly considered any issue for debate. 
During the Park era there were reactions, especially by concerned intel- 
lectuals and opposition assemblymen, to the continuing decline in the fortune 
of the legislative body. In journalistic parlance the tendency was given the 
name, "Kukhoe sinychwa," meaning that the legislative branch had become 
a maidservant of the executive. 
Although executive dominance of the National Assembly had been dis- 
cussed in the past and a few proposals put forth, no concrete moves were 
made to reinvigorate the legislative institution.'' Indeed, after the adoption 
of the 1972 Yushin system it became even more difficult than it had been in 
the past to raise such an issue. After 1972 any proposal to change the consti- 
tutional status of the legislative branch ran the risk of being perceived as a 
violation of the political taboo against challenging the basic structure of the 
Yushin government. Because a change in the constitutional status of the 
legislature was imperative to any attempt to strengthen the body, its power 
could not be increased as long as the Yushin constitution remained intact. 
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The Yushin system, based on a strong executive, was justified on two 
grounds. The first was national security. Having suffered through a fratricidal 
war from 1950 to 1953 and still fearful of North Korean aggression, the 
people in South Korea were acutely concerned with national security. Their 
sense of vulnerability was made more acute by the United States' plan to 
phase out American troops stationed in Korea. 
The Yushin system was also justified by the need for rapid economic 
development. The Park regime sought to pull the country out of a stagnant 
economy by achieving rapid industrialization through centralized economic 
planning. Three five-year economic plans were drafted and implemented by 
the Democratic Republican regime, each concentrating on the growth of 
strategic industrial sectors. Planning and implementation of such ambitious 
economic plans required a strong and efficient government bureaucracy, and 
thereby provided another persuasive argument for a strong executive. 
Now that South Korea has achieved a measure of economic prosperity, 
the need for rapid economic development will become an increasingly less 
persuasive argument for an executivecentered system. However, the security 
argument may continue to be an important factor in the years to come. 
The collapse of the DRP regime in October 1979, following the assassina- 
tion of President Park Chung Hee, brought an end to the Yushin system. In 
the months following the assassination, South Korea witnessed a brief and 
frantic period of political realignments, reflecting an upsurge in popular 
demand for a new democratic order. However, this unrest was brought to an 
end when military officers who had remained loyal to President Park quickly 
and forcefully reasserted their claim to power. A national referendum in 
October 1980 resulted in Korea's current constitution which specified the 
present governmental structure, including the National Assembly. 
TURKEY 
POLITICAL SETTING 
In the hopes of regaining lost status in European politics and lost terri- 
tories, the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on the side of the 
Central Powers and was defeated in 1918. The Allied occupation of Turkey 
during the First World War, and a Greek effort to invade western Turkey, 
led to the development of Turkish political-military resistance organizations 
which were often led by nationalist officers, generally known as the Defense 
of Rights Associations. The associations were united in the fall of 1919 
by Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk. The resulting Executive Committee ruled the 
Turkish Independence Movement until the Grand National Assembly opened 
in 1920. The Sultan's government, a captive of the Allied occupation, lost its 
power and collapsed in 1922. 
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The new National Assembly included remnants of the last Ottoman Cham- 
ber of Deputies along with three new members from each province. It served 
as a constituent assembly and, until the Republic was established in October 
1923, also as the governing body. 
The politics of the country for the next 23 years was dominated by the 
Republican People's Party (RPP), the political successor of the Defense of 
Rights Associations. Two experiments with other new parties in 1924 and 
1930 were quickly aborted because they became vehicles for proponents of 
the former regime. 
The single-party period was one of extensive social reform in Turkey. At 
the end of RPP rule, Turkey emerged as one of the most secular countries 
in the world and, with the exception of Israel, the most socially and eco- 
nomically advanced country in the Middle East. 
Turkey avoided involvement in the Second World War through an intricate 
system of alliances. The war, nevertheless, did affect Turkish domestic and 
political life. The Second World War saw full scale mobilization in Turkey, 
more authoritarian rule, and shortages of many industrial goods, conditions 
that led to dissatisfaction with the RPP. Growing conflicts with the Soviet 
Union led Turkey to search for closer ties with Western democracies to insure 
her security, and it was believed that such ties would be improved by political 
liberalization. Other developments, not related to the war, facilitated Turkey's 
transition to competitive politics. One was the death in 1938 of Ataturk, the 
undisputed and charismatic leader of the Republic. Another was the view 
held by prominent RPP leaders that the single-party period was a stage in 
the process of becoming a western-style democracy. The fact that the pro- 
ponents of political liberalization and competition were prominent members 
of the RPP contributed to its success. 
In the first elections contested by several parties, held in 1946, the RPP 
was seriously challenged by the new Democratic Party; in the 1950 elections 
the Democratic Party won a sweeping majority. During the next ten years, 
despite its electoral successes, the Democratic Party became more authori- 
tarian, introduced deep cleavages into the society. and brought the national 
economy to a state of bankruptcy. Turkish lack of experience with competi- 
tive politics led to continuing tensions between the government and opposi- 
tion. The Democratic Party had come to power by catering to those voters, 
particularly in rural areas and small towns, who were critical of the modern- 
izing trends introduced by the RPP. As the Democratic Party sought to 
maintain its power, it began to violate the rules of the game and increasingly 
antagonized the modern elites in Turkish society. There were student demon- 
strations, the military was brought in to establish law and order, and in May 
1960 the Democratic Party government was overthrown by a committee of 
military officers calling itself the National Unity C~mmittee. '~ 
A constituent assembly convened by the National Unity Committee pre- 
pared a new constitution which was adopted by the voters in the fall of 1961. 
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The elections that followed produced the first coalition government (led by 
the RPP) in Turkish history. The 1965 and 1969 elections. however, were 
won by the Justice Party, one of the parties set up to court the votes of the 
nowdefunct Democratic Party. 
As student radicalism became increasingly violent during the 1960s, the 
Justice Party governments were unable to control it. In March 1971 the 
Turkish chief of staff and the commanders of the armed forces issued a joint 
communique asking the prime minister to resign for having failed to bring 
law and order to the country. But instead of assuming direct control, the 
military leaders pressed for and secured the formation of civilian cabinets 
which were accorded reluctant votes of confidence in the National Assembly. 
The refusal of the Assembly to appoint the military chief of staff as president 
upon the expiration of the term of the former president marked the turn of 
the tide in favor of civilian dominance of politics. Elections, due in October 
1973, were held on time. 
Because no one party was able to achieve a controlling majority in the 
National Assembly after the 1973 and 1977 elections, the country was ruled 
by coalition governments during this period. The coalitions were themselves 
not very stable. With the exception of one coalition established by the RPP 
with a number of independents, parties of the radical right, one religious and 
one with racist tendencies, were important partners in these governments. 
Their influence was greater than their numbers might suggest, creating at 
times high levels of tension between the government and the secular-oriented, 
social democratic opposition of the time. Reliance on fringe parties to pro- 
duce majorities created lasting instabilities in the political system. The period 
of coalitions, particularly after 1974, was also marked by increasing political 
violence of both mass and individual terroristic variety by extremist groups 
on both left and right. 
On September 12, 1980, the National Security Council, consisting of the 
highest ranking officers of the Turkish armed forces, disbanded the Grand 
National Assembly. The military leadership promised to reinstitute competi- 
tive civilian politics, control terrorism, restore confidence in public institu- 
tions, and prepare a new constitution which would correct the inadequacies 
of the constitution of 1961. A new constitution was drafted with the assis- 
tance of a constituent assembly and ratified in a national referendum in the 
fall of 1982. 
GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS 
At the time of the establishment of the Republic, Turkey was a rural 
society with an agricultural economy. Two trends have been visible since the 
beginning of the Republic, becoming stronger after the Second World War 
and particularly during the 1960s. First, Turkey is being urbanized at an  
accelerated rate. The exodus from the villages has had both urban-pull and 
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rural-push dimensions, but in either case, urbanization has taken place at a 
more rapid pace than the economic development in urban areas would war- 
rant. This has resulted in urban unemployment, growth of shanty towns 
around the cities, insufficient municipal services, and a host of related 
problems. The migrations from the countryside have also introduced neo- 
traditional elements into urban politics that have to be taken increasingly into 
account. 
Second, Turkey is becoming rapidly industrialized. Turkish industry ini- 
tially developed as a means of import substitution, but it is now becoming 
increasingly oriented toward an international market and is growing in 
sophistication. This has also brought new forces into politics, such as labor 
unions and business associations. 
At the time of the founding of the Republic, 90 percent of the citizens were 
estimated to have been illiterate. This figure had gradually declined to about 
45 percent by 1970, and is expected to decline more rapidly in the future. 
Literacy is highest among urban males and lowest among rural females. As 
the importance of nonverbal communication has increased in public life, so 
have the pressures to learn to read and write. 
Since the Islamic-Turkish part of the Ottoman Empire comprised the terri- 
tory on which the Republic was established, Turkey is a relatively homo- 
geneous society. There are some Kurdish-speaking people in the eastern 
provinces and a few Arabic-speaking persons in the southern provinces. It is 
also in these regions that traces of an earlier tribal organization may be 
found and that politics may sometimes be dominated by traditional families. 
Nationality, as it is understood by the Republic, is political and acquired by 
being a Turkish citizen. Basing politics on ethnic differences is not viewed 
with favor by the political culture or by the law. Thus, ethnic divisions 
may be appropriately treated as cultural phenomena with minor political 
consequences. 
The geographic proximity of the country to the Soviet Union has in the 
past caused apprehension, not only toward the Soviet Union and her allies, 
but also toward various types of socialist thinking. This inclination has 
broken down, particularly since the 1960 Revolution. While the propagation 
of communist ideologies and the establishment of communist parties are still 
illegal, organizations and publications preaching the teachings of Marx, 
Lenin, Mao, and others are widespread and enjoy an uneasy existence. 
Democratic Socialism, on the other hand, has gained wide appeal, and the 
RPP has itself adopted a social democratic platform. 
In recent years, many Turkish workers have gone to Germany. This ex- 
portation of labor has helped reduce domestic unemployment while bolster- 
ing the hard currency reserves of the country. The social and political con- 
sequences of having workers abroad have not yet become clear, although it 
is thought that this might hasten modernization in the villages as workers 
return home. 
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POLITICAL PARTIES 
Although political parties existed during the later stages of the Ottoman 
Empire (a constitutional monarchy had evolved in 1908, following a brief 
two-year experiment in 1876), the parties of the Republic have not been their 
descendants. As was previously explained, the first political party to have 
been established, just before the Republic was proclaimed, was the People's 
Party, which later added "Republicann to its name. The RPP, with a nation- 
wide organization, included many of the former Ottoman officers, bureau- 
crats, and intellectuals, as well as some local elites who were committed to 
the Republic and to the values it represented. While aspiring to achieve 
eventual popular representation, the party initially worked to ensure the 
survival and development of the Republic through propagation of its values 
and introduction of radical changes in various areas of public life. 
The Democratic Party, mentioned earlier, was born among the ranks of 
the RPP, and initially represented various shades of opinion. After it gained 
power in 1950, however, the party began to emphasize private enterprise 
rather than state economic activity. It encouraged foreign trade and invest- 
ment and catered to the preferences of the more traditional voters, with 
programs, for example, to fund the construction of mosques and the opening 
of teacher training schools. When the Democratic Party was closed follow- 
ing the 1960 Revolution, a number of parties emerged seeking the votes that 
it had previously won. The chief contenders in 1961 were the Justice Party 
and the New Turkey Party. The Justice Party proved to be the more success- 
ful, and in the 1965 elections it emerged as the victor. 
Turkey is a country going through rapid social and economic change, and 
as a consequence its political organizations have often appeared to be tem- 
porary alignments of forces. While organizations bearing the same name 
survive, their policies and constituencies undergo change. The RPP, for 
example, ever since the development of multiparty politics, had sought a 
program that would have wider appeal to voters than its longestablished 
policies of secularism and modernization. Prior to the 1965 elections, the 
RPP  announced that it would pursue a "left of center" policy. As the mem- 
bers of the party sought to define that policy more precisely, splinter parties 
appeared. One of the most serious splits occurred in 1971 over the question 
of whether party leaders should support the effort of military leaders to form 
a civilian national coalition movement. Despite these divisions, the RPP in 
1973 won one-third of the vote and the largest number of Assembly seats in 
the election. 
The Justice Party also experienced rifts in its ranks. One such division 
forced the resignation of the Prime Minister, Mr. Demirel, in 1970; when he 
formed a government without the dissidents, they established a new Demo- 
cratic Party. 
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Three other parties deserve mention. The Turkish Labor Party, formed 
prior to the 1965 elections, was the first socialist party in the country's politics. 
It was ravaged by internal ideological quibbles, and then was closed by the 
Constitutional Court in 1971 for having preached the establishment of the 
domination of one social class over others. Since that time other socialist 
parties have been established with no visible backing. 
The National Order Party, established prior to the 1969 elections, repre- 
sented the religious reaction to a secular, and rapidly urbanizing and indus- 
trializing society. Although it was closed by the Constitutional Court for 
using religion for political purposes, it reemerged in the 1973 elections under 
the name of the National Salvation Party and succeeded in becoming the 
third largest party in the country. It has been a member of the major coali- 
tions that have ruled the country since then. 
The third party of note, the National Action Party, is a national socialist 
party with a tightly controlled paramilitary youth organization that has given 
it formidable power in street politics. It gradually, if modestly, increased in 
electoral support during the late 1970s, and became an essential part of coali- 
tions led by the Justice Party. 
The current state of flux in the Turkish society and economy was reflected 
in the lack of stability among the Turkish political parties with regard to their 
numbers, their constituents, and their ideologies. While the Justice Party 
subscribed to economic development by private enterprise, the RPP empha- 
sized the development of a welfare state and attached more importance to 
public enterprises and cooperatives as ingredients in realizing its goals. The 
National Salvation Party (NSP) worked to further the role of religion in 
public life. Along with the Democratic, the Reiiance, and the National Action 
parties, NSP was also inclined more in the direction of private enterprise. 
Two effectively organized interest groups in Turkey, business and industrial 
labor, have in the past accorded support to the Justice and the Republican 
People's Parties, respectively. This support, which has never been solid, was 
breaking down, particularly on the part of business, prior to the assumption 
of political power by the military leadership in the fall of 1980. 
The 1973 and 1977 elections suggest that both the RPP and the Justice 
Party have fared better in more economically developed and industrialized 
provinces, mostly in western Turkey, while the votes have been more widely 
dispersed in the rural and less developed regions.I3 The RPP has appealed 
more to industrial and urban workers, the salaried middle class, small farmers, 
farm workers, and intellectuals. The Justice Party has appealed to business, 
large farmers, and persons in professions and service sectors. The Democratic 
Party has received small business support. The National Salvation Party has 
been supported by various groups having trouble coping with social change. 
The current military government abolished all existing parties. Their leader- 
ship and MPs have been banned from forming or joining newly formed 
[46I THE LEGISLATIVE CONNECTION 
political parties for specific periods. New parties for the elections that were 
expected to take place late in 1983 were in the process of being formed. 
THE LEGISLATURE 
The first Turkish legislative body was established in 1876, and operated 
intermittently with little power but with some popular participation until 
the end of the Ottoman Empire. The National Assembly that convened in 
Ankara in 1920 was a constituent assembly, and subsequently played a major 
policy role in the government of the new Republic. The constitution of the 
Republic formally gave the National Assembly supreme power in the political 
system. It elected the president, gave a vote of confidence to the cabinet, and 
made laws. However, as in other parliamentary systems. the legislature came 
increasingly under the influence of the executive and party leadership. There 
was an indirect system of election of deputies, involving party slates. 
Between 1923 and 1945 a number of changes made the political system 
more competitive: suffrage was extended to women, freedom to associate 
was established, and direct elections were instituted. The coming of multi- 
party politics did not significantly affect the domination of the parliamentary 
parties by party leaders or the ability of parties to discipline their deputies. 
Occasionally, however, revolts did break out among deputies against their 
parties' leaders. 
The National Unity Committee closed the Assembly in 1960 and convened 
a new constituent assembly, which sought to create a constitutional structure 
that could not be so easily misused by the majority party. While multimember 
districts coinciding with provinces were retained, representation in each was 
made proportional. A Senate of the Republic was created, with members 
elected for staggered six-year terms. The president was chosen by the parlia- 
ment for a nonrenewable seven-year term. During this period primaries were 
developed in the provincial party organizations to nominate deputies, a prac- 
tice which weakened the control of the national parties. In order to avoid 
political interference, the judiciary was given control over running elections. 
A Constitutional Court was established with power to declare acts of parlia- 
ment unconstitutional and to outlaw parties that violated the constitution or 
laws. 
The period from 1960 to 1980 bears the marks of ambivalence as to how 
much faith could be placed in a legislature if its powers were not checked by 
other political institutions. While rhetoric placed the legislature, particularly 
the National Assembly, which is the lower chamber, at the apex, a system 
inspired by a model of checks and balances was in fact created. 
Parliamentary political parties, and their leaderships in particular, were 
the main actors in the political life of the country. While parties and leaders 
have been blamed for the difficulties of the country on frequent occasions, it 
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is important to note that the idea of a parliamentary system itself has never 
been seriously challenged. Even the military governments which have inter- 
vened on three occasions have promoted the idea that Turkey should be a 
parliamentary democracy. 
The constitution of 1960 gave the legislative authority exclusively to the 
Grand National Assembly, stipulating that this authority could not be dele- 
gated to other branches of government.m~egislation was broadly defined as 
the making, changing, or repealing of laws. Approving the budget, deciding 
to issue legal tender, finalizing death.penalties, and declaring partial or 
general amnesty were also specifically mentioned, as were deciding to use 
armed forces and approving international treaties. Laws were to be made by 
simple majorities of those present in both chambers, except that the budget 
required an absolute majority. A constitutional change required approval by 
two-thirds of the entire membership, and no constitutional change could be 
made regarding the republican form of government. Laws became operative 
upon being signed by the president of the Republic, who could choose to 
veto them, which he had done on a number of occasions. Vetoes could be 
overridden by simple majorities. 
Laws were subject to review by the Constitutional Court, which could find 
them either partially or entirely unconstitutional. The Court could not initiate 
procedures itself, but could have cases referred to it from a number of groups 
specified in the constitution. 
The president was legally charged with appointing a prime minister, who 
in turn chose a council of ministers and submitted the list for presidential 
approval. Technically, the cabinet took office by the affirmative action of the 
president, but it prepared a program and sought a vote of confidence from 
the lower chamber of the legislature as a matter of course. Failure to get a 
vote of confidence directed the president to reinitiate the process of forming 
a government. 
A constitutional change was introduced in 197 1, enabling the Council of 
Ministers to receive authorization from the legislature to issue decrees having 
the validity of laws in a given area of policy for a defined period of time. 
Though this change might have undermined the legal exclusiveness of the 
legislature as a lawmaking body, the executive tended to be the hub of law- 
making in any case. Most proposals originated in the government, and those 
coming from the government had a greater chance of being enacted into law. 
Proposals that did not have government backing, on the other hand, had 
little chance of getting to the floor, and when they did, were likely to be 
rejected. This is not to suggest, of course, that the government was insensitive 
to the sentiments of its parliamentary party or parties, but rather that the 
government was the agency that determined the priorities. 
Legislative oversight of the executive was exercised by addressing ques- 
tions to the ministers in oral or written form, requesting general discussion 
1481 THE LEGISLATIVE CONNECTION 
on a particular topic or area of policy, initiating parliamentary investigations 
of ministers, or engaging in a parliamentary review of government activities. 
Review procedures, which could originate only in the National Assembly, 
could be included in the agenda by a simple majority vote. An absolute 
majority was needed to depose the cabinet or one of the ministers. Parlia- 
mentary investigation of ministers, on the other hand, was conducted by a 
joint committee of both chambers. and decisions were reached at a joint 
session. 
Just as the political system favored the government vis-a-vis the legislature. 
so parties were favored over individual legislators in the chambers. Legisla- 
tors were expected to submit their own proposals to the leaders of their 
parliamentary caucuses for approval before presenting them to the officers 
of the legislature. Speakers for parties were given priority over those who 
wanted to speak on their own behalf. both in the by-laws and in deed. The 
legislator was expected to comply with all the decisions of his party with 
regard to how he should vote. Failure to do so resulted in disciplinary 
sanctions. including expulsion from the party. The constitution specifically 
prohibited party caucus decisions on removing the immunity of a represen- 
tative or bringing ministers under parliamentary investigation. but even in 
this case party sentiment weighed heavily in the decision of the individual 
legislator. 
Apart from the differences in the composition and the election methods 
explained earlier, some other differences between the prerogatives of the two 
chambers were significant. Budget proposals, unlike all other proposals. were 
first discussed in the Senate, then in the National Assembly. In either place. 
no amendments increasing public expenditure or decreasing public revenue 
could be introduced. In case of conflict between the two chambers, the matter 
went to a conference committee. but the National Assembly was given the 
final say on which proposal would become law. Giving a vote of confidence. 
as noted before, was a privilege of the lower chamber. 
The Grand National Assembly convened without invitation the first day 
of November each year. Both chambers went in and out of session simul- 
taneously. Vacation could not be longer than five months a year. Extraor- 
dinary sessions could be called by the president at his own initiative or upon 
the request of the Council of Ministers. 
Elections for the National Assembly were held every four years. Elections 
for one-third of the Senate, on the other hand, were held every two years. at 
which time by-elections for the Assembly could also be conducted. Candi- 
dates of parties and the order in which they appeared on the ballot were 
determined by a primary in which delegates chosen from members of the 
parties of each subprovince participated. The national party organization 
could veto candidates and recommend the placement on the ballot of other 
candidates, not to exceed 5 percent of all the candidates advanced by a party. 
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Parties that had received 5 percent or more of the popular vote in the last 
election, and which had succeeded in electing enough representatives to form 
a caucus of ten representatives, were entitled to receive grants from the 
treasury in amounts determined by law. 
The votes were tabulated according to a modified d'Hondt system of 
proportional representation where the vote each party had received was 
successively divided by 1, 2, . . . n, where n is equal to the number of repre- 
sentatives to be elected from that province. The quotients for all parties were 
then rank ordered, starting with the highest until n quotients were ranked. 
The number of times each party's quotients appeared in the rank ordering 
was the number of seats that party would get. Since places of candidates on 
each party's list were already ranked through a primary, it was then a matter 
of procedure to identify the individual winners. 
POLITICS AT THE TIME OF THE STUDY 
Field work in Turkey commenced seven months after the elections in 
1973. No party had gained a majority in the elections: the RPP had won 186 
seats; the Justice Party, 149; the National Salvation Party, 48; the Demo- 
cratic Party, 45; and others, 22. Ideological differences and personality con- 
flicts among leaders of parties made it very difficult to form a coalition for 
almost two months. After lengthy negotiations, the RPP and NSP succeeded 
in forming a coalition headed by Biilent Ecevit of the RPP which stayed in 
power for nine months. It was during their rule that the Turkish armed 
forces intervened in Cyprus in response to a takeover by Eoka supporter 
Nikos Sampson. While this resulted in an upsurge in the popularity of the 
government, it did not overcome the major differences between the two 
partners. The Ecevit Government resigned in September 1974. 
It took more than three months to form a new coalition headed by Siiley- 
man Demirel of the Justice Party. This government also had many elements 
of instability in it. Tensions between the RPP and the coalition partners, 
which called themselves the "parties of the right," were high. 
At the time of the study. the country faced two major problems. The first 
was an inflation rate of about twenty-five percent which the government was 
unable to control. Second was the embargo of American military assistance 
to Turkey which followed the Cyprus intervention. 
Part I1 
LEGISLATORS A N D  POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
Chapter 4 
THE MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE 
We begin our discussion of representation and the relationships legislators 
forge between their constituents and central political institutions with an 
analysis of the backgrounds, predispositions, and ambitions of the central 
actors in this process, the legislators. As noted in chapter 2, our samples of 
legislators from Kenya, Korea, and Turkey were not selected on a random 
basis, because our objective was to interview all MPs from the constituencies 
in which we conducted our surveys of local leaders and the general public, 
and because of political events in the three countries at  the time of our study. 
While our samples of parliamentarians are highly representative of the uni- 
verse of legislators in each country, we must approach our data with some 
caution and regard the results reported herein as tentative conclusions to be 
validated by further research. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGISLATORS 
SOCIAL BACKGROUND 
Political leaders throughout the world are invariably better educated and 
higher in socioeconomic status than members of the general public. The 
legislators from Kenya, Korea, and Turkey interviewed for this study are no 
exceptions. Consistent with the situation in other countries, they are also 
overwhelmingly male; and their median age is somewhat less than that of top 
government officials. Most members of our three samples are also long-term 
residents of the districts they were elected to represent. More than three- 
quarters of the legislators in each of the three countries had resided in their 
districts for more than a decade. while at least two-fifths had resided in their 
districts for more than twenty years. 
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Within these expected parameters, however, there are several significant 
variations among the legislators of the three countries, variations which 
appear to be closely related to the different levels of economic development 
each country has achieved and to the history of the legislature within each 
political system. Thus, in table 4.1 we find that Kenyan legislators tended to 
be significantly younger and less educated (as measured by the number of 
years spent in school) than their counterparts in Korea and Turkey, while the 
Korean respondents' were the oldest and by far the best educated. Similarly, 
TABLE 4.1. 
Demographic and Social Background Characteristics of Legislators 
(percentages) 
Konya Koreaa Turkey 
Sex 
Male: 
Female: 
N = 
Age 
Under 30: 
31 -40: 
41 -50: 
51-60: 
Over 60: 
Median age: 
N = 
Education 
Less than 9 years: 
10-12 years: 
13-16 years: 
More than 16 years: 
Median education: 
N = 
Occupational rank (Hollingshead) 
High 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Low 8 (unemployed) 
Median rank: 
N = 
Length of residence in district 
1-10 years 
11 -20 years 
21 or more 
N = 
a. Elected member8 only. 
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Kenyan parliamentarians were more likely to have pursued occupations of 
lower prestige immediately prior to their election to parliament than were 
Koreans or Turks. Kenyans were also more likely to have been long-term 
residents of their constituencies, a reflection of the fact that more than 80 
percent lived in rural areas and had occupations that did not afford them a 
high degree of geographic mobility. 
These variations suggest that recruitment into parliament is from a wider 
range of social strata in Kenya than in Turkey, and from a much wider range 
in Kenya than in Korea. This hypothesis is further supported by examining 
the family background of M Ps and the degree of intergenerational mobility 
experienced by the legislators from the three countries. 
As indicated by table 4.2, the fathers of Kenyan legislators were signifi- 
cantly less well educated than their counterparts in Korea and Turkey. While 
half of the Kenyans' fathers had received no formal schooling, half of the 
fathers of Korean and Turkish legislators had received a primary school 
education or more. The occupational rank of the fathers of Kenyan MPs 
was also much lower than the occupational ranks of the fathers of Korean 
and Turkish respondents. More than half, in fact, were peasants. Despite 
these variations, legislators in all three countries are drawn disproportionately 
from the middle and upper middle classes. This is true even in Kenya where, 
although more than half of the respondents indicated that their fathers were 
peasants, more than 40 percent were sons of men who had been employed in 
one of the three highest categories of employment. 
TABLE 4.2. 
Socioeconomic Background of Legislators' Fathers (percentage) 
Kenva Korea Turkev 
Father's education 
Less than 5 years 64 52 33 
6-9 years 25 14 26 
10-12 years 7 18 33 
13-16 years 4 12 1 
More than 16 years - 4 7 
Median education - 4 8 
N =  (28) (82) (97) 
Father's occupational rank 
High: 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 (including peasants) 
Low: 8 (unemployed) 
Median rank: 
N =  
1561 THE LEGISLATIVE CONNECTION 
It would thus appear that, while legislative recruitment remains an open 
process in the three countries, drawing from and supplied by all strata of 
society, it is also a process with an increasingly narrow and entrenched social 
base. As economic development proceeds and is accompanied by the almost 
inevitable increase of inequality, and as successive generations of parliamen- 
tarians are elected to office, legislatures in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey-as in 
other less developed countries-will be increasingly composed of members 
of the emerging socioeconomic elite. Though the legislature is an institution 
to which one gains entry via popular election, our data clearly suggest that 
legislative recruitment in these countries is not significantly different from 
the recruitment processes of other institutions, such as the civil service, the 
educational system, and large firms in the private sector. What effects these 
changing patterns of legislative recruitment will have on the ability of par- 
liamentarians to forge linkages from the periphery to the center of these 
political systems will be discussed in chapter 5. 
In the types of constituencies they were elected to represent and in their 
party affiliations, the legislators in our three samples were a diverse group. 
As indicated by table 4.3, most of the members of the three samples were 
elected by rural constituencies, o r  constituencies which were only partly 
urbanized at the time of our surveys. Here again, there were marked varia- 
tions among the three countries. These variations reflect the different levels 
of economic development each country had reached, and parallel the data 
presented in tables 4.1 and 4.2. It is not surprising, therefore, that almost all 
of the Kenyan legislators represented rural constituencies, while those from 
Korea, and especially those from Turkey, were more evenly divided among 
rural, urban, and mixed areas. 
Even more interesting was the tendency of different types of constituencies 
to elect similar individuals as representatives. A comparison of the back- 
ground characteristics of legislators from rural, semiurban, and urban con- 
stituencies reveals few significant differences in the dimensions of age, educa- 
tion, occupational rank, and length of residence in the district. In view of the 
rapid rate of urbanization in the three countries, and the high mobility of 
urban residents, we had expected legislators from urban constituencies to be 
TABLE 43. 
T y p  of District (Constituency) Legislator 
Was Elected to Represent (prcentages) 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
Urban 4 21 38 
Mi xed 11 26 26 
Rural 86 53 36 
N =  (28) (83) (104) 
4. Members of the Legb&ture WI 
younger and to have resided in their districts for shorter periods than their 
counterparts from rural districts. Neither of these expectations was consis- 
tently confirmed by our data. M Ps from urban and semi-urban areas were 
somewhat better educated and had pursued more prestigious occupations 
than M Ps from rural constituencies, but the differences were limited-measur- 
ing five to ten percentage points-and could be attributed to sampling errors. 
Ecological differences between constituencies might be expected to explain 
differences in the political and ideological orientation of MPs. Like most 
other African countries still under civilian rule, Kenya is a one-party state in 
which almost 90 percent of the population resides in the countryside. In such 
countries, political cleavages tend to occur along sectional and ethnic lines 
rather than along the lines of class. Opposition parties in these countries 
have disappeared from the scene partly because there have been few questions 
of policy on which these parties had significant differences with the party in 
power. Opposition M Ps frequently deserted their parties when opportunities 
arose to join the governing party and partake of the state's resources and 
patronage, which the governing party controlled. As only fifteen of Kenya's 
158 parliamentary constituencies are within urban areas, it is not surprising 
that the country is ruled by a one-party system, and that MPs from urban 
areas have not founded a second party to advance the special interests of the 
people who elected them to office. 
In contrast to Kenya, Korea and Turkey are more urbanized and eco- 
nomically developed societies, and both are industrializing. Historically, eco- 
nomic development, and industrialization in particular, have accelerated 
the level of differentiation among the members of society and given rise to 
political cleavages that cut across cleavages of sectionalism and ethnicity. 
Ideological differences emerge under these circumstances, with the result 
that urban residents begin to elect representatives who hold different ideo- 
logical positions and who are members of different parties from those elected 
by their counterparts in the countryside. This tendency is illustrated by table 
4.4. It is most prominent in Turkey, where a majority of the M Ps from urban 
areas were members of the social democratic Republican Peoples' Party, 
while a majority of the legislators from rural constituencies were members of 
the conservative Justice Party. 
The classic left-right, urban-rural dichotomy, however, was not repeated 
in Korea. As discussed in chapter 2, socialist and radical parties on the left of 
the political spectrum were prohibited in Korea due to fear of communism 
and aggression by the communist regime in the North. Korean parties con- 
sequently operated in a truncated political spectrum ranging from the center/ 
right to right. 
The Democratic Republican Party, which was the governing party before 
the military takeover in 1980, and the New Democratic Party were virtually 
identical in terms of ideology, and addressed themselves to the same class 
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interests. Given these conditions, it is not surprising that MPs from urban 
and rural areas did not overwhelmingly support one or the other of the two 
major parties. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that a majority of the 
M Ps from urban constituencies were members of the opposition New Demo- 
cratic Party which. though not a party of the left, was highly critical of the 
conservative Democratic Republican government, and drew some of its most 
vocal support from intellectuals and other residents of Korean cities, where 
dissatisfaction with the government of President Park was most pronounced. 
To many of these people, voting for candidates of the New Democratic Party 
was a means of registering protest about the existing political order rather 
than a way of supporting an alternative program from an opposition party. 
In sum, the membership of the legislatures in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey 
seemed to be evolving in a manner similar to that which occurred earlier in 
Western Europe. As development proceeded, ideological and class distinc- 
tions superceded those of sectional interest, and the socioeconomic back- 
ground of M Ps became more restricted. We expect that the emergence of an 
upper-class oligarchy, such as Robert Michels found within the German 
Social Democratic Party2 or such as emerged more recently within the par- 
liamentary British Labour Party, will be replicated in those developing coun- 
tries where the process is allowed to play itself out. 
CAREERS 
Being a legislator is but one relatively short-term role in the careers of 
most M Ps in the three samples. To understand the perspectives these people 
bring to their work, it is therefore useful to examine briefly the context of 
their lives in which these roles are played. As indicated in table 4.1, the 
TABLE 4.4. 
Party Affiliation of Legislators by Type of Constituency 
(percentages) 
Semi- 
Urban Urban Rural 
Korea (elected MPs) 
Democratic Republican 
New Democratic 
Other 
N =  
Turkey 
Justice 
Republican People's 
Other 
N = 
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median age for the legislators who comprised the three samples ranged from 
forty-five to forty-seven years. Most members of the samples assumed their 
positions in their late thirties or early forties, after having pursued other 
careers for a decade or more. We have also noted that the members of our 
three samples are disproportionately drawn from prestigious occupations, 
particularly in Korea and Turkey. 
In terms of specific occupations, there are, however, several variations 
among the three countries, and among legislators of different political parties 
-the only variable which significantly affected legislative recruitment among 
our three samples of legislators. As is shown by table 4.5, more than half of 
the Kenyan respondents were civil servants or businessmen prior to entering 
the National Assembly. 
In Korea, the civil service was also a significant source of legislators, 
though primarily from the right-wing Democratic Republican Party. The 
Democratic Republicans also drew a significant proportion of their represen- 
tatives from the educational system and the military. In contrast, the most 
important source of opposition MPs was the party organization. Forty-two 
percent of the MPs of the centerist New Democratic Party were recruited 
after having served as full-time paity workers. 
Still a different situation was found in Turkey, where the largest number of 
MPs entered the legislature after pursuing legal careers. This was especially 
TABLE 4.5. 
Occupation of MPs at the Time of Their Election to Parliament (percentages) 
Kenya Korea (elected MPo) Turkey 
New Democmtlc Republican Juotlce 
KANU Democrats Republltcmr Peoples P. Party 
Specific categories 
Civil servant 
Teacher 
Journalist 
Lawyer 
Military 
Businessman 
Leader of an 
interest group 
Party employee 
Other 
General categories 
Managerial 
Professional 
Political (Party) 
Other 
N =  
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common among the MPs of the RPP. A high proportion of MPs of the 
conservative Justice Party were also lawyers, although the Justice Party 
recruited many of its parliamentarians from the civil service and business 
community as well. 
This review of the data presented in table 4.5 suggests that the specific 
pattern of legislative recruitment in any one country was a function of con- 
ditions unique to that country, rather than a result of generic differences 
between that country and others. An occupation which was a major source 
of MPs in one country was usually a minor source in the others. If there 
existed a pattern of variation within each of our three samples, or between 
them, which can be explained in terms of the differential impact of one or 
more of the independent variables which is evident in all three samples, such 
patterns were not easily discerned. 
However, upon collapsing the occupational data into a small number of 
analytical categories, a clearer picture emerges. In the lower part of table 4.5 
we find that in all three countries about half of the parliamentarians of the 
rightdcenter and conservative parties entered the legislature after mana- 
gerial careers in the civil service, the military, or business. Conversely, par- 
liamentarians of parties on the left were more likely to have been elected to 
the legislature after pursuing a career in one of the professions (teaching, 
law, journalism). Regardless of their party affiliation, three-fourths of the 
legislators in each of the three samples had held managerial positions or 
been professionals prior to their pursuit of a legislative career. 
The data presented in these tables reveal another significant feature of the 
process of legislative recruitment in the three countries. With the exception 
of the Korean M Ps from the New Democratic Party, few legislators entered 
parliament after pursuing careers which were explicitly political in nature, 
though many were officers in the political parties to which they belonged. It 
is especially interesting that few MPs had been leaders of interest groups, 
given that such groups invariably make demands for allocations of state 
resources and consequently are involved in the political process. 
Although most legislators are men of high status, a distinction must also 
be made between those who are members of the national political establish- 
ment and those who are only prominent notables within their local consti- 
tuencies or minor leaders of other types. With the exception of the few 
legislators who are ministers or junior ministers of executive departments, 
most M Ps fall into the latter category. 
Given their career backgrounds, most legislators in the three samples are 
thus men of status, but not usually men of power. We have already discussed 
why legislators are not important decision makers in these countries, nor in 
most other developing political systems. Perhaps as a result of this situation, 
and of the limited resources available for allocation by the governments of 
these societies, there is also an extremely high turnover in the membership of 
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the legislature. Table 4.6 shows that two-thirds of the members surveyed in 
Kenya and more than half of these in Turkey were serving their first terms at 
the time they were interviewed. 
There are a number of explanations for high turnover, and they are not 
equally important in each of the three countries. Some members do not 
seek reelection, and some are either denied renomination by their party or 
defeated by the voters. Some of those who do not seek reelection may be 
discouraged and disillusioned by the limited opportunities they have to in- 
fluence policy making. Some may consider the legislature to be only an inter- 
mediate step in their careers. 
In Kenya, which had the highest rate of turnover, members were elected 
from single-member districts where their performance was exposed to close 
public scrutiny. Because they had little power to make public policy, and 
because the government lacked the resources to provide them with the ser- 
vices they sought for their districts, most MPs in Kenya were unable to 
"deliver the goods" to their constituents. This often resulted in electoral 
defeat. Approximately half of the Kenyan MPs who sought reelection in 
1969, 1974, and 1979 were defeated. As a result, the Kenyan legislature is 
composed largely of inexperienced newcomers. but is dominated by a small 
group of MPs who are party leaders and government ministers and who 
have survived the electoral process. In Kenya and other countries where this 
occurs, the legislature may be unable to expand its authority to make public 
policy, and may have difficulty in generating widespread public support. 
In Turkey there were other explanations for the high turnover of legisla- 
tors, in addition to what could be explained by voluntary turnover. In the 
large multimember districts individual MPs were under less pressure to, and 
had less responsibility to provide services to their constituents. They had, 
however, to satisfy local party organizations, and ran the risk of losing the 
renomination bid to delegates from local parties. During the 1970s in Turkey, 
new political parties emerged whose candidates were usually persons with- 
out previous experience in the legislature. The various divisions within the 
TABLE 4.6. 
Number of Terms Elected to the Legislature 
(percentages) 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
One time 68 28 59 
Two times 23 37 20 
Three times 9 21 9 
Four or more times - 14 14 
N =  (22) (83) (101) 
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Republican People's Party, for example, led to the replacement of experi- 
enced legislators with new members. Thus in the elections of 1977, only two- 
thirds of the members of the Turkish National Assembly sought reelection. 
In the fourteen provinces which served as the research sites for our study, 
only 114 of 168 incumbents sought reelection, and of those, 32 percent lost 
their seats. Put differently, less than half of the outgoing MPs from these 
provinces returned to the new parliament after the elections. 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS AND 
CONCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT 
Although most M Ps in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey are not men of power 
at the national level, their values are important insofar as they are regarded 
as leaders within their local communities and spokesmen for these communi- 
ties in the legislature and other central agencies of the state. Because they are 
intermediaries charged with forging linkages between the mass public on the 
periphery of the political system and the top decision makers who control 
the institutions of the state, the beliefs of the MPs are of interest, especially 
their definition of economic and political development. 
Members of parliament provide an effective feedback service, without 
which top decision makers cannot govern. Regardless of whether decision 
makers accept the views and demands expressed by legislators, they must a t  
least listen to what M Ps say if they are to develop strategies through which 
their policies will be effectively implemented at the grass roots, and if they 
are to continue to command public support. Thus, while most MPs in our 
samples did not participate significantly in the decisionmaking process, they 
contributed substantially to the creation of the context within which that 
process occurred. Their value orientations in turn affected the manner in 
which they did this, and we now turn to a review of these. 
We are primarily concerned with two types of value orientation which 
M Ps bring to bear on their activities: (1) their basic conception of economic 
development, and of how it may best be achieved; and (2) their conception of 
what constitutes the ideal policy for the society and culture in which they 
live. 
As we noted in chapter 1, political conflict in most developing countries is 
a conflict over what constitutes economic development and how development 
can best be achieved. The first of these questions is macro systemic and 
philosophical in scope, and involves an ideal conception of the economic 
sector in the "good society." The second is practical and specific in scope and 
focuses on the alternative strategies and policies a state might pursue to 
achieve the conception of economic development to which it subscribes. 
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CONCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
By the mid-1970s the political leadership within most developing countries 
subscribed to one of two broad definitions of economic development. Gen- 
erally they defined economic development either as the achievement of self- 
sustained growth of the GN P or as a combination of self-sustained economic 
growth and an equal distribution to all members of society of the wealth that 
is created. On a more global and philosophical level this has been translated 
into the distinction between capitalist and socialist models of development. 
In operational terms, the choice that must be made by policymakers in 
developing countries is usually between an economy expanding a t  an annual 
rate between 5 and 10 percent, with marked inequalities in the distribution 
of wealth, and one expanding a t  only I to 4 percent, but with less severe 
inequalities of distribution. Rapid economic growth is an inherently unbal- 
anced process. It involves three forms of inequality, which are most acute in 
the poorest and smallest non-Western countries. 
First, rapid growth requires a concentration, in one or a very few locations, 
of the capital and human resources necessary for development. Economic 
growth is easier to achieve, and hence more rapid, in areas where some 
development has already occurred. Consequently, rapid growth leads to re- 
gional inequality, as nations invest their limited resources a t  locations where 
the payoffs are greatest. The net result is often a widening disparity between 
developed, urban areas and underdeveloped, rural areas. Given that political 
cleavages in these societies are usually along sectional lines, exacerbated by 
ethnic considerations, economic policies stressing rapid growth are likely to 
generate considerable opposition. New resources are limited, and competition 
for them becomes a zero-sum game. 
The second inequality incurred by systems defining development as eco- 
nomic growth is the attendant rise of inequality between different strata of 
society, and the ultimate formation of classes that are potentially antagonistic. 
Class inequalities are likely to parallel regional inequalities, with urban resi- 
dents being better off than rural residents. But there are also class conflicts 
within regions: between the commercial bourgeoisie and the proletariat in 
the cities, and between a trader/commerical-farmer bourgeoisie and a large 
peasantry in rural areas. 
Third, countries defining economic development primarily as growth also 
require greater foreign participation in the development process than do 
other countries. Some writers argue that this leads to further underdevelop 
ment of Third World countries, by increasing their dependence on major 
western industrial economies, and on the institutions of the international 
capitalist system which these economies have spawned. 
Those countries that try to achieve both growth and equality face other 
problems, most of which result from the slower rate of economic expansion, 
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often approaching stagnation. Thus, while many developing countries have 
embraced socialist modes of development, most have done so at a rhetorical 
rather than at an operational level. Kenya and, at times, Turkey are examples 
of this tendency. 
Given the choices facing policymakers in developing countries, where do 
the M Ps in our three samples stand? When asked to choose between growth 
and regional equality, a large majority of the MPs from all parties except 
the Democratic Republican in Korea opted for the latter. Sentiment for 
promoting regional equality, even if efforts to achieve such equality were 
accompanied by a slowdown in growth, was particularly strong in Kenya 
and among the members of center and left-of-center parties in Korea and 
Turkey. It is not surprising that the concern for regional equality was sub- 
stantially greater among M Ps who were on the left, or o n  what was regarded 
as the left of the political spectrum in their countries, than among M Ps on 
the right or far right. A concern for regional equality, however, is basically 
a reflection of the fact that in most developing countries the fundamental 
source of political cleavage is conflict between sectional interests. Given the 
relative levels of development in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey, it is also not 
surprising that Kenyan MPs as a group, rather than by party, were the 
most concerned about minimizing regional disparities. As we shall see in a 
moment, this concern is especially interesting in light of the tolerance Kenyan 
M Ps expressed for inequality between people of different socioeconomic 
strata. 
Turning to the choice between economic growth and the elimination of 
class inequalities, social democratic MPs in Turkey and opposition MPs in 
Korea who were regarded as being relatively, if not substantively on the left, 
consistently favored equity over growth. In contrast. MPs of conservative 
parties, including MPs of the Kenyan African National Union, ovenvhelm- 
ingly favored growth over equity. 
In sum, MPs who were members of parties on the left were concerned 
with both regional and social inequities, and believed that the elimination of 
these two forms of inequality should take precedence over economic growth. 
Conversely, M Ps who were members of parties on the right were inclined to 
tolerate a high measure of social inequality to achieve a rapid expansion of 
the economy. These M Ps were often unwilling, however, to accept regional 
disparities. particularly if they lived in a political system where the deepest 
political cleavages are sectional ones. M Ps from right-of-center parties thus 
opted for what is often termed the "trickledown" model of economic devel- 
opment, provided their districts participated in the process. Such a concep- 
tion of economic development has been the basis of economic policy in all 
three of the countries included in this study as it is in most of the developing 
world. 
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This is a model that invariably gives considerable latitude to a capitalist 
class of entrepreneurs, while encouraging state intervention to eliminate 
regional disparities-particularly in the provision of social welfare services. 
On the other hand, MPs opting for a socialist development model choose 
one requiring state intervention in almost all aspects of economic life for it to 
become a reality. The important point, however. is that regardless of the 
model of development preferred. most M Ps-with the notable exception of 
the Democratic Republicans in Korea-define economic development as a 
process requiring at least some state participation, particularly in lessening 
regional inequalities. As we shall see in chapter 5.  this concern for eliminating 
regional inequalities is paralleled by a strong commitment by most M Ps to 
serving their district first and the nation second. Their emphasis on consti- 
tuency service reflects the fundamentally sectional nature of political conflict 
in developing societies. 
To close our discussion of M Ps' conceptions of economic development. we 
present a summary table showing the distribution of MPs by party on an 
index of capitalism versus socialism (table 4.7). The index is an additive scale 
consisting of M Ps' responses to four statements on economic de~elopment .~ 
The summary index points to the marked ideological differences between 
MPs of the major parties. More interesting for o u t  consideration. however. 
is the relatively moderate capitalist orientation of Democratic Republican 
MPs in Korea. and Justice Party MPs in Turkey. This moderate. almost 
centerist, conception of economic development by MPs of parties on the 
right is partially the result of the concern shared by all MPs for minimizing 
regional disparities for the reasons outlined above. 
It is useful to note. however. that while M Ps on the left included regional 
balance in their conception of economic development because they are ideo- 
logically committed to the creation of an egalitarian society. MPs on the 
right do so primarily for tactical reasons. As indicated by table 4.4. parties 
on the left of the political spectrum in both Korea and Turkey draw the bulk 
of their support from the major urban centers with their emergent industrial 
working class and highly differentiated class structure. Thus, while M Ps of 
left-of-center parties are most committed to the abstract goal of an egalitarian 
society. their supporters are geographically concentrated in the major metro- 
politan areas. Conversely, while MPs of rightist parties generally favor eco- 
nomic growth at the expense of equality. they must concern themselves with 
the spatial if not the class dimension of equal distribution, because the source 
of their political power is geographically dispersed. 
Table 4.7 also shows the great similarity between the ideological distribu- 
tion of Kenyan MPs and those of the Democratic Republican and Justice 
parties in Korea and in Turkey. In all three countries M Ps representing rural 
constituencies and right-of-center parties give priority to growth over equality, 
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while expressing concern about the geographical distribution of new eco- 
nomic enterprises. Conversely, in Korea and Turkey, rapid economic expan- 
sion and urban growth have produced left-of-center parties committed to a 
more egalitarian economic and political system. The data consistently suggest 
a strong relationship between MPs' conceptions of the ideal economic system 
and the constituencies and parties they represent. 
CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
As we have emphasized, political leaders in most developing countries are 
confronted by an unceasing flow of demands greater than can be met by 
their limited resources. These demands are particularly intense when they 
are sectional in nature, and they lead to pressures for distribution of resources 
to foster economic development that threaten governmental policies for eco- 
nomic growth. Political leaders frequently must choose between policies that 
may require a measure of coercion and authoritarian rule and ones that are 
direct responses to popular, particularly majoritarian, demands. 
To determine how legislators in developing countries are likely to resolve 
this dilemma, and to learn how they think the political system ought to run, 
the MPs in our samples were asked to agree or disagree with three statements 
which measure the extent to which they favor democratic or authoritarian 
rule. Their responses were then added together to yield a summary score for 
an index of democracy vs. authoritarianism. The distribution of these scores 
is presented by party in table 4.7.4 
TABLE 4.7 
MPs' Conceptions of Economic and Political Development (percentages) 
Kenya Korea (elected MPs) Turkey 
New Democratic Republican Justice 
KANU Democrats Republicans Peoples P. Party 
Capitalism 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Socialism 
Authoritarianism 
1 
2 
3 
1 
Democracy 
4. Members oj the Legislature [671 
A quick review of the data indicates that most M Ps lean toward a demo- 
cratic conception of the most desirable type of political system. As in indus- 
trial societies, members of left-of-center political parties are especially fervent 
in their democratic orientations insofar as these orientations involve a funda- 
mental belief in the appropriateness of majoritarian rule, coupled with belief 
in the right of the individual to express dissent. The strong democratic orien- 
tations expressed by M Ps of all parties, however, suggest two interesting 
conclusions about the way legislators perceive the political process. 
First, it would appear that M Ps in developing countries subscribe to the 
view frequently expressed by parliamentarians in industrial societies that 
legislators and the legislature constitute a bulwark against the authoritarian 
tendencies of executive power. By rejecting the view that society is better 
ruled by a "few enlightened leaders than by the will of the masses," the 
members in our three samples seem also to be saying that their role as 
parliamentarians is an inherently democratic one. As directly elected repre- 
sentatives of the citizens in their home areas, MPs do not accept the view 
that the executive, with its great resources of administrative and technical 
expertise, should make public policy entirely on its own. 
A second interesting feature of M Ps' opinions about how the political 
system ought to function is that legislators of opposing political parties 
diverge much less in their beliefs about the political rules of the game than 
they do  in their values about economic relationships. Because M Ps'attitudes 
about the economic system are in large part a function of the types of consti- 
tuency they represent, we may expect M Ps from different constituencies to 
diverge much less in their conceptions about the political system than in 
those about economic development. Put differently, legislators in developing 
countries appear to be more likely to arrive at a consensus about what con- 
stitutes the political dimension of development than about what constitutes 
the economic dimension. 
Chapter 5 
LEGISLATORS A N D  REPRESENTATION 
In chapter 1 we argued that legislators in developing countries perform a 
distinctive and necessary function when they establish linkages from the 
periphery to the center of the political system. The establishment of these 
networks for communication and the exchange of resources is a necessary 
first step in the representational process. If we are to determine the extent to 
which legislators in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey contribute to the representa- 
tional process, we must identify whether and in what manner these legislators 
seek to create the linkages of which the representational process is composed. 
To make this determination, we shall focus on the activities of individual 
legislators as they carry out their respective conceptions of what constitutes, 
and what should constitute, the legislative role. Put simply, we shall attempt 
to answer the questions of whether and how legislators in developing coun- 
tries contribute to the representational process by first determining what 
these legislators do and why. We shall describe the legislators' conceptions of 
their roles and try to determine to what extent their behavior fulfills these 
role expectations. 
In chapter 6 we will compare these findings with the role expectations 
held by constituents. 
LEGISLATORS' DEFINITIONS OF PURPOSIVE ROLES 
In all countries where the legislative process is a significant component of 
political life there exist at least five distinct sets of expectations of what the 
role of legislators should be: (1) the formal role as specified by the country's 
constitution and/or by the rules of procedure which regulate the legislative 
process; (2) the selfdefinition of the legislative role which each individual 
legislator articulates for himself or  herself; (3) peer expectations of the legis- 
lative role; (4) the legislative role as defined for each legislator by his or her 
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constituents; and (5) the legislative role as defined by referents outside the 
legislature and outside the districts each individual legislator represents. 
These include the expectations of the executive, the civil service, major 
interest groups, and the public at large. 
In this study we are principally concerned with the second and fourth sets 
of role expectations, because of our interest in the linkages legislators estab- 
lish from the periphery to the center of the political system. The establish- 
ment and perpetuation of these linkages is largely a function of the relation- 
ships between legislators and their constituents, and so the ways in which 
each of these groups views the role of the legislator constitute our main 
concern. The reader should, therefore, remember that our discussion of legis- 
lative role expectations is a selective and partial one. It is not, nor does it 
pretend to be, a comprehensive study. 
To determine how the legislators interviewed for this study conceived of 
their roles, we commenced our interviews in all three countries with an open- 
ended question: "How would you describe the job of being a legislator- 
what are the most important things you do?" The responses, which are pre- 
sented in table 5.1 by the political parties to which the respondents belong, 
indicate that legislators usually defined their roles in terms of two functions- 
lawmaking and representation. 
The data also suggest that legislators conceive of their roles as being quite 
different from those of members of the executive on the one hand and of the 
civil service on the other. None of our respondents, for example, thought 
that it was his or her duty to shape public opinion, an important component 
of political leadership in new states, and one normally assumed by the head 
TABLE 5.1. 
MPs' Descriptions 01 Their Purposive Roles (percentages) 
Lawmaking, legislating 
Performing "constitutional" and legally defined duties 
Policymaking, participating in key government decisions 
Representing the voters, and/or various interest groups 
Helping to shape and guide public opinion 
Assisting in the implementation of government policy 
through close cooperation with the executive 
checking and balancing the power of the executive branch 
Initiating plans for economic and social development 
~ e l p i n ~ t o  achieve overriding national objectives (i.e.. 
unity, national identity) 
Kenya Korea 
Note: Percentages often total to more than 100 because some respondents gave multiple answers 
to this open-ended question. 
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of state and/or by cadres of the ruling political party, where such exist. 
While some respondents expressed a desire to participate in making of key 
government decisions, the principal function of the executive, it was not a 
major concern. Nor did more than a handful of our respondents feel that 
they should play a significant role in the implementation and administration 
of policy, the main reponsibility of civil servants. 
Upon considering the two activities cited most often by our respondents, it 
seems somewhat strange and formalistic that they placed so much emphasis 
on lawmaking, given the relative weakness of the legislatures in the three 
countries. A closer examination of table 5.1. however, suggests why our 
respondents replied to our query in the manner they did. 
First, legislators in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey did not appear to equate 
lawmaking with policymaking. While almost half of the M Ps in each country 
defined their roles in terms of lawmaking, no more than a sixth (and usually 
much less) defined their roles in terms of policymaking. It would thus seem 
that lawmaking is perceived by the legislators as the process through which 
policies made by others are ratified and legitimized via translation into law. 
The most significant differences among MPs from the three countries lay 
in the importance attached to representing the voter, ranging from 60 percent 
in Kenya, to 4 1 percent in Korea and only 22 percent in Turkey. These differ- 
ences can perhaps be explained by differences in the electoral systems and 
by alternative methods of linkage available to constituents. Single-member 
district systems (Kenya) and to a lesser extent two-member districts (Korea) 
provide more direct contacts between voters and their representatives than is 
likely to occur in large multimember districts (Turkey). 
It is important to recognize that the legislator is only one of a number of 
channels available to voters who seek to gain benefits or to influence decisions 
of the government. Voters may also work through local party organizations, 
voluntary organizations in the community, local leaders of various kinds, or 
even local agents in the bureaucracy. Moreover, it is possible that some citi- 
zens will go through intermediaries, such as local leaders or  local party 
organizations, in order to contact their legislators, rendering an MP's repre- 
sentation of constituents quite indirect. 
Local party organizations played an important linkage role in both Korea 
(especially for the governing party) and Turkey. Constituents in these coun- 
tries often contacted local party officials instead of MPs or  (especially in 
Turkey) as a way of getting their message to MPs. The importance of the 
party organization in both Korea and Turkey helps to explain why legislators 
in those countries were less conscious of a representative role. 
Upon examining the data further to determine whether MPs of different 
backgrounds and affiliations defined the role of the legislator differently, we 
found few variations in the patterns of response that were replicated in all 
three countries. The only variable to give rise to significant variations in the 
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ways members of the three countries defined their roles was that of party 
affiliation, but these variations were largely due to conditions specific to one 
of the three political systems considered in this study. For example, the ideo- 
logical position of an M P's party had little effect on the way they conceived 
of their roles. Although in all three countries MPs from parties on the left 
and right of the political spectrum held very different conceptions of what 
constitutes the good society, their conceptions of the role of the legislator 
were roughly the same. 
On the other hand, M Ps who were members of the governing party in 
their country at the time of our survey tended to place greater emphasis on 
lawmaking than did members of the opposition. Such an orientation is what 
one would expect, given that these MPs had the votes in the legislature to 
enact legislation and were in part elected to translate their party's policies 
into law. 
Conversely, M Ps belonging to the opposition expressed the reverse posi- 
tion. In Korea, more than half of the members of the opposition New Demo- 
cratic Party defined the role of the legislator as providing a check and balance 
to executive power. This finding is hardly surprising given the extent and 
methods by which the government of President Park dominated the Korean 
political system. But it was not a view expressed by backbenchers (the 
functional equivalent of an opposition) in Kenya. The fact that the Turkish 
system is basically a parliamentary one helps to explain why MPs in that 
country were not concerned about checking executive power. 
Variations in the social backgrounds of MPs-their occupations, educa- 
tion, or age-resulted in no consistent or significant differences in the ways 
they conceived of their roles. nor did variations in the types of constituencies 
M Ps were elected to represent. Representatives of urban and rural districts 
conceived of the legislator's role in similar terms, though MPs who were 
members of parties that drew a disproportionate amount of their support 
from rural areas were somewhat more likely to define their roles in represen- 
tational terms than were members of parties supported by the residents of 
rural areas. 
ROLE BEHAVIOR OF LEGISLATORS 
After questioning our respondents about their purposive roles, we asked 
them a series of questions about the activities to which they devoted the bulk 
of their time. The purpose of these questions was to obtain both a detailed 
description of what our respondents did and a measure of the extent to 
which this behavior was consistent with their roles as they initially defined 
them. 
To determine the activities on which MPs spent most of their time, the 
members in the three samples were first asked to rank six activities frequently 
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cited as important components of a legislator's role in Kenya, Korea, and 
Turkey. The results of the survey are given in table 5.2. 
A review of the table suggests that none of the six activities dominated the 
attention of the respondents in all three countries, though two--obtaining 
resources for one's district and interceding with civil servants on behalf of 
one's constituents-occupied the time of 43 to 60 percent of the Kenyan and 
Korean M Ps. Conversely, only one activity, helping to resolve local conflicts, 
was consistently ignored. 
As was the pattern with the respondents' descriptions of purposive roles, 
M Ps of different social backgrounds and affiliations and representing differ- 
ent types of districts did not differ significantly or consistently in respect to 
the role behavior they reported. Further examination of the data, however, 
indicates that in choosing to concentrate their efforts on different activities, 
the members of the three samples tended to cluster themselves by selecting 
activities that were similar in type. The inclination of M Ps to cluster them- 
selves on the basis of the activities to which they devoted most of their time is 
revealed by crosstabulating the respondents' fi rst and second choices of these 
activities. Upon so manipulating the data, one finds that the respondents 
tend to cluster themselves within two broad groups which we shall henceforth 
refer to as the "internals" and the 'externals." As can be seen from a review 
of table 5.3, the great majority of the respondents who said explaining gov- 
ernment policy was their most important activity also indicated that debating 
and amending bills was the second most important activity on their agendas. 
Conversely, a majority of those who said that legislation was their most 
important activity indicated that explaining government policy was their 
second most important duty. 
By contrast, a majority of those who devoted their principal efforts to 
obtaining resources for their districts said that their second most important 
activity was contacting civil servants on their constituents' behalf. And the 
great majority of those whose principal activity was contacting civil servants 
said their next most important effort was obtaining resources for their dis- 
tricts. Given these clusters, we shall label the first group of respondents (those 
who confine the bulk of their activities to discussing government policy and 
legislating) as "internals," and the second (those who obtain resources and 
intercede with civil servants) as 'externals." 
In reviewing the distribution of the data in table 5.3, the reader will note 
that respondents who indicated that their most important activity was ex- 
pressing the views of their districts do not fit neatly into either of the afore- 
mentioned clusters. However, because of the low N of our country samples, 
we have decided to apportion these respondents to the internal and external 
clusters on the basis of the activity they regard as the second most important. 
It is then possible to present a typology of legislators' behavioral roles and a 
distribution of the three country samples across this typology (see table 5.4). 
TABLE 5.2. 
Activities to which Legislators Devote Most of Their Time (percentages) 
Kmya 
Flmi Second 
chdce chdce Total 
Explaining policies to voters 15 11 26 
Proposing, debating, and amending bills 19 15 34 
Expressing the views of the people in my district 15 19 24 
Obtaining government resources for my district 44 15 59 
Interceding with civil servants on constituents' behalf 7 37 44 
Resolving local conflicts - - - 
second 
c h d a  Total 
Turlrey 
Flnt Second 
choke choke TOW 
A 
Second chdca 
- 
TABLE 5.3. 
Most Important Activities: First Choice by Second Choice (percentages) 
Fin1 chdce 
Explaining policy - 38 10 10 4 - 
Debating bills 25 - 43 20 6 - 
Expressing views of district 40 38 - 17 16 100 
Obtaining resources 26 6 19 - 74 - 
Contacting civil servants 9 14 29 53 - - 
Resolving conflicts 
N =  
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We believe that the categories of internal and external legislators are valu- 
able in analyzing representation for several reasons. In order to understand 
representation we need to know what legislators actually do, and our question 
about how they spend their time (though imperfect) is our best measure of 
their activity. We have found (table 5.2) that in fact some members tend to 
concentrate their time on activities within the legislature, while others con- 
centrate on activities outside the legislature. We recognize of course that 
some members (perhaps many of those who are unclassified) devote much 
time to both. We believe, nevertheless, that this distinction between internal 
and external priorities in MPs' activities is the most useful analytical tech- 
nique, given our data. No other distinction between the kinds of roles legis- 
lators play was apparent in all three countries. Consequently, we will devote 
considerable attention in the rest of this chapter to determining which char- 
acteristics are useful in distinguishing between these two types and how they 
differ in actions and beliefs. 
COUNTRY VARIATIONS BY ROLE BEHAVIOR 
As shown in table 5.4, the typology embraces between 69 and 84 percent 
of the M Ps surveyed in each of the three countries, proportions that support 
the use of this dichotomy as an appropriate scheme for distinguishing among 
the behavioral roles of most legislators. Most interesting are the differences 
among the countries: the much larger proportion of externals in Kenya, the 
larger proportion of externals in Korea, and the larger proportion of inter- 
nals in Turkey. In trying to explain these differences, we might compare 
electoral structures, party systems, legislativeexecutive relations. or basic 
socioeconomic differences among the three countries. In choosing which roles 
to emphasize, individual members may be guided by their own preferences; 
the demands made on them by colleagues, other political actors, and con- 
stituents; and the realistic possibilities for effective activity within or outside 
the legislature. Because our typology is a relative ranking, it is affected by ' 
variables that encourage or deter internal activities, as well as by those that 
have an impact on external activities. 
Earlier in this chapter, in our analysis of purposive roles, we noted several 
factors that help to determine how many members emphasize representing 
voters. These same factors should help to determine how much time mem- 
bers devote to external activities. Consequently, the higher proportion of 
"externals" in Kenya may result partly from the use of single-member dis- 
tricts and the absence of such linkage vehicles as strong local parties. The 
multimember districts and strong local parties in Turkey may discourage 
Turkish MPs from devoting as much time to external activities. The priority 
attached to internal activities, on the other hand, is certainly affected by the 
opportunities available to members to participate in debates, offer amend- 
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ments, and have some impact on the policymaking process. These oppor- 
tunities were greater in Turkey than in Kenya and Korea, where policy- 
making is dominated by the executive. 
The level of economic development in the three countries would also 
appear to have some effect on the priorities that legislators assign to internal 
and external matters. Due to factors discussed in chapter I ,  we would expect 
that the more urbanized and industrialized the country, the more likely the 
legislators are to devote time to internal matters. 
As noted in chapter I ,  political conflict in agrarian societies usually occurs 
between competing sectional interests, geographically defined, rather than 
between competing economic interests, functionally defined. As a result, 
legislators in agrarian societies are most likely to define the constituencies 
they represent in geographical or sectional terms, while those in industrial 
societies define their constituents in terms of the different economic interests 
located in their districts, interests which usually exist in other districts as 
well. 
Where legislators perceive the interests of their constituents in geographic 
terms. as in Kenya, the main task of the legislator, if he is responsive to 
constituent demands, is that of obtaining resources for his district and helping 
individual constituents with their problems. This role does not require devo- 
tion to the task of policymaking, but rather to the specific distribution of 
resources already allocated by the policymaking process to his district. Most 
of these activities occur outside the legislature, and thus can be described as 
external. 
Where legislators define the needs of their constituents in terms of the 
demands made by the leading economic interests in their districts, as they do 
in Turkey, their main task is to shape the outcomes of the policymaking 
process so that the resources allocated by that process are directed to interests 
of the kind located in their districts. This means that the legislator must be 
concerned with the making of public policy as it occurs in the legislature (if 
indeed it does) and within other institutions at the center of the political 
system, such as the executive branch. 
TABLE 5.4. 
A Typology of Legidaton' Eehavioral Roks By 
Country (percentages) 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
lnternalr 28 28 46 
Externals 54 42 23 
Not classified 18 30 31 
N = (28) (83) (104) 
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If external and internal priorities of legislators were based entirely on the 
level of development, Korean MPs should be approximately as internally 
oriented as those in Turkey. We have already suggested, however, that other 
factors (such as executive domination of policymaking and the structure of the 
electoral system) may reduce the internal orientation of Korean legislators. 
The relationship between the level of development and behavioral roles 
that we have found at  the national level appears to be replicated at the 
district level. Legislators from rural districts tend to be externals, while those 
from more urban and more economically developed areas tend to be inter- 
nals. We were unable, however, to determine whether the behavior of the 
members in our three samples was primarily a function of the overall level of 
development in their respective countries or of the level of development in 
the districts they represent. Upon controlling for the effects of both variables, 
we found that the impact of each appeared to be roughly the same. 
PERSONAL BACKGROUND VARlABLES 
Among the personal background variables that might be expected to affect 
behavioral roles, we found that social status and ideology (see chapter 4) had 
no effect. We did find, however, that older respondents were more likely to 
be internals than externals. A major reason for the positive relationship 
between the age of MPs and their propensity to be internals is the correlation 
between age and political experience. 
Older MPs have been elected to office many more times than younger 
legislators,' and are therefore more likely to occupy leadership positions in 
their parties and in the government, should their party be in power. As such 
they are more likely to be concerned with questions of basic policy than are 
younger MPs, questions which require them to concentrate their efforts on 
activities which transpire within the legislature and at the center of the politi- 
cal system. The data suggest a strong and clear relationship between being a 
party leader and being an internal. The MPs who have held party office at  
the national level, or who have been officers of their parliamentary party, are 
more likely to be internals than are legislators who have merely held staff 
positions or positions within local party organizations. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MPS' PURPOSIVE A N D  BEHAVIORAL ROLES 
There ought to be a positive relationship between the purposive and be- 
havioral roles of legislators, that is between what they think are the most 
important parts of their job and what they say they devote most time to. 
Table 5.5 shows this to be the case. The internals are more likely to rank as 
important those parts of the job that would appear to arise within the legisla- 
ture: lawmaking, legal duties, and implementing government policy. Policy- 
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making, however, was mentioned more often by externals. Those classified 
as externals were also more likely to mention representing voters, checking 
the executive branch, and initiating plans for economic and social develop- 
ment, plans that would presumably be focused on the district. The fact that 
externals gave more attention to checking the executive branch is interesting, 
for it is a function that while not strictly internal, is more national than local 
in its focus. 
When legislators were asked which activities they would like to spend 
more or less time on, there was a slight tendency for internals to prefer 
internal activities and for externals to mention external activities. It is clear, 
however, that some members would like to spend more time on types of 
activities substantially different from those that now take up their time. One 
reason for  this is that  in countries with the most externals-Kenya and 
Korea-many legislators wanted to play a more active role in policymaking 
through debate and amendment of bills; in Turkey, where there were more 
internals, many M Ps said that they should spend more time getting govern- 
ment resources for the district. 
There was, as we would expect, a much closer correlation between the 
internalexternal dichotomy and the MPs' responses to a question about 
whether national or district problems occupied most of their time. Almost 78 
percent of the externals said they concentrated on district problems, and 56 
percent of the internals said they concentrated on national problems. The dif- 
ferent types of issues which occupied internab and externals further suggests 
TABLE 5.5. 
MPs' Descriptions of the Role of the Legislator by the 
Roles Legislators Actually Play (percentages) 
Activities pursued by internals 
Lawmaking. legislating 61 29 
Performing "constitutional" and legally defined duties 9 4 
Policymaking, participating in key government decisions 8 15 
Assisting in the implementation of government policy 
through close cooperation with the executive 6 3 
Total 84 51 
Activities pursued by externals 
Representing the voters and/or various interest groups 30 44 
Checking and balancing the power of the executive branch 8 18 
Initiating plans for economic and social development 1 8 
Total 39 70 
Other activities 12 12 
N =  (77) (73) 
Note: Percentages total to more than 100 because of multiple responses. 
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that internals are basically oriented towards the center of the political system, 
while externals face the periphery. This distinction will be explored further 
below. 
THE LEGISLATOR IN THE DISTRICT 
In order to understand more specifically how legislators represent their 
constituents and what variations occur in representation, we will present 
data on the legislators' descriptions of what they do in their districts: how 
often they visit, to whom they talk, what topics are discussed. We will make 
comparisons among countries, and also look for differences reported by in- 
ternal~ and externals. Subsequently, in chapter 6, we will explore constituent 
views of the M Ps' visits to their districts. 
Let us begin by examining how frequently legislators visit their districts. 
Not all legislators can make frequent visits. First, there is the problem of 
distance. Some electoral districts are far from the capital. Transportation 
systems, like distance, may either facilitate or impede travel to a legislator's 
constituency. Second, the amount of time each deputy may devote to visiting 
his constituency varies. Those in leadership positions, for example, may have 
less time for visits than do backbenchers. It may also be argued that legis- 
lators whose seats are insecure may be more motivated to visit their districts 
than those who experience fewer difficulties in getting reelected. 
Our data show that most legislators visit their districts one or more times 
each month. Although all Kenyan districts are located within a day's travel 
of the capital, it is still remarkable that 96 percent of the Kenyan deputies 
visited their districts three times or more a month, indicating the importance 
they accorded to being available to their constituents. It is also somewhat 
surprising to discover that almost half of the elected Korean deputies did not 
feel the need to visit their districts, despite the fact that most Korean districts 
are easily accessible. Seventy-six percent of the Turkish legislators visited 
their districts once or  twice a month. Those paying more frequent visits were 
from provinces which are either near the capital or  easily reached by rapid 
transport systems. 
Contrary to what might be expected, we do not find that externals visit 
their districts more often than internals do. Neither do we find evidence from 
our Kenyan and Korean data to support our expectation that backbenchers 
would visit their districts more because they had more time available. While 
we might also expect that the frequency of visits by a legislator to his district 
might be determined by his expectations about the prospects for reelection, 
this line of reasoning is not borne out by the data. Those Turkish and Korean 
deputies who anticipated opposition to their renomination (the question was 
not asked in Kenya) did not appear to visit their districts any more frequently 
than those who expected no such opposition. Thus, easy access to transpor- 
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tation determines frequency of visits by deputies to their districts in Turkey, 
but not in Korea, where strong personal electoral machines eliminate the 
need for frequent visits to the constituency. 
What do legislators do when they visit their districts? Whom do they see or 
who tries to see them? The answers to these questions will help us identify the 
linkage patterns between the legislators and the constituents. We asked legis- 
lators in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey whether they saw most of their con- 
stituents individually or in groups when they visited their districts. Kenyan 
deputies most often saw their constituents both individually and in groups, 
Korean deputies individually, and Turkish deputies in groups. 
Table 5.6 shows that Kenyan and Korean legislators demonstrated remark- 
ably similar activity patterns when they visit their districts. They asked con- 
stituents about their problems and in some cases informed them about new 
laws. By contrast, Turkish legislators most frequently mentioned informing 
citizens about new laws, and also often said that they asked them their 
opinions about legislation. 
We also see a difference in emphasis in constituent visits between internals 
and externals. lnternals were most likely to inform constituents about new 
laws and policies; two-thirds of them either informed constituents about laws 
or  sought their opinions. By contrast, two-thirds of the externals said that 
their most important activity was to find out about constituent problems, 
and only 4 percent of them gave top priority to discerning views on legis- 
lation. In other words, internals used their district visits to facilitate and 
support their legislative activities within the central institutions of the politi- 
cal system, while externals used the visits to become better informed about 
the needs and demands of their districts. 
The differences in the mode of legislators' interaction and the type of 
activities they conducted when visiting their districts suggested that systemic 
TABLE 5.6. 
Legislators' Most Important Activity when Visiting District (percentages) 
All countrlw 
AcUvity Kenya Korea Turkey Internalr Externals 
Asking constituents' opin- 
ions about legislation 4 2 22 22 4 
Asking constituents what 
problems are troubling 
them 72 75 16 31 66 
Informing constituents about 
new laws and policies 16 15 54 44 16 
Others 8 8 8 3 14 
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characteristics may affect the behavior of legislators. Kenya, as noted earlier, 
has the least structured and formalized political party. The Kenyan deputy 
does not have intermediary institutions between himself and his constituents. 
He meets them both in groups and as individuals, consults them about their 
problems, and then tries to assist them. The Korean M P, on the other hand, 
belongs to a well-organized and disciplined party at the parliamentary level 
that has no counterpart at the local level. Instead there is often a personal 
political machine, the members of which the Korean MP consults for infor- 
mation on district problems. 
The Turkish deputy not only belongs to an organized and disciplined 
parliamentary party, but also to a national party organization that is well 
organized on the local level. The fact that several deputies represent the same 
province (for example, forty-three deputies represented Istanbul in 1977) 
means that a single deputy does not have a clearly defined constituency, at 
least not in geographic terms. When a Turkish deputy visits his district, he 
will typically go to the headquarters of the local party organization, talk to 
the party activists, and bring them news from Ankara, often explaining how 
new legislation and government decisions may be exploited for local ends. 
Personal problems are sometimes brought to the member, but local party 
leaders tend to most of these. 
The analysis we have presented above is given added support by an exami- 
nation of whom the MP tries to see or  who tries to see him most often when 
he is visiting his district, and of what the topics of conversation are. 
As indicated in table 5.7, Korean and Turkish MPs saw party officials 
(members of their political machines in Korea, and local party leaders and 
activists in Turkey) when they visited their districts. Kenyan MPs saw party 
officials and local leaders of various kinds, many of whom constituted the 
local personal machine of the MP in the district. Korean MPs also mentioned 
seeing village heads and other traditional leaders, suggesting their importance 
as a source of support. 
Kenyan MPs often mentioned contacts with local civil servants, such as 
district or subdistrict commissioners, for two reasons. First, these public 
officials have an important role to play in the planning and execution of 
development projects, and it is therefore important for the MP to maintain 
close relations with them. Second, M Ps act as transmitters of constituency 
problems and desires, interceding with them on behalf of constituents. The 
Korean deputy, though to a lesser extent, also devoted some time to visiting 
with civil servants. Turkish deputies, however, did not report such contacts, 
since this was ordinarily done by local party leadership. It is also true that in 
Turkey, provincial and subprovincial governors, for example, perceive them- 
selves as nonpartisan employees of the state, and shy away from close rela- 
tions with deputies who are political figures. 
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If we divide the MPs from all countries into internals and externals, it is 
clear that the former make a concerted effort to contact party officials, while 
the latter seek out other local notables, such as leading businessmen, leaders 
of interest groups and social organizations, and village headsmen and chiefs. 
Sixty-two percent of the externals in our study contacted party officials first 
when visiting their home districts, while only 38 percent of the internals did 
so. This may be because the party leaders, though functioning at the local 
level and often parochial in their roles and interests, are often part of a 
national organization which is directed at the center; the other local leaders 
are not only located on the periphery, they are actually much more interested 
in the purely local problems that are of particular concern to externals. 
The topics deputies discussed when visiting their districts also confirmed 
the influence of systemic constraints on modes of interaction with wnstitu- 
ents (see table 5.8). Kenyan deputies most often discussed district matters, 
whereas Koreans discussed partisan matters, consulting with members of 
their personal political machines. 
Turkish legislators, on the other hand, talked most about national political 
matters. We suspect, however, that the concern with national matters was 
somewhat exaggerated, while district problems were somewhat deempha- 
sized, as a consequence of the Turkish intervention on Cyprus. Yet the basic 
pattern was probably unchanged, since more than 60 percent of the inter- 
views were, in fact, completed a month before the military action. 
lnternals and externals also differed in the subjects they discussed with the 
people they made a special effort to see. The distinctions here were somewhat 
blurred, because the subjects discussed also varied with the type of persons 
MPs saw, but when talking to local leaders other than party officials, ex- 
ternals were more likely to discuss local issues and personal matters than were 
TABLE 5.7. 
Who Legislator Sees when Visiting District (percentages) 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
Village head, traditional leader 
Local social leaders 
Business notables 
Party officials 
Civil servants 
Others 
None in particular 
N = 
Note: Percentages do not add to 100 because categories of minor importance 
in all countries have been eliminated. Figures in parenthesis indicate second 
ranked activity. 
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internals, and less likely to discuss issues of national concern. When talking 
to party officials, however, there was little difference between the two types of 
legislators, as both were particularly interested in discussing partisan matters. 
These findings suggest again that internals tend to be oriented towards the 
center of the political system, while externals look to the periphery. 
FOCUS OF REPRESENTATION 
Students of American legislatures, and a few studying other countries, 
have sought to determine how legislators make choices among various groups 
that they represent or have responsibilities t o ~ a r d . ~  Particular attention has 
been paid to the distinction between trustees, who follow their own convic- 
tions, and delegates, who take instructions from a particular constituency. 
These distinctions are particularly meaningful in those legislative bodies (such 
as the United States Congress and state legislatures) in which members play 
an important decison-making role and have some freedom to choose among 
various groups that make demands on them. The greater the range of answers 
to such questions in a legislature, the greater the variety and complexity of 
roles there are; where there is consensus on representational focus, or on 
other types of roles, we can conclude that legislative norms are strong enough 
to prevent much diversity. 
A comparison of representational roles in several legislative bodies should 
be useful because it would demonstrate how much consensus there is in each 
body and provide some basis for estimating the importance of various factors 
in the decision-making process. In other words, it is one important clue to 
understanding how legislators represent and whom they represent. 
There are some limitations, however, in the utility of such role analysis- 
TABLE 5.8. 
Topics of Discussion when Visiting District (percentages) 
-- -- 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
National political matters 
District matters 
Campaign matters 
Partisan matters 
General matters 
Personal matters 
Other 
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate second ranked activity. Figures may not 
add to 100 due to errors in rounding. 
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particularly on a crossnational basis. The choices that a legislator makes in 
choosing among competing foci of representation may be more complicated 
than can be captured in a few brief questions. Legislators may give the 
answers that they think are expected of them, rather than completely frank 
responses. Legislators in different political cultures may interpret questions 
differently. While these problems are inherent in all crossnational studies 
based on questionnaires, they seem particularly applicable to the study of 
representative roles. 
We must also recognize that the average member of the legislature in each 
of the three countries we are studying played a modest role in the decision- 
making process. The strength of executive authority in Kenya and Korea, 
and the strength of party in Korea and Turkey, limited the choices that MPs 
could make on legislative matters. Undoubtedly, many legislators paid less 
attention to legislative business then they did to constituency service. 
Keeping these limitations in mind, we shall now examine the responses of 
MPs to a series of questions on representation. The MPs were asked, "If you 
had to make a choice between the views of the following groups, which one 
would you choose?" These five groups were on the list: "my constituents," 
"leaders of my party," "my personal conviction," "my party faction," and "a 
major interest group." The results are summarized in table 5.9, which shows 
the results of the forced choices among the three most salient groups-party 
leaders, constituents, and the MPs personal convictions. The bottom half of 
the table shows what proportion of MPs ranked each group high, using an 
additive index (one point for each time the item was chosen). It should 
be noted that members in Kenya were less willing to make such choices 
than were those in the other two countries. This is largely because the politi- 
cal party and party leaders are less important in that legislature, and con- 
sequently choices involving the party were not meaningful to many Kenyan 
legislators. 
A close examination of the data shows some interesting differences among 
the countries. Interest groups commanded little attention in any of the coun- 
tries, and, except in Korea, party factions were relatively unimportant. In 
Korea a strong party orientation was evident in the responses of MPs; this 
appears to reflect the political realities of the Korean legislature. The Korean 
MPs also gave higher priority to their own beliefs than they did to the views 
of their constituents. 
The strong constituency orientations of Kenyan legislators, which we have 
noted throughout this chapter, were evident in the analysis of representative 
focus. When asked to choose between their constituents and other groups, 
Kenyan MPs always chose their constituents. Kenya was the only country 
where a majority of those responding professed to prefer the views of con- 
stituents to their own. In reality, many Kenyan legislators believe that they 
must remain sensitive to the general wishes of their constituency, but that, 
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being better educated and informed, they are responsible for guiding and 
articulating constituency wishes. It would be incorrect to assume from this 
analysis that Kenyan MPs regularly vote against the party leadership, but 
the data do suggest that they maintain a strong constituency orientation and 
that they use whatever opportunities they have in the capital to advance 
constituency interests. 
In Turkey, where MPs are elected on party slates in multimember districts, 
it is not surprising to find that constituency ranks relatively low. What is 
surprising is that, despite the strength of the party system, members ranked 
party leaders even lower than constituents. By far the strongest focus of 
representation for Turkish MPs, according to them, were their own convic- 
tions. The label of trustee would appear to fit the Turkish MPs better than it 
would MPs in other countries. The relatively high level of education and 
legislative experience among Turkish legislators probably contributes to their 
trustee orientation (though it is not higher than the levels found in Korea). 
The constitutional declaration that MPs should represent the whole nation 
rather than any district, together with Turkey's strong national party organi- 
zation, contributes to the norm that makes a purely constituency delegate 
role seem too parochial. The independence that Turkish MPs expressed 
TABLE 5.9. 
Legislators' Focus of Representation 
Kenya Korea 
Percentage of members making 
choice 
Party leaders v. 14 53 
my constituents 36 39 
Personal convictions v. 
my constituents 
Party leaders v. 14 58 
personal convictions 21 36 
Percentage of members scoring 
high for each item on index 
My constituents 25 36 
Leaders of my party 14 57 
My personal convictions 18 53 
My party faction 7 17 
Major interest group 4 0 
N =  (28) (83) 
Turkey 
Note: Legislators who were unwilling or unable to make these choices are not 
listed, and consequently percentages in the top part of the table do not add up to 
100. The index in the bottom half of the table was constructed by counting one 
point for each time an item was chosen in forced choices with another item, 
resulting in scores ranging from 0 to 4 for each index. Those MPs with a score of 
3 or 4 on an item are classified as scoring high. 
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with regard to party leaders may reflect some wishful thinking, though it is 
not an uncommon occurrence for legislators to resign from their parties over 
an issue and become independents or eventually join another party. 
We compared the answers given by our two major categories of MPs- 
internals and externals-to the questions on focus of representation, but 
found no significant differences. In other words. those who devoted their 
time primarily to legislative business were not more responsive to party 
leaders as we might have expected. Neither were those who spent more time 
on district affairs necessarily more responsive to their constituents when 
making decisions. We will return to the topic of representative focus in 
chapter 6, where we will compare the choices of MPs with the preferences of 
their constituents. 
Chapter 6 
CONSTITUENTS A N D  REPRESENTATION 
Representation is shaped by the interplay between representatives and 
constituents. In the preceding chapter, we concentrated on the problem of 
representation as seen from the standpoint of legislators. Now we turn to the 
other actors in representative linkages, the constituents. How do constituents 
regard the legislative institution? What kind of roles do they attribute to 
their MPs? How do they evaluate the performance of their representatives? 
What positions do they take on key policy issues, and to what extent are 
their preferences represented by their MPs? And what are the consequences 
of representative linkages in broader political terms? 
Two different but interrelated topics are explored in this chapter. The first 
is the political subculture of representation at the constituency level. The 
second is the nature of linkages between the M P  and his district. Let us 
elaborate the first topic by formulating a precise definition of legislative cul- 
ture and by specifying its analytic components. 
THE CONCEPT OF LEGISLATIVE 
CULTURE 
The term legislative culture refers to the patterns of popular recognition, 
role expectation, and evaluation of the legislature and its individual members. 
In this sense it is part of the general political culture in a society, a part 
specific to the representative institution. It consists of the public's belief about 
and attitudes towards the function and performance of the representative 
body. Several aspects of the concept require further explication. 
The legislative culture is, first, a political subculture because it is comprised 
of beliefs and attitudes concerning a single political institution. In an effort 
to make our concept consistent with the more general Almond-Verba formu- 
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lation, we too will regard the legislative culture as based on three dimensions: 
cognitive, affective. and evaluative.' Thus, the legislative culture may be 
described in terms of the patterns of cognition, affection, and evaluation 
regarding a representative body. 
Second, the legislative culture focuses upon beliefs and attitudes rooted in 
the masses. Our attention is directed principally to the constituent attitudes 
and their patterns of distribution across the population, not to the system of 
beliefs and norms governing the behavior of legislators within a representative 
body. While legislative culture could be taken to mean the subculture within 
the legislative body itself, we wish to make it clear that in our study it refers 
only to the constitutents' attitudes and beliefs. 
Third, the legislative culture may be described at different levels of society. 
One can speak of the legislative culture in a nation as a whole. In this 
instance, one is concerned with a general characterization of the patterns of 
popular beliefs and attitudes relevant to the representative institution. One 
may also speak of the legislative culture in a district. The district legislative 
culture consists of the patterns of attitudes shared by those who reside in a 
geographically defined area. 
Just as one can describe the system of beliefs and attitudes as it exists in a 
district, so can one apply the same concept to a group of elites such as local 
 notable^.^ Given the political activism and influence of local elites, the legis- 
lative culture embedded in an elite stratum may prove to be much more 
important than the general culture of a district in shaping representative 
linkages. In a crossnational comparison, the national legislative culture may 
be an appropriate focus, while both the district and the elite legislative cul- 
tures may be of particular utility for comparisons within nations.-' 
Fourth, the legislative culture as we define it constitutes an important part 
of the political milieu in which the legislature and its individual members 
function. Not only is the MP elected by a geographically defined constitu- 
ency, i.e., an electoral district, but he also must serve his district in some way 
between elections. The legislative culture intervenes in the election process 
by playing a role in voters'decisions. It may also influence the ways in which 
M Ps behave between elections. Obviously, M Ps who operate in a legislative 
culture which places little emphasis on personal records are less likely to 
perform certain acts designed to impress the voters. The legislative culture 
may also influence the daily activities of MPs, the frequency and mode of 
their interactions with constituents. 
The components of legislative culture include the public's cognition of the 
legislature (knowledge about the legislature and about the activities of indi- 
vidual M Ps) and its actions, the roles that the public attributes to M Ps, and 
the public's evaluation of the institution and its members. We shall report 
data on such knowledge and its distribution pattern at the constituency level. 
In investigating role expectations, one cannot assume that every adult 
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citizen has a clear conception of what MPs should do. In fact, it is more 
realistic to assume that citizens lack such clear role expectations. We begin, 
therefore, by seeking information about the extent to which citizens hold 
welldefined role expectations concerning MPs. We also examine the con- 
tents of their role expectations. Whom do constituents think the M Ps should 
represent? (This is often referred to as a representational focus.) How should 
the M Ps discharge their d u t i e ~ ? ~  (This is usually called representational style, 
and refers to the MP's choice of following his own convictions or those of 
others.) Another aspect of role expectations is the personal qualities that 
constituents believe M Ps should possess. 
A final component of the legislative culture is the constituents'evaluation 
of the legislature and of its members' performance. Do constituents believe 
that legislators have the personal qualities that they consider important? 
Their judgment on this may affect their evaluation of the legislature and their 
support for it. Evaluative attitudes also entail the public's judgment of the 
performance of MPs in particular and the legislature in general. 
THE CONCEPT OF LINKAGES 
Our understanding of representation is enhanced when we can determine 
the precise nature of linkages connecting an MP and his constituency. In the 
final analysis, representation refers to the manner in which the representative 
and the constituent are connected. The core of representation studies should 
therefore focus on linkages of this kind. 
Linkages may be examined from three different vantage points. First, we 
may examine the patterns of interaction between the M P and his constitu- 
ents. A description of these linkages involves an analysis of a complex inter- 
active process and is an insuperably difficult task. It requires matching an 
MP with his specific home district, which in turn necessitates the transfor- 
mation of the individual-level data to group-level data, the level of the con- 
stituency as a whole. Where a single member represents a district, the task of 
matching the data is a relatively simple matter, but it becomes a treacherous 
operation in multimember districts such as exist in both Korea and Turkey. 
Therefore, we shall pursue the subject only insofar as we can make some 
intuitive sense? 
Linkages may also be examined in terms of policy concurrences between 
an MP and his  constituent^.^ To what extent is there agreement over key 
policy issues? Do MPs and constituents agree that the benefits of economic 
growth should be equally distributed? Do they agree that political democracy 
should be a principal developmental objective? Do they agree that rapid 
social modernization is necessary, even at the expense of valued traditions? 
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The last but not the least important context in which linkages may be 
viewed is that of role congruence or the extent to which an MP and his 
constituents hold a concurrent perception of the legislator's role. Since we 
have already made an analytic distinction between representational foci and 
styles, role congruence will be investigated in terms of these two analytic 
dimensions. 
PATTERNS OF LEGISLATIVE CULTURE 
Because the legislative culture refers to the patterns of beliefs and attitudes 
that constituents hold toward the parliament and its members, it provides a 
convenient descriptive vehicle to characterize the basic public attitudes and 
expectations in a nation. 
COGNITIONS 
How much does the public in each country know about the legislature? Is 
the legislature more salient to some citizens than others? To measure the 
public awareness of the institution, we put to our respondents three questions: 
how familiar were they with the history of the nation's legislature; did they 
know the size of the legislature; and could they distinguish the legislature 
from other government agencies? The relevant data from the survey are 
summarized in table 6.1. 
TABLE 6.1. 
Level of Knowledge about the Legislative Institution (ptrcentnp) 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
Local ConaUt- Local Conrttt- Local Conrlt- 
Salbnca ltmu notabler wntr notables uenb notables uentr 
Knew the history of 
the legislature 74.8 46.6 80.3 40.2 83.3 53.4 
Knew the correct size 
of legislative 
membership' 56.5 21.6 62.4 19.2 83.2 39.3 
Could distinguish the 
legislature from 
other government 
agenciesb 49.9 21.6 66.5 2.6 88.9 56.2 
a. An answer was considered "correct" if the number indicated by a respondent came within a 
range of f 10 of the real size. 
b. Respondents were asked to indicate the differences in functions between the legislaturn and 
other partsot government. Those who mentloned one or more such differences were taken as being 
able to make such distinction. 
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Of the three nations the Turkish public appeared to be the best informed 
about their legislature. More than half of the Turkish constituents (53.4 per- 
cent) had a good knowledge of the history of their legislature; nearly 40 
percent were capable of accurately indicating the size of the legislature, and 
56 percent knew that the legislature is charged with distinctive functions and 
therefore is different from other government agencies. In Korea and Kenya 
the legislative institution was considerably less salient to the public. 
These differences may be due to two unique features of Turkish history 
and politics. Of the three countries studied, Turkey's legislative history dating 
back to the turn of the century is the longest. During this long period the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly has become firmly institutionalized in 
the minds of the general population and is therefore now regarded as one of 
the key political institutions. 
The second feature relates to the visibility of the Grand National Assembly. 
Because the cabinet system headed by a prime minister requires the support 
of a majority of the legislature, the executive power is constrained in a signifi- 
cant way by what transpires in the representative body. Hence, the Turkish 
National Assembly serves as a central political arena, and enjoys high public 
visibility. By comparison, the legislatures of Kenya and Korea are oversha- 
dowed by a dominant executive and relegated to a relatively minor role. 
Among those who act as the leaders of their local communities, the legis- 
lature is a highly salient institution in all three countries. The level of knowl- 
edge of this group concerning the history, the s i z  of membership, and the 
specific functions of the legislature is consistently higher than that of ordinary 
citizens. Further, it was the Turkish local elites who were the best informed 
in this regard among the elites of the three countries. 
How much detailed information do constituents have about individual 
members of the legislature: What proportion know the name of their own 
M P? How specific is their knowledge of the MP's activities? We distinguish 
the salience of an institution from that of its individual members, because 
they are two different cognitive elements. 
The salience of individual M Ps may derive in part from what Almond and 
Verba have called "the subject culture."' This type of culture is distinguished 
from others by its overwhelming emphasis on the output of the political 
process. In a subject culture the citizen's attention is directed disproportion- 
ately to those aspects of leadership behavior that involve the delivery of 
political goods and services, while the input aspects of politics receive little or 
no public attention. Insofar as citizens perceive an opportunity to extract 
goods and services, they might be expected to develop an extensive body of 
political knowledge and become actively involved in the political process. In 
the specific context of representation, this would mean that constituents tend 
to have a good deal of knowledge about their individual members, especially 
when the latter act as a principal provider of goods and services. On the 
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other hand, they would know very little about the legislative institution to 
which their M Ps belong, a body too abstract and too remote in their cognitive 
maps to be of any immediate relevance. 
Kenyan constituents were the best informed about their individual M Ps. 
Nearly every adult citizen knew the name of his or her representative, while 
in other countries scarcely more than one-half of the citizenry could perform 
this task. Also, a majority of Kenyans had a definite opinion concerning the 
honesty and level of education of their MPs. In Korea and Turkey those 
able to indicate the personal qualities of their M Ps were less numerous (see 
table 6.2). 
As we shall show later, Kenyans regarded service as the single most im- 
portant role of their MPs, to a considerably greater extent than did the 
electorates in other countries. Moreover, Kenya uses a single-member district, 
whereas a multimember district is used in Korea and Turkey. The differences 
in these characteristics may account for the higher salience of individual 
MPs in Kenya. It is also important to note that both Kenyan constituents 
and local notables were less capable of distinguishing the MPs from the 
officials of other government agencies than were their counterparts in other 
countries. Only 18 percent of the constituents and 42 percent of the notables 
in Kenya could differentiate MPs from other government officials. In other 
countries these figures were substantially higher. 
TABLE 6.2. 
Level of Knowledge about Individual MPs (percentages) 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
Local Constlt- Local Constlt- Local Constit- 
SJknce Items notablw uenta notables uents notables uenb 
Knew MP's name' 97.1 83.5 96.7 69.1 95.1 52.9 
Knew MP's distinctive 
functionsb 42.2 18.0 82.1 41.6 95.7 68.9 
Had a view on 
whether MPs are 
honestC 90.7 87.7 30.7 82.3 85.0 74.8 
Had a view on 
whether MPs are 
well educatedC 91.7 87.5 57.0 87.5 91.4 79.2 
a. Because of the multimember system used in Korea and Turkey, the respondents were allowed to 
name several MPs. Anyone naming one or more of his or her MPs was included in the computations. 
b. The question was designed to indlcate whether the respondent could differentiate the legis- 
lators from other civil sewante. Those who could clearly mention one or more differences were 
included in the computations. In Kenya 37 percent of the constituents and 35 percent of the local 
notables said that there were no differences in functions between their MPs and government officiala. 
c. Honesty and good education were the two personal qualities of an MP regarded as most im- 
portant by the public. The MPs were, it is assumed. more salient to those who could express a view. 
positive or negative, on their MP's honesty (and education) than to those who could not. 
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The evidence suggests that Kenyans know a great deal about what the 
individual members of their legislature do, but very little about what the 
legislative institution itself does. This cognitive discrepancy appears to be 
due to Kenyans' preoccupation with the extraction of scarce government 
resources, a tendency characteristic of a subject culture, and their view of 
M Ps as the principal agents of resource allocation. 
Local notables were significantly better informed about individual MPs 
and their activities than were ordinary citizens. These differences were pro- 
nounced and consistent across all three countries. As leaders of their com- 
munities, opinion makers, and intermediaries between the center and their 
respective communities, local notables naturally keep in close touch with 
what M Ps do. 
One interesting aspect of local notable data came from Korea where the 
local notables showed relatively low percentages (as compared to Kenya and 
Turkey) on two items. Quite contrary to our expectations, less than 3 1 per- 
cent indicated a definite opinion concerning the honesty of their MPs, and 
only 57 percent expressed familiarity with M Ps' educational qualifications. 
These figures compare very poorly with those of the general public. It is 
difficult to believe that the Korean notables were less well informed of their 
MPs' honesty and educational qualifications than was the public at large. 
Instead, what seems to be reflected here is notables' reluctance to reveal their 
true feelings about their M Ps' qualities. The political sensitivity of the ques- 
tions, combined with deeply ingrained cultural attitudes that discourage any 
criticism of a specific leader, may have caused many Korean notables to 
avoid the questions rather than give negative replies. 
To summarize, the data on cognition revealed a distinctively different 
pattern in each country. in Turkey, both the legislature and its individual 
members were highly salient objects. In Kenya, MPs were highly salient but 
the institution in which they serve was not. In Korea, neither the legislature 
nor its members were highly salient to the public. 
ROLE EXPECTATIONS 
Role expectations are an important constituent element of the legislative 
culture. What do constituents expect of the legislature and its members? We 
begin first by looking at the personal qualities expected of the MPs in the 
three countries. Table 6.3 lists eight such qualities rated for importance by 
respondents. These qualities include: a good education, personal honesty, 
being a community leader, a lengthy residence in the district, being a success- 
ful person in his occupation, an ability to understand the common man, an 
ability to work hard, and being a member of a particular ethnic or clan 
group. 
The quality most often mentioned by constituents and local notables in all 
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three countries was personal honesty. The second most frequently mentioned 
quality was the ability to work hard, followed by the ability to understand 
the common man and a good education. The pattern was consistent across 
nations and across different groups, suggesting that personal honesty, an 
understanding of common man, and a good education are the qualities 
desired everywhere, not only in MPs, but in all leaders. 
What kinds of activities do constituents expect from their MPs? This 
question relates to one important aspect of legislative roles, generally known 
in the literature as the purposive role.8 In table 6.4 the role perceptions of 
M Ps, local notables, and constituents are compared. The activities considered 
most important by constituents include those matters which directly affect 
them. In each country, constituents listed expressing the views of the district 
as the most important role of the MP. They also stressed the role of MPs 
in bringing government projects to the district and in assisting constituents 
who have problems with government agencies. In all three countries the 
public regarded these constituency service aspects of the MP's role as the 
most important. On the other hand, only a minority of the constituents attri- 
buted great importance to M Ps' role in lawmaking or explaining government 
policies. These findings are in complete accord with recent studie>.of the 
legislature in developing societies. 
TABLE 6.3. 
Important Personal Qualities that Local Notables and 
Constituents Expected of Their MPs (percentages) 
- .  
Kenya Korea Turkey 
Local Comtft- Local Conrtlt- Local ConstH- 
Personal qualitlea notables uentr notablea uentr notablea uents 
Honest 
Hardworking 
Able to understand 
common men 
Good education 
Community leader 
Successful in an 
occupation 
Long-term resident of 
district 
Member of a right 
ethnic or clan group 
58.7 53.8 30.6 38.6 32.8 
Not 
24.3 29.2 8.3 22.7 asked 
22.3 
Not 
asked 
Note: The respondents were asked to rate each quality as "very important." "irnportant," "not im- 
portant." or "don't know" in Kenya and Turkey. In Korea the data were coded without making a 
distinction between "very important" and "irnportant." Only the case of "very important" was included 
in computations for Kenya and Turkey, while the only case for "irnportant" entered the computations 
for Korea. 
TABLE 6.4. 
Role Expectations: Aspects of Legislative Activities Regarded aa Important 
by MPs, Local Notables, and Constituents (percentages) 
- 
Kenya K o n r  Turkey 
Explaining policies to 
voters 
Proposing, debating, 
and amending bills 
Expressing the views 
of the people in 
district 
Obtaining government 
projects for district 
Interceding with civil 
servants for district 
voters 
Resolving local 
conflict 
Visiting district 
Local Conan- Lowl conm- L d  comtlt- 
MPr n o t a w  lnnb M h  n o t a b  uonb M h  notoblr uonb 
10.7. 
32.1 
28.6 
71.4 
28.6 
7.1 
not 
asked 
(28IC 
30.0 
75.0 
55.0 
40.0 
35.0 
0.0 
not 
asked 
(7-0lC 
69.4 
41.7 
51.4 
59.7 
30.6 
16.7 
not 
asked 
(W 
a. The MPs were asked if they felt they should spend more time, about the same time, or less time on each activity listed. The 
percentages include those who said they should spend more time on these activities. 
b. Both the local notables and the constituents were asked to rate the importance of each activity. The percentages include those 
indicating each activity as "very important." 
c. We have examined only those MPs in whose districts we conducted the mass survey. Consequently, the size of Nsfor the MPs are 
smaller than the totals whom we interviewed in each legislature. 
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The local notables had more sophisticated conceptions of the legislative 
role than did the constituents, and placed a higher value on MPs' role in the 
areas of lawmaking and explaining government policies. Nevertheless, it was 
still the constituency service roles of MPs that notables considered most 
important. 
MPs defined their own roles differently than did constituents, and to a 
lesser degree local notables. With the exception of the Kenyan legislators, 
most MPs emphasized their own roles of lawmaking and explaining govern- 
ment policies equally, if not more than, their service roles. For instance, 
nearly 70 percent of the Turkish legislators regarded their role of explaining 
policy as very important, a striking contrast to 39.4 percent of the notables 
and 18 percent of the constituents. In regard to the lawmaking role, the same 
is true: while 42 percent of the MPs stressed this role, the comparable figures 
for the notables and the constituents were 33.4 percent and 18.6 percent, 
respectively. 
In Korea, the lawmaking role was rated very highly in importance by all 
three groups. Among the MPs, three-fourths stressed it, making it by far 
their most valued role. Both notables and the constituents concurred with 
their MPs (67 percent and 44 percent, respectively). The importance attri- 
buted to M Ps' lawmaking role in Korea should not. however, be construed 
to mean that the Korean legislature is an effective lawmaking body. On the 
contrary, its lawmaking power is in fact quite overshadowed by that of the 
executive. Why then did Koreans rate the lawmaking role so highly? 
One possible reason is that many Koreans are profoundly disillusioned 
with their impotent National Assembly. They know that a strong and active 
legislature is the prerequisite of a liberal democracy, a form of government 
promoted in school textbooks in the last three decades. But Koreans also 
know that their legislature is nothing more than a mere rubber-stamp organi- 
zation. Koreans' aspiration for a strong representative body may account for 
their emphasis on the lawmaking role. This response, then, might be inter- 
preted to indicate that Koreans believe their legislature should be stronger 
than it really is. 
Kenyan M Ps provide a unique case. More than two-thirds (7 1.4 percent) 
stressed their constituency service role, especially their activities aimed at 
obtaining government resources and delivering tangible benefits to their 
districts. This role also received the highest rating from both Kenyan notables 
and constituents. In contrast to their Turkish and Korean counterparts, 
Kenyan MPs regarded other activities as much less important. Also, there 
was a widespread consensus on this role among the general population as 
well as among the legislators themselves. This aspect of representation clearly 
distinguishes Kenya from other countries that we have studied. 
MPs represent different groups in their actions. Some MPs endeavor to 
represent the interests of their constituencies, while others act as agents of 
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their political parties or other interest groups. Still others may pursue their 
duties on the basis of their own personal political convictions. The subject 
here pertains to the classical question of representational foci; whom should 
the M Ps strive to represent in the6 action? In our survey we asked the 
respondents to indicate whether or not they felt it important for the MP to 
represent the interests of his district, his political party, the executive branch 
of government, interest groups, his advisors, or to act according to his own 
personal beliefs. As shown in table 6.5, different patterns of representational 
foci emerged in each country. 
In Kenya the district was considered the single most important represen- 
tational focus; almost 86 percent of the notables and 78 percent of the con- 
stituents mentioned the district. Over 73 percent of the notables considered 
the political party, the KANU in this case, to be nearly as important as the 
district. For the constituents, however, the party was not as important. In 
Korea also, the greatest importance was attributed to the district focus, 
followed next by political parties. However, the Turkish pattern was differ- 
ent. Political parties in Turkey were considered more important foci than 
were the electoral districts. This may bedue to the central political role of the 
Turkish parties and to the multimember systems used in that country. 
Of special interest is a strong emphasis placed on personal convictions in 
Korea. More than half of the Korean notables (56.2 percent) felt that MPs 
should act according to their personal convictions. Almost as many constitu- 
ents (43 percent) held similar views. These figures are quite high compared 
to those in other countries, and suggest that many Koreans subscribe to a 
trustee role of representation. 
TABLE 65.  
Role Expectations: Representational Focus Considered Very Important 
by Local Notables and Constituents (percentages) 
Kenya K m  Turkey 
LOCOI conrut- L-I conrut- LOCA conrtn- 
Repcemtt.tionalfoc1 n o l r b h  wnlr notables uenb notables uenlr 
Electoral district 85.4 77.7 62.4 59.1 18.5 15.3 
Political party 73.3 48.0 41.2 23.4 39.0 16.2 
Executive branch of 
government 43.0 38.7 25.6 22.6 14.6 12.2 
Interest group 41.7 41.2 15.2 12.1 18.8 9.3 
MPs personal 
advisers 25.6 26.3 7.5 8.5 10.1 8.1 
MP's own convictions 32.2 27.8 56.2 42.8 29.6 17.8 
N =  (453) (4.128) (468) (2.278) (287) (2,007) 
Note: The comparable data for the MPs were already reported in table 5.9 in chapter 5. Re- 
spondents were asked to rate the importance of each representational focus listed above. The per- 
centages are based on those who rated any focus as "very important." 
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It has been suggested that such trustee orientations are particularly com- 
patible with the prevailing norms and expectations of the leadership role in 
K ~ r e a . ~  Confucian ethics, still dominant in the Korean culture, extol the 
virtue of chijo, being a man of principle. Leaders are expected to stand 
firmly by their personal convictions, and actions leading to compromise or 
conciliation are regarded as egregious violations of the chijo code. The cul- 
tural norms of chijo encourage trustee orientations, making them politically 
appropriate and desirable behaviors. 
Another aspect of role expectation is the style with which an MP performs 
his representative duties. Two different styles of representation have been 
suggested: the delegate and trustee roles.I0 These roles represent the two 
polar types of orientations, the delegate indicating a closer tie with the views 
of constituency while the trustee an inclination to act independently of the 
constituents' views. The orientations of those who could not be classified by 
either of the two role types were grouped into the 'mixed' category." 
The data on representational style show a different pattern in each country 
(see table 6.6). In Kenya a majority of the people expected their M Ps to act 
as delegates. And, Kenyan MPs also perceived their jobs primarily in terms 
of the delegate role. 
The delegate role was deemphasized in both Korea and Turkey. In these 
countries, both the public and MPs themselves considered the trustee role 
as most appropriate. Nearly 60 percent of both Korean and Turkish MPs 
defined their jobs in terms of the trustee role. Local notables of the two 
countries also regarded the trustee role as most appropriate, although to a 
slightly lesser degree than did the MPs themselves (60 percent vs. 53 percent 
in Korea and 6 1 percent vs. 51 percent in Turkey). Constituents' role expecta- 
tions deviated very little from those held by their local leaders. They expected 
the trustee role orientations from their M Ps just as frequently: 41.9 percent 
in Korea and 47.3 percent in Turkey, respectively. 
In all three countries there was a relatively high congruence on the repre- 
sentational roles. Kenyan M Ps, local notables, and constituents regarded the 
delegate role as most appropriate. In Korea and Turkey, all three groups 
indicated their preference for the trustee role. While different role styles were 
stressed in different countries, there exists nonetheless an impressive amount 
of agreement between the MPs and their constituents in each country regard- 
ing what constitutes an appropriate role for the MPs. 
The question of role behavior is quite distinct from that of role expecta- 
tions. And, so, the next question put to MPs was how they actually behave 
in their roles? The same question was put to constituents: On what activities 
should their M Ps spend most of their time? Based on responses to the second 
question we classified the general public into two groups: one that stressed 
the external orientations of their M Ps and the other the internal orientations. 
TABLE 6.6. 
R d e  Expectations: Representational Styles (percentages) 
Kmya Koma Tukey 
Locml Conrtlt- Loul Constlt- Loul Conrtlt- 
Role stykr MPa nokbko mnt. MPa notabkr umts MPa nokblm uonb 
Delegate 64.3 52.9 55.8 20.0 23.1 30.3 30.5 17.0 20.8 
Mixed 17.9 32.2 28.1 20.0 23.7 27.8 8.3 31.6 31.8 
Trustee 17.8 14.9 18.1 60.0 53.2 41.9 61.2 51.4 47.3 
N =  (28) (429) (4,018) (20) (459) (2,083) (72) (282) (1,902) 
Note: The Ns for the notables and constituents in each country are smaller because the cases of no response were 
eliminated in the tabulations. 
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There was a marked discordance between what the MPs actually did and 
what their constituents expected them to do. In all three countries the MPs 
spent less time on external activities than their constituents expected them 
to. In Kenya. over 90 percent of both the notables and constituents stressed 
the external aspects of an MP's role. Yet, among the MPs themselves no 
more than 53.5 percent showed behavioral tendencies that could be classified 
as external. Although the overall emphasis placed on the external aspects of 
the legislative role in Korea and Turkey was quite low, more than two-thirds 
of the constituents in the two countries stressed the external orientation of 
their MPs. Only 35 percent of the Korean MPs and 21 percent of the Turkish 
MPs acted as externals. 
EVALUATION 
Another aspect of the legislative culture is the constituent evaluation of 
the legislature and its members. Does the public feel that their MPs possess 
the kind of personal qualifications they ought to? How well do they feel the 
MPs are performing their job? How strongly do they support the legislature 
as a valid and legitimate institution? To explore the public evaluation of 
MPs' personal qualities, we asked them about the qualities they thought 
M Ps should have and the qualities they thought their M Ps actually did have. 
If the constituents said their MPs did not possess the qualities they should 
have, we considered this a negative evaluation.'* 
TABLE 6.7. 
Shortcomings in the Personal Qualities of MPs as Perceived by 
Local Notables and Constituentsa (percentages) 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
L o d  ConoUt- Local Conrtlt- Local Corutlt- 
LIcklng In qualtler notabler uentr notables uenb notabler uenta 
Honesty 62.7 64.3 - 44.1 48.4 44.5 
Able to understand 
common people 67.5 55.8 - 41.8 59.9 46.8 
Hardworking 58.1 52.8 - 36.5 60.3 44.7 
Good education 47.0 39.4 - 20.8 30.7 32.0 
Community leader 33.6 . 38.9 - 17.7 26.5 23.7 
Successful in an 
occupation 28.5 29.6 - 12.7 32.4 23.5 
Long-term resident of 
district 30.0 33.7 - 11.1 24.7 20.9 
N =  (453) (4,128) - (2.274) (287) (2,007) 
-- 
a. The percentages in this table indicate the proportion of respondents who thought a given 
personal quality very important but felt that most MPs lacked it. 
b. The Korean local notable data were coded differently. Thus, comparable figures could not be 
presented. 
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Strikingly similar qualities were mentioned by all constituents in the three 
countries (table 6.7). Most frequently mentioned was the quality of personal 
honesty of the MP, but it was also one quality that was considered most 
lacking among legislators. Nearly one-half of the constituents in Korea (44.1 
percent) and Turkey (44.5 percent) mentioned a lack of honesty among their 
politicians. In Kenya, almost two-thirds (64.3 percent) considered their M Ps 
to be less than honest. 
Other shortcomings mentioned included M Ps' inability to understand the 
common people and their failure to work hard. More than one-half of the 
Kenyan constituents, and nearly a half in the other two countries, thought 
that their MPs lacked the ability to understand the common people. A large 
number of constituents in all three countries also felt that their MPs did not 
work as hard as they should. The Kenyan citizens were most critical in this 
regard, with nearly 53 percent showing a negative evaluation. In Korea and 
Turkey, too, the negative feeling was quite widespread (36.5 percent and 44.7 
percent, respectively). 
During our fieldwork, as well as in our personal interviews with the MPs, 
we were impressed time and again by the workload each legislator carried. 
Virtually all MPs complained about a short supply of time and staff that 
made it difficult to attend to all the matters they felt they should. We were 
left with the impression that all MPs, leaders and backbenchers, worked 
very hard at their jobs. Still, their constituents thought otherwise. 
Local notables concurred with constituents in their perceptions of M Ps' 
basic shortcomings. For each personal quality examined the local notables' 
evaluation followed very closely the pattern revealed in the constituent data. 
Notables also felt that the personal qualities MPs lacked most were honesty, 
an ability to understand the common people, and an ability to work hard. 
They were even more critical in some respects: the proportion of notables in 
Kenya and Turkey who negatively evaluated their M Ps'ability to work hard 
and to understand the problems of the common people exceeded the propor- 
tion of constituents with similar complaints in those two countries. 
The data on constituents' evaluation of MPs' job performance are dis- 
played in table 6.8. Constituents were asked to rate the performance of their 
MPs on seven specific activities which we thought comprised the most salient 
aspects of legislators' jobs. These activities included explaining government 
policies to citizens, actively participating in deliberation and debate on bills, 
telling the government what constituents want, bringing more government 
projects to the district, interceding with government agencies on behalf of 
constituents, helping to solve community problems, and frequently visiting 
the district. Kenyans gave the most positive overall ratings of their MPs' 
performance, the Koreans the least positive. 
Of the seven activities listed, constituents in all three countries regarded 
certain activities as more important than others, suggesting a uniform pattern 
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of role expectations across nations. They all stressed MPs' responsibility to 
explain policies, make laws, represent district interests, and help district 
voters who have problems with government agencies. These were also the 
activities for which MPs received the most positive ratings. 
A closer scrutiny of the data reveals that constituents tended to give MPs 
positive ratings for those activities about which they knew and cared relatively 
little. Conversely, constituents gave less favorable ratings to those activities 
which they regarded as the most important aspects of their MPs'jobs. For 
example, they gave very favorable ratings to their MPs' performance in 
explaining policies and making laws, processes about which they knew rela- 
tively little. Yet, they gave a much lower rating to their MPs'job performance 
in obtaining government projects and assisting those who had problems with 
government agencies, areas in which constituents had considerable personal 
knowledge. 
Local notables, in comparison to constituents, showed markedly more 
favorable ratings of their M Ps' performance. The difference was remarkably 
consistent across nations, as well as across different activity items. Why were 
local notables more satisfied with their MPs' performance? In part, because 
they were better informed about politics in general, and about the activities 
of their MPs in particular. Moreover, because of their status in their com- 
munities they were more likely to be in close contact with MPs than were 
constituents. Through this contact notables benefitted more from the services 
provided by their MPs, and therefore, were more satisfied. 
TABLE 6.8 
How Well Does the Public Think the MPs Are Doing Their Jobs (percentages) 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
L a d  Conrtn- L a 4  Constit- Lacd Conrtlt- 
TYP.~  ol A C t w  notrbles wntr notables umts notables uents 
Explaining policies to 
voters 69.1 55.0 54.3 30.7 48.4 45.7 
Proposing, debating, 
and amending bills 77.3 57.0 56.8 31.9 50.6 43.4 
Expressing the views 
of people in district 69.5 52.4 50.0 26.2 52.0 42.5 
Obtaining government 
projects for district 65.1 50.8 35.2 22.0 38.0 35.8 
Interceding with civil 
servants for district 
voters 62.7 46.7 44.9 24.2 64.8 43.6 
Resolving local 
conflict 56.9 43.7 46.8 24.1 39.4 36.1 
Visiting district 63.2 46.2 39.4 19.0 43.6 36.9 
N =  (453) (4.128) (468) (2,274) (287) (2,007) 
Note: The percentages indicate the proportions of the respondents who said their MPs were doing 
a "good" or "very good" job for each activity listed. 
6. Constituents and Representation 
PATTERNS OF REPRESENTATIVE 
LINKAGES 
Representative linkages consist of the connection between an M P and his 
district constituency. Linkage patterns are the specific ways in which their 
interactions are organized. We will concentrate on two aspects of linkages: the 
degree of concurrence between an M P and his district voters in terms of their 
attitudes toward key developmental policies and the degree of congruence 
between an M P's own role perception and his constituents' role expectations. 
This part of our analysis requires a district-bydistrict scrutiny and involves 
data aggregation from the individual level to the constituency level. We draw 
upon three different sets of data: the M P file, the local notable file, and the 
constituency file. And, these disparate data need to be matched by each 
constituency. There are some obvious difficulties in interpreting the results of 
such an analysis because of the difference in the electoral systems of the three 
countries. In Kenya, where a single-member district is used, matching a 
legislative member with his constituency poses little problem. In such a 
system it makes sense to make a direct comparison between an M P and his 
constituents on a range of attitudes and actions. However, where a multi- 
member district is used, such as in Turkey and, to a limited extent, in Korea, 
it becomes difficult to make a meaningful comparison of the data. Consider 
the problem of concurrence in policy attitudes, for an example. We can 
measure the attitudes of each legislator on a policy. To aggregate this infor- 
mation to the constituency level we have to take an average of the attitude 
scores for all legislative members representing a district. Some members may 
hold attitudes very much similar to the constituency attitudes, but others 
may hold opposite views. Matching the average attitude scores of M Ps with 
constituency attitude scores poses a serious problem for interpretation. Its 
meaning is not as intuitively clear as it is in the context of a single-member 
district. Nonetheless, because of our theoretical concern for representative 
linkages existing in each electoral district, we will pursue the analysis of the 
aggregated data, mindful of the difficulties mentioned above. 
CONCURRENCE ON KEY DEVELOPMENTAL POLICIES 
In chapter 4 we identified several key policy issues relevant to development: 
distributive policy, political democracy, and social change. Attitudes on each 
of these policy issues were measured from an identical set of survey items 
included in all of our surveys, which made it possible to develop an exact 
parallel measure across different population groups and across nations.13 
The resulting data indicated important variations by country and by groups 
within countries. 
Among the M Ps, the Turkish deputies supported an equitable distributive 
policy more strongly than did anyone else. Almost 8 1 percent favored such a 
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policy in Turkey compared to only 43 percent in Kenya and 55 percent in 
Korea. Furthermore, in Turkey deputies favored a proequality policy more 
strongly than did constituents (53.8 percent) or local notables (55.6 percent). 
In Korea and Kenya there were no noticeable group variations in this regard; 
M Ps, local notables. and constituents showed similar levels of commitment 
to an equitable distributive policy. 
With regard to other policy issues, two general conclusions could be drawn 
from the data. One is a uniformly consistent tendency for M Ps to advocate 
democratic values more strongly than do citizens. The other is that M Ps in 
all three countries were more strongly change-oriented in their attitudes than 
were the populations they represented. Thus, MPs tended to favor the devel- 
opmental policies of social modernization and democratization a good deal 
more than the people they led, and to favor an equitable distribution of 
wealth as much as, if not any more than, the general public. 
The policy concurrence data are reported in table 6.9. In each district we 
examined three types of concurrence: between the M P (or M Ps) and con- 
stituents, between the M P and local notables, and between local notables and 
constituents. The highest concurrence was obtained between local notables 
and constituents in all three countries. One could have easily predicted this 
result, for notables are themselves an integral part of their local communities 
and so are likely to share the attitudes and beliefs that prevail in these 
communities. 
Little concurrence occurred between M Ps and constituents in their policy 
preferences. The lack of policy agreements was consistent across countries 
and in some instances we even noticed strong policy disagreement. For 
example, in Korea, the more strongly an MP endorsed modernization poli- 
cies, the greater was the level of anti-modernism among his constituents 
( r  = -.56). Several similar negative correlations occurred in Turkey and 
Kenya. 
Policy concurrence between MPs and local notables was also negligible. 
Although the data show a slightly greater concurrence here than between 
MPs and constituents, it is still true that local notables were closer in their 
policy preferences to constituents than to M Ps. Policy concurrence does not, 
therefore, constitute an important basis upon which representative linkages 
are forged in the three countries. 
ROLE CONGRUENCE 
The degree to which MPs and their constituents agree on the legislative 
role is an important aspect of representative linkages. In their discussion of 
the legislative role system, Wahlke and his associates suggest two different 
kinds of role consensus: interposition and intraposition.14 They argue that 
"without some minimum of consensus the legislature would cease to be 
TABLE 6.9. 
Concurrence on Key Developmental Policies (Pearson r) 
-- 
Kenya Koma Turkey 
MP v. MPv. Notabkrv. MP v. MP v. Notables v. MP v. MP v. Notablm v. 
Polky amas conatltuenta notablm constituents constltuenta notables constituents constltuenta notablm conotltuenta 
t 
Distributive policy -0.05 -0.06 -0.47' 0.1 1 -0.42 0.68' -0.23 0.01 -0.15 
Democratization 0.15 0.37 0.54' -0.05 -0.01 0.79' -0.07 0.37 0.54 
Social 
modernization -0.1 1 0.13 0.32 -0.56' 0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.16 0.32 
a. Significant at the level of 0.05. 
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an institutionalized group.IS Consequently, role congruence may serve as a 
measure of the level of institutionalization of a legi~lature. '~ The sort of role 
consensus that we will analyze in this section is the interposition consensus, 
involving the degree of agreement between M Ps and their constituents about 
the appropriate behaviors of a legislator. 
We will focus upon two "classicalwaspects of the representative role. First, 
we will analyze the service aspect of the legislative role: how much agreement 
is there between an M P and his constituents concerning the importance of 
service functions? Next, we will examine the centrality of election district in 
the conceptions of both M Ps and their constituents: to what extent do they 
agree that the district should serve as a main focus for representative actions? 
Questions included in the M P survey asked whether legislators felt they 
should spend more or  less time on a variety of legislative activities. An iden- 
tical set of questions were put to constituents and local notables. Whenever a 
respondent indicated a service activity such as obtaining resources for district 
or assisting voters who had problems with government agencies a score of I 
was assigned. These scores were summed to form a Cpoint index, with a 
high score indicating a greater emphasis placed on the service role. Finally, 
these scores were aggregated to the constituency level in order to compare 
the relative emphasis that each group placed on the service role. 
A similar procedure was followed to create an index of centrality of the 
district. However, it should be noted that the specific items used for the 
index were different. The index for M Ps was based on a set of forcedchoice 
questions ("If you had to make a choice between the views of the following 
groups, which one would you choose?"). This was followed with a list of 
choices: leaders of my party vs. my district constituents, my own party faction 
vs. my constituents; my personal convictions v. my constituents, and so forth. 
The index scores were derived from the frequency with which MPs chose 
constituents over other groups." 
For obvious reasons we could not repeat the same questions in the mass 
survey. Because constituents do not confront the same situations as do M Ps, 
the same set of questions would be of little relevance to most of them. Con- 
sequently, we formulated a somewhat different set of questions for constitu- 
ents. Specifically, we asked them: Should MPs do what the people want 
regardless of M Ps' own opinions? Should M Ps follow their personal judg- 
ments in their actions, as they know what is best for their own districts? 
Should MPs act according to their own beliefs even though people in the 
district often disagree? Although different from the items used in the M P 
survey, the three questions cited above were nevertheless designed to measure 
the same role attitude, the extent to which the general public regarded the 
district as a central element in representation.I9 
We report our role congruence data in table 6.10. As expected. the great- 
est congruence occurred between the local notables and constituents. The 
TABLE 6.10. 
Role Cbngruence (Pearson r) 
Kenya (N = 14) Korea (N = 12) Turkey ( N  = 14) 
MP v. MP v. Notablm v. MP v. MPv. Notablesv. MP v. MPv. Notablsrv. 
Rdsr constltwnts notables conrtituenta conrtltuents notables constltuentr constltuentr notabhr coMtftuents 
Service role -0.38 -0.52. 0.61' 0.22 0.29 0.73' -0.15 0.51' 0.14 
District role focus -0.29 -0.42 0.6T 0.07 -0.21 0.27 0.25 0.39 -0.55. 
a. Significant at the level of 0.05. 
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Turkish case, however, presents an exception to this general rule, for here 
local elites agreed very little with constituents ( r  = 0.14) and disagreed rather 
dramatically over the centrality of the district ( r  = -0.55). In Kenya there 
was a strong role consensus between local leaders and constituents. Correla- 
tion between the two groups was 0.61 on the service role and 0.62 on the 
centrality of district issue. Thus, the Kenyan notables stood very close to the 
members of their community in terms of their role expectations. A similar 
pattern was obtained in Korea but with a slight variation. Whileconstituents 
and notables tended to agree on the service role ( r  = 0.73), they showed little 
agreement on the centrality of district issue ( r  = 0.27). Although the data 
do not provide unequivocal evidence, one can nevertheless draw a tentative 
conclusion that local elites and constitutents tend to have congruent role 
expectations. 
Role consensus between MPs and local notables was generally low, with 
the exception of Turkey. In Turkey, a substantial consensus occurred between 
the two groups. The level of their consensus reached an impressive correlation 
of 0.51 for the service role, while the consensus on the centrality of the 
district issue attained a modest correlation of 0.39. 
No such consensus was seen in Kenya or Korea. On the contrary, the data 
indicate strong negative correlations between the two groups in Kenya and 
to a lesser extent, in Korea. 
The most important aspect of role congruence for our purposes is that 
which occurs between M Ps and their constituents. In none of the three coun- 
tries did we observe any significant consensus between these two groups. 
Evidently, MPs and their constituents did not see the legislative role in the 
same way. 
When an MP stressed his service role, his constituents chose to ignore it. 
Conversely, when an MP sought to concentrate his efforts on activities other 
than service functions, his constituents called for a more active service role. 
This was particularly so in Kenya, as indicated by the negative correlations 
(r = -0.38 and -0.29), and to a lesser extent in Korea and Turkey. 
The analysis of role congruence in each district failed to disclose strong 
linkages based on consensual role perspe~tives.~~ MPs' own perceptions did 
not match closely those held by the local notables and constituents. Because 
role congruence was conspicuously absent in all three countries as well as in 
all electoral constituencies that we studied, it clearly cannot form an impor- 
tant part of representative linkages. 
LINKAGE FORMS IN ELECTORAL DISTRICTS 
Different forms of linkage may evolve in different constituencies. To prop- 
erly understand linkage, we need to trace the patterns of interaction among 
all principal actors participating in representative relationships. Few studies 
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have treated the subject of representation as an intergroup relationship, 
although virtually all have defined the term as some form of relationship. 
Loewenberg and Kim observed in their recent study that, "an individualistic 
interpretation of representation has guided a good deal of research on this 
subject over the past two decades, while very little work has been done on 
representation as an inter-group relati~nship."~' Furthermore, much research 
has approached the subject from the perspective of legislators, thus neglecting 
the equally important perspective of constituents. There are only a handful 
of studies in which all the relevant partners of the representative relationship 
have been analyzed sim~ltaneously.~~ 
In thinking about the nature of representative linkages that evolve in each 
constituency, we begin by identifying the key participants. We consider three 
groups to be the most relevant to linkage formation: representatives, their 
district voters, and local notables. Local notables are included because they 
play an especially important role in developing societies as the intermediaries 
between the political center and the periphery. In all three countries we dis- 
covered that local notables held political beliefs and attitudes most consonant 
with those of their community members. Both groups agreed closely with 
each other on several basic values including their expectations of the legis- 
lative role. 
Each of these groups acts out its unique role, exchanges support and bene- 
fits, and forges a common sense of solidarity. The ways in which the three 
groups interact with each other define the form of representative linkages. On 
the basis of the data collected from forty constituencies, we have identified 
four basic forms of linkages; these are shown in figure 6.1.23 
Multiple linkages. Extensive contact and communication among the MP,  
local notables, and constituents characterize this form of representative link- 
age. The M P maintains a broad and frequent contact with his constituents, 
while he simultaneously seeks to remain in close touch with local notables. 
Constituents in such a district have access to two main channels through 
which they can take their personal or community problems to the MP: they 
can approach the MP directly with their requests, or they can ask their local 
notables to mediate such requests on their behalf. A legislator who is elected 
from a district with multiple linkages is likely to spend a great deal of his 
time in his home district providing a variety of services to constituents and 
local notables. 
Direct linkages. This form is quite similar to the multiple linkage discussed 
above except for the lack of extensive contact between the MP and local 
notables. In direct linkages, local notables must compete for attention and 
influence with the emergent groups of professionals, party officials, and eco- 
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nomic interest groups. In this case notables do not hold a monopoly over the 
role of intermediary for they must share it with new groups. 
The most important causes for the decline in notables'community standing 
are modernization and its accompanying social effects. As the traditional 
authority structure has broken down, so has the stature and influence of 
local notables. Direct linkages are most likely to occur in industrialized and 
urbanized constituencies where modern forms of political organization grow 
rapidly, replacing the traditional roles that local notables used to perform. 
Because modernization leads to an increased level of political conscious- 
ness, constituents in an industrialized district develop a higher sense of politi- 
cal competence than do those in socially backward districts. Residents of 
industrialized constituencies exhibit definite ideas about what their legislature 
should do and are familiar with the roles that legislatures of other advanced 
Multiple linkages Direct linkages 
Local 4-) Constituents Local <-> Constituents 
notables notables 
Mediated linkages Minimal linkages 
Local <-> Constituents Local <-) Constituents 
notables notables 
<-) Extensive contact 
- - - - - $ Weak contact 
FIGURE 6.1. Forms of Representative Linkages 
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countries play. They also have clearer notions about what their own MPs 
should do and about whether the MPs deliver what they promise. When 
they have problems, they seek direct contact with the MPs or mediation by 
modem groups such as labor unions or party branches, rather than mediation 
by local notables who have by now lost much of their past stature and power. 
We expect to find more of the direct representative linkages in modernized 
societies and in relatively more developed regions of a country. 
Mediated linkages. Local notables play the pivotal role in this form of 
linkage. Almost exclusively they fill the intermediary role within their com- 
munities. Without mediation of notables, political leaders at the center can- 
not reach the grassroots. The behavior of an MP serving such a district is 
easily anticipated. He will strive to cultivate good will among influential 
local notables by returning to his district as frequently as possible and by 
spending a great deal of his time there talking to a few select community 
leaders. 
The MP will also strive to provide an active constituency service, mostly 
in response to requests coming from or mediated by local notables. He is 
unlikely to seek direct and personal contacts with his constituents. In districts 
like this, local notables are in effect neighborhood captains in what students 
of political development call a "patronclient system." 
Representation consists of, in this context, a two-step flow of communica- 
tion and contact: first, from the members of a community to their local 
notables, and second, from the notables to the MP. Such mediated linkages 
are likely to evolve in less modern and more traditional constituencies. Also, 
such linkages are likely to be formed by people still retaining strong emo- 
tional attachments to parochialism or tribalism. 
Minimallinkages. The absence of significant contacts between an M P and 
his constituents, and between the MP and local notables, constitute minimal 
linkages. Between elections, the MP seldom visits his home district. Instead, 
his main arena of action is the nation's capital. He regards constituency 
service as onerous and largely irrelevant to his primary duties. Consequently, 
he provides only a minimal amount of constituent service. Minimal linkages 
are likely to evolve in places where the legislature and its members perform 
only a nominal constitutional role, and in areas which remain poorly inte- 
grated into the mainstream of the political life of a nation. In such areas 
constituents have not yet established strong psychological ties with the gov- 
ernment at the center, and are still content in their private world of parochial- 
ism or tribal culture. They see little relevance in all that goes on outside their 
immediate environment, including the actions of the MPs. In fact, the people 
of these subcultures are excluded from effective representation for the reasons 
of their own making. Minimal linkages may also evolve in places where the 
people are disenchanted with the performance of the legislature. 
Linkage8 
Multiple linkages 
Mediated linkages 
Direct linkages 
Minimal linkages 
TABLE 6.11. 
Forms o f  Representative Linkages Forged i n  Each Constituency 
Kenya (N = 14) 
.- -- 
Kajiado-North 
7% (1) 
Kilifi-South, Starehe. Embu-South. 
Mbooni. Githunguri, Kericho, 
Busia-East 
50% (7) 
Nyakach 
7% (1) 
Kirinyaga-West, Laik~pia-West, 
Ikolomani. Mbita. Kitutu-East 
36% (5) 
Korea (N = 12) Turkey (N = 14) 
Pyongtaek. Imsil. Chungju. Kongju. Ankara, Canakkale. Denizli, 
Kwangju Diyarbakir, Konya 
42% (5) 36% (5) 
Kangnung 
Pusanjin 
Gaziantep. Istanbul. Samsun 
0 
Kars, Mus, Yozgat 
8% ( 1 )  21 % (3) 
Seoul. Andong, Dalsong, Mokpo. Adana, Izmir, Rize 
Chinju 
42% (5) 21% (3) 
Note: This table lists percentages, frequencies (In parentheses), and the names of electoral d~strlcts where we conducted the mass survey 
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In Table 6.1 I the results of our classification efforts are displayed. After 
examining the interaction data, we were able to determine the specific form 
of representative linkages functioning in each con~ti tuency.~~ By and large, 
the results confirmed our initial expectations. In each of two comparably 
modernized societies, Korea and Turkey, we identified five electoral districts 
where multiple representative linkages operated. This number accounts for 
more than one-third of all constituencies in which we conducted research. In 
Kenya, the least modernized of the three countries, we could identify only 
one district with multiple linkages. 
Of the fourteen constituencies that we studied in Kenya, we could place 
seven in the mediated linkages category. This suggests that the intermediary 
role of local notables in these Kenyan districts is crucial to representation. In 
other countries we found fewer cases of the mediated linkages: only one in 
Korea and three in Turkey. Mediated linkages were a dominant form of 
constituency representation in Kenya, which comes to us as no surprise; the 
salience of the patron-client system in Kenyan politics has been well docu- 
mented by scholars, and our own data collected at the local level have cor- 
roborated the same point.25 
We did not expect to find multiple or direct linkages in Kenya, given the 
importance of the intermediary role of local notables in that country. How- 
ever, in one district, Nyakach, we did identify direct representative linkages. 
Upon closer examination it became clear that the MP representing that 
district was quite unique in his approach to his constituency. He held, in 
addition to his legislative seat, the important position of secretary general of 
the Center Organization of Trade Unions and deviated from the general 
norm by seeking direct contacts with voters. Moreover, he rejected the tradi- 
tion of the patron-client network, and in so doing, angered many of his local 
notables. He evidently believed that he could afford to bypass the influential 
local notables because of his national visibility. 
In Korea, two dominant forms of constituency representation were ob- 
served. One was the category of multiple linkages. This particular form of 
representation was identified in five districts: Pydngtaek, Imsil, Ch'ungju, 
Kongju, and Kwangju. The other dominant form was the category of mini- 
mal linkages which were identified in another five districts, including Seoul, 
the capital; and a southern district called Mok'po which produced a former 
presidential candidate, Kim Dae-jung, who had almost unseated President 
Park. Subsequently, Kim was charged with treason, supposedly for political 
reasons, and sentenced to a prison term, losing his seat in the Assembly. 
Because of this and other events, Mok'po constituents had reason to be 
disenchanted. There were also reasons for the voters in Seoul to be disen- 
chanted. Seoulites are the best educated group in Korea, and have a relatively 
high political awareness. Moreover, they obtain much of their political infor- 
mation about politics and government from national media located in the 
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capital which are always critical, and at times, even cynical in their political 
coverages. Their proximity to the centers of government, and especially to 
the National Assembly, tends to magnify their perception of the seamy sides 
of politics. This high political awareness leads them to expect high govern- 
ment performance. These are the principal sources of their political disaffec- 
tion, manifest in their records of "protest voting" for opposition parties. 
Disillusioned with politics and, in particular, with the ineffectiveness of the 
legislature, they do not look upon its members as influential political actors, 
and consequently, do not try to establish close contacts with them. 
We found no single dominant form of representative linkages in Turkey, 
other than the multiple linkages that we mentioned previously. We identified 
such linkage forms in five districts: Ankara, Canakkale, Konya, Denizli, and 
Diyarbakir. Other constituencies showed quite divergent forms of linkages. 
This diversity may, in fact, reflect the complex nature of representative 
politics in Turkey. The extremely complicated electoral system, the unique 
constitutional clause formally barring deputies from representing district 
interests, and important variations in subculture and socioeconomic condi- 
tion by region are all contributing factors. 
The types of representative linkages an MP forges with his constituency 
may have direct effect on his reelection. When the constituents and local 
notables are closely linked to their representative, and are satisfied with his 
service activities, they are likely to return him to the legislature. In Kenya, 
where we followed the political fortunes of individual M Ps in the election of 
1974, we discovered a striking pattern. Constituencies where we identified 
mediated linkages returned all but one of their M Ps, an 86 percent reelection 
rate. By comparison, only one of the five MPs representing the minimal 
linkage districts was reelected. It seems clear that in Kenya the establishment 
of mediated linkages in home districts is a key factor for MPs' reelection 
success. Although we do not have comparable data for Korean and Turkish 
MPs, our evidence from Kenya is suggestive of the similar effects in these 
countries. 
Having determined the specific forms of representative linkage character- 
istic of each constituency, we must now confront an important question: 
Why do representative linkages vary from district to district? The variables 
that we expect to be important in shaping representative linkages are sum- 
marized in figure 6.2. 
The first group of variables includes personal characteristics of an MP 
such as his personal background, political experience, and basic political 
attitudes. The second group is comprised of the characteristics of the district: 
its homogeneity, modernity, partisan alignment, and cultural orientations. 
Equal in importance to these two groups of variables is legislative culture of 
a district. This group consists of ecological characteristics as well as the dis- 
trict's relationship to the nation as a whole. The fourth group of relevant 
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variables consists of systemic attributes such as a nation's constitutional 
structure, its party system, political culture, and so forth. Loewenberg and 
Kim have suggested, on the basis of research in six countries, that these 
systemic variables are most useful in explaining variations in parliamentary 
representat i~n.~~ 
Unfortunately, we do not have the necessary data for a full investigation of 
the sources of representative linkages. We have, however, examined a few 
constituency-level variables and have failed to find any variables that, alone 
or in combination, account for a significant amount of the variation in repre- 
sentative  linkage^.^' Our limited analysis of the sources of linkages suggests 
that representative linkages are the product of a complex set of interacting 
variables. A systematic search for the sources of linkage variation by district 
is beyond the scope of our study, but it is one that requires the collection of 
detailed personal data about the MP and indepth observation in each dis- 
trict, of a kind much more detailed and intensive than we were able to collect 
through our structured survey. 
Country 
Level 
Constituency 
Level 
Systemic Variables: 
Constitutional structure, party system, political culture, 
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RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Chapter 7 
GENERAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION: THE ROLE OF 
THE LEGISLATURE A N D  LEGISLATORS 
The legislature is one of many governmental institutions involved in re- 
source allocation. Other actors in the resource allocation process include the 
executive, the bureaucracy, local governments, political parties, and indepen- 
dent or  autonomous government agencies. The rules and patterns of inter- 
action among actors are important factors in determining who gets what in a 
political system. Equally important is the internal structure of organizations 
competing for resources. 
For our purposes, it will be useful to make a distinction between general 
and specific resource allocation. General resource allocation is the process by 
which the legislature produces outputs as a collectivity, while specific alloca- 
tion refers to the implementation of policies that are determined by the 
bureaucracy, with some possible influence by legislators. As an example, the 
legislature may make a general budgetary allocation to a rural electrification 
program. But, the decision about which villages in which provinces will be 
electrified is a specific allocation; if a legislator wants villages in his district to 
benefit from the program he must intervene in the administrative process. 
THE LEGISLATURE AND GENERAL 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
In order to identify the role of legislatures and legislators in the process of 
resource allocation in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey, we shall first examine their 
location in their respective political systems and the constraints which operate 
on their resource allocation activities. We shall then examine the perceptions 
of the MPs about how their legislatures make general allocative decisions 
[1201 THE LEGlSLATIVE CONNECTION 
and how they as individuals participate in that process. In the next chapter 
we will examine the role of legislators in the specific allocation of resources, 
that is, the efforts they make to gain benefits for their districts. 
THE LEGISLATURE A N D  THE EXECUTIVE 
The legislature is said to make laws. Such a statement is correct in the 
sense that laws are not enacted without being accepted by a majority of the 
members of the legislature, but it often does not reflect where bills originate, 
who shapes them, whether and how much the legislature determines their 
content. 
In all three countries in our study, the executive has historically played an 
important role in lawmaking. Executive dominance has been a conspicuous 
feature in Korean politics in the last three decades. Under the Yushin system, 
executive power expanded even more, giving the president the power to do 
virtually anything he wanted. Constitutionally, both individual MPs and the 
executive were empowered to submit legislative bills. In practice, however, 
bills submitted by individual MPs were not only few in number but also had 
a significantly poorer rate of passage on the floor than government bills.' 
Moreover, the National Assembly seldom amended the government bills in 
any significant fashion. The dominant role of the executive in lawmaking was 
almost complete and was built upon three factors: a constitution that favored 
executive power, the president's control of major parties in the Assembly, 
and the personal stature of the president himself. 
In Kenya virtually all bills originate in government ministries. They are 
normally drafted by the attorney general's office, and are scrutinized by the 
president and his inner circle of advisors before being introduced in the 
National Assembly as government bills. Only rarely do individual legislators 
present bills on their own; only one such bill has been passed into law since 
1969. 
Occasionally, however, a bill is introduced by a backbencher that has 
widespread support in the National Assembly. Such bills, which usually 
challenge the government on a given issue, are vigorously opposed by the 
front bench. When such bills are passed, however, or when it is evident that 
a majority support the measure, the government often introduces a substitute 
bill of identical content, which it then insists be passed into law.* 
Since bills passed by the Kenyan National Assembly do not become law 
until they are signed by the president, an executive refusal to sign bills that 
have been introduced and passed by backbenchers, coupled with the intro- 
duction of a substitute measure, effectively means that no private member 
bills become law regardless of whether they are passed by the legislature. On 
the other hand, such bills are occasionally an effective means through which 
the legislature, as a collective body, can influence government policy. 
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In Turkey, most bills originated in the ministries, were discussed in the 
cabinet, and were presented to the legislature as government proposals. The 
substance of government-backed legislation was seldom changed. Individual 
legislators, to be sure, were able to present their own bills, but such bills were 
not given priority in consideration. The traditions of parliamentary parties 
required legislators to clear their bills with the leadership of the parliamentary 
party before they submit them. The leadership of the majority party (or 
parties, if the government was a coalition), worked closely with the govern- 
ment and often acts as the government spokesman to the legislature. 
In all three countries, then, the executive was the major source of legislative 
proposals, and the legislature was viewed as an institution which generates 
support for governmental action. 
DISCIPLINE IN THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES 
The organizational structure of political parties, the nature of the relation- 
ship between the party organization and the parliamentary party, and the 
internal organization of the parliamentary party itself are among the fac- 
tors that will promote or restrict the influence of the legislature in resource 
allocation. 
The parliamentary parties in Turkey voted in compliance with the decisions 
of the party leadership. The bylaws of the Grand National Assembly treated 
the "party group" rather than the individual deputy as the main actor in par- 
liamentary activity. Official spokesmen of parties, for example, were favored 
over individual deputies in floor debates. In the case of budgetary debates, to 
cite an instance, only three deputies were permitted to speak, for periods not 
to exceed ten minutes each, on the budget of a ministry or other government 
agency. Committee assignments were made by the party leadership. 
Violations of Turkish party discipline were rare, given the powers of the 
leadership of the parliamentary party, which increased when the party was 
in power. The failure of an individual or group of deputies to comply with 
party discipline was usually a prelude to a break from the party. 
Such rigid party discipline did not mean that backbenchers of the parlia- 
mentary party lacked channels through which they related their preferences 
to their leaders. First, individual discussions with deputy leaders of the par- 
liamentary group of a party were always possible. Second, and more impor- 
tant, party leaders called meetings of the parliamentary group for discussion 
and consensus building. Once a decision was reached, however, the deputies 
were expected to obey. 
In Korea, party discipline was strong, especially in the two government- 
controlled parties. At the time of our research, the leadership of the Demo- 
cratic Republican Party (DRP) exercised tight control over its members. It 
was very rare that a DRP member spoke or voted against his party position. 
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Similarly, the members of the Society for Revitalizing Reforms (SRR), who 
were appointed by the president to the legislature, acted in a concerted 
manner, always in complete agreement with the DRP legislators. Violations 
of party discipline were dealt with severely, through expulsion and other 
sanctions. While the leadership of the two government parties were in com- 
plete control of their individual members, they did not exercise power in- 
dependently. The leaders of both the DRP and the SRR were personally 
linked to the president, and they were in effect nothing more than the floor 
managers for the executive. 
In the case of the main opposition party, the situation was somewhat 
different. The opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) insisted on strong 
discipline, but internal factional strife frequently impaired this discipline. 
The NDP was really a confederation of several factions organized around 
individual leaders. In the face of dominance by government parties, these 
factions formed an opposition coalition and acted as a cohesive unit. But on 
occasions when the factions disagreed, they failed to act as a disciplined 
group. 
As described in chapter 3, Kenya is technically a one-party state but 
because of the organizational weakness of the ruling KANU party, it is 
usually more accurate to describe Kenya as a no-party state. Although there 
is a KANU parliamentary party composed of all members of the Kenyan 
National Assembly and presided over by the president, the parliamentary 
party rarely meets except when the president wishes to address the MPs or  
conduct parliamentary business in private. Under these conditions, the ruling 
party as an organization has little impact on the course of legislative business. 
Although government bills are often introduced by ministers who are also 
senior party officials, it would be a misinterpretation of the situation to 
suggest that the parliamentary party therefore influences the legislative pro- 
cess. Such bills are government bills, not party bills, a distinction often under- 
scored by the fact that backbenchers occasionally vote against measures 
introduced by their own "partyw leaders. 
PARTY ORGANIZATION OUTSIDE THE PARLIAMENT 
Parliamentary parties may be extensions of a national political organiza- 
tion or  they may constitute the essence of a political party. The existence of a 
national party organization may affect the role of the legislature and the 
legislators in the process of resource allocation in several ways. First, the 
party organization may bring pressures on legislators to observe party disci- 
p h e .  Second, local party organizations may serve as channels through which 
district needs are communicated to the legislators. Third, local organizations 
may serve as support bases for deputies mobilizing local funds for develop 
ment projects, or organizing meetings or rallies when they visit the district. 
Fourth, party organizations may help constituents to resolve their problems 
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with the national bureaucracy or local government. Such assistance may 
facilitate the work of a deputy in that many constituent problems may be 
handled without reaching him, thus easing his constituency service burden. 
Such assistance may also undermine his direct linkages with the voters, 
rendering him more reliant on local party bosses at  his next election. 
Turkish political parties had formal and permanent organizations down to 
the subprovincial level, with informal extensions into lower levels of admin- 
istrative organization. Local party leaders often intervened on behalf of con- 
stituents to help settle their problems with officials of the national govern- 
ment, and guide them to the deputies representing them in the capital for 
additional help. They were instrumental in organizing local lobbying delega- 
tions to Ankara. 
Local party organizations in Turkey were important because they deter- 
mined the electoral chances of deputies. Party tickets in each province were 
chosen in intraparty primaries where delegates, acting as representatives 
of the provincial party membership, voted on candidates. The local party 
leadership was the single most influential group in the naming of delegates, 
and so exercised significant power over deputies. 
Leaders of subprovincial party organizations often engaged in bargaining 
with each other to win province-wide support for the candidates they spon- 
sored. Leaders of provincial and subprovincial party organizations were 
generally able to deny renomination to incumbent legislators who proved to 
be mavericks or incompetents. On the other hand, an incumbent or any 
other candidate who campaigned hard often won votes from delegates in the 
primary without the support of provincial or local party leaders. 
The role of the national party organization in the nominating process 
tended to be defensive. It had the authority to veto candidates before a 
primary, and it could effectively prevent primaries in provinces where the 
party organization was either very weak or splintered into factions. The cen- 
tral party organization could also place a limited number (5 percent) of 
candidates on the party ticket. Such spots were ordinarily filled by prominent 
incumbents, incumbents who formerly belonged to other parties, or other 
individuals the party wanted nominated. In provinces where primaries were 
not held, the party would select the nominees, but this tactic was limited to 
provinces where the party was weak. From the viewpoint of an incumbent 
MP, the prospects for renomination and a position on the party list high 
enough to make reelection likely, depended heavily on maintaining good 
relations with provincial and local party leaders and activists. 
Korean political parties at  the time of our study were essentially parlia- 
mentary parties in character. With the exception of the governing DRP, they 
lacked a well-organized mass base. The Society for Revitalizing Reforms 
consisted of appointed members without specific district constituencies and 
without a need for support at the grassroots level. The New Democratic 
Party was poorly organized at the mass level, because it was no more than a 
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loosely organized collection of factions. What organizations did exist at the 
grassroots level were often electoral machines fostered by individual politi- 
cians. These organizations are known as the jiban in the Korean language, 
and their purpose is explicitly to provide reelection support to politicians. 
Such organizations were not regarded as integral parts of the party organi- 
zation. The governing DRP probably had the best party organization in 
Korea, penetrating deeply and effectively down to the villages. With profes- 
sional staff at every level, the DRP was very successful in reaching voters in 
rural areas. 
The organization of Kenya's ruling KANU party has withered. Party 
branch organizations at the district level, which once constituted the back- 
bone of KANU, have-except in a few unusual cases-ceased to exist. These 
district-wide party organizations have frequently been displaced by the per- 
sonal political machines of individual MPs. These machines in turn, are 
usually confined to single parliamentary constituencies, and are therefore 
smaller than district-wide party organizations. Where they do exist, the ma- 
chines serve as feedback and support mechanisms for individual legislators. 
ORGANIZATION OF ELECTORAL DISTRICTS 
Electoral districts may be organized as single or multimember districts, 
and the pattern is different in each of the three countries of our study. Kenya 
has single-member districts, and Korea elected two members in each district. 
Turkish electoral districts elected from three to thirty-four members each, 
depending on the size of the population in the district. Turkish deputies were 
chosen on a proportional representation system using party lists. 
The size of electoral district affects the resource allocation activities of 
legislators in many ways. The representative from a single-member district 
may be more visible to his constituents, better known by them, and also the 
single target of constituency demands. In multi-member districts, individual 
legislators are less visible and consequently more reliant on the local party 
organization, both for electoral support and for advice on the services ex- 
pected from them. A division of labor may emerge in such districts with some 
deputies becoming more oriented toward constituency service and others 
toward legislative activity. 
Also important may be the competitiveness of elections in an electoral 
district. Where the marginal value of votes is high, we may expect the 
deputies to be more attentive to constituency service. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE LEGISLATURE 
In accounting for the domination of the executive over the legislative 
branch, it is often argued that the latter does not possess the same expertise 
and access to information as the former. Legislative committees and staff are 
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cited as two means which may serve to remedy the weakness of the legislature 
vis-8-vis the government and thus help it to acquire a greater role in the 
process of resource allocation. 
The Turkish Grand National Assembly had twelve standing committees 
and several ad hoc committees. The ad hoc committees were generally estab- 
lished to conduct parliamentary investigations. The standing committees 
were viewed as procedural organizations and did not ordinarily modify the 
substance of legislative proposals. It is interesting to note that two of the most 
sought after committees were the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Com- 
mittee on State Economic Enterprises. The first gave its members a chance to 
get into the diplomatic circles in Ankara, the second an opportunity to meet 
managers of enterprises who might be able to find jobs for constituents. 
Partly because the rate of turnover of deputies was high in recent elections 
and partly because committee members changed frequently, committees were 
unstable groupings which did not wield influence of substantial consequence. 
There was one legislative committee, however, which granted its members 
an opportunity to affect legislation in a way which is reminiscent of the pork 
barreling practices in the United States: the Joint Committee on Budget and 
Planning. The preparation of the national budget went through several 
elaborate stages in the bureaucracy and was debated in this committee. 
Committee members introduced resolutions for changes in the proposed 
budget to restore funds which had been targeted for cuts in the budgets of 
ministries and other government agencies. 
The Joint Committee on Budget and Planning included thirty-five deputies 
from the lower chamber and fifteen members from the Senate; the govern- 
ment was guaranteed thirty of these seats. The members of the committee 
certainly had a greater opportunity than did most legislators to influence 
budgetary policy in ways that would benefit the interests and constituents 
they represent, but the magnitude of this opportunity should not be exag- 
gerated. Committee members who belonged to the majority party, particu- 
larly those who had seniority or held leadership positions, had an advantage 
over other members. 
In order to limit the possibilities for log-rolling and major changes in the 
budget, proposed amendments were submitted first to a subcommittee, which 
reviewed them carefully in consultation with budgetary officials; subcom- 
mittee recommendations were generally accepted by the full committee. A 
further restriction on the prospects for amendment was the reluctance of the 
committee to recommend amendments to the investment budget. 
Members who served on this committee were seldom able to have any 
dramatic effect on budgetary policy, but there may have been some disguised 
advantages. Members of the committee on Budget and Planning had oppor- 
tunities to meet and work with the highest ranking civil servants of the capital 
officialdom. Such relationships were obviously advantageous to members 
who did business with members of the bureaucracy on behalf of constituents. 
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In summary, it may be said that while the committee system in the Turkish 
legislature did not constitute an instrument through which the legislature or 
legislators affected general resource allocation in any significant way, it did 
provide opportunities for legislators to affect specific allocations for their 
constituents. 
The chief officers in the Korean National Assembly were the speaker and 
two vice-speakers. The speaker was elected at the beginning of each session; 
the post usually went to the leader of the governing party. One of the two 
vice-speakers was always the leader of the opposition party, as a matter of 
courtesy by convention. 
Other main offices include the chairmanships of the standing and special 
committees. The standing committees were organized to parallel ministries 
in the central government such as the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Home Affairs, the Committee on Education, and so forth. 
The committee chairmanships were always filled by influential leaders of 
government parties. Although every legislative member received an assign- 
ment to at least one standing committee by law, the key committee posts 
were controlled by government parties. 
The committees were important sites in the legislative process because all 
legislative bills were sent to them for deliberation. On many occasions in the 
past the opposition party confronted the government in these committees. 
Even though the committees were more or less controlled by government 
parties, the opposition members could still frustrate government programs 
by obstructing committee processes. 
The Kenyan National Assembly is presided over by a speaker, and has 
seven standing committees to facilitate its operation. Of the seven standing 
committees. the Sessional Committee is the only one directly concerned with 
the flow of legislative business in the House. Two committees, Public Ac- 
counts and Estimates, exist for the purpose of legislative oversight, while the 
remaining four deal with the internal management of the National Assembly 
and its physical plant and are of no consequence so far as policymaking is 
concerned. 
Only two of the committees dealing with legislation and oversight meet on 
a regular basis. The Sessional Committee determines the agenda of the 
National Assembly. and meets weekly when parliament is in session. It is 
chaired by the vice-president acting in his capacity as the leader of govern- 
ment business. It is composed of twenty to thirty members, and is completely 
under the control of the government. 
In contrast, the Public Accounts Committee is usually chaired by a back- 
bencher. It consists of twenty-five to forty members, and meets regularly 
during the course of an annual session. The annual session usually begins its 
work between May and July and lasts from four to five monthsduring which 
time the Public Accounts Committee reviews the work of each government 
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ministry. The committee tenders an annual report on its findings, but the 
impact of this report on government policy is difficult to assess. 
In addition to the standing committees, select committees are created from 
time to time to deal with specific issues. Select committees are appointed by 
a resolution of the house, and in recent years have been the focus of much 
controversy. They have invariably been controlled by backbenchers and have 
been a thorn in the side of the government. Select committees are the only 
significant mechanism backbenchers have for pressing their case against the 
government on specific issues. In recent years select committees have been 
created to investigate a number of extremely sensitive problems, a develop- 
ment which has often led to government intimidation and occasional deten- 
tion of the M Ps invo1ved.j 
THE BUREAUCRACY 
The bureaucracy, being the chief implementor of policy, is the major source 
of specific resource allocations. It is with the bureaucracy that the legislators 
intervene to perform constituency services. The specific resource allocation 
activities of the legislators are affected by the bureaucracy; its size; the scope 
of services it provides; the efficiency of its administration; its level of au- 
tonomy (with respect to the cabinet and political parties); and its degree of 
professionalism. When the bureaucracy is capable of performing the services 
expected of it there is less need for legislators to perform certain constituency 
services such as finding hospital beds for ailing constituents or getting an 
agricultural bank to extend seasonal credits to a small farmer. Generally, the 
more professional a bureaucracy, the more resistance it will exhibit toward 
partisan use of public funds. 
As discussed at length in chapter 3, Kenya is basically an administrative 
or no-party state in which the state bureaucracy governs the country in a 
manner similar to that which characterized the colonial period. A single 
national civil service carries out governmental policy across the country 
through a hierarchy of eight provincial commissioners and forty-two district 
commissioners assisted by a vast network of government-appointed chiefs at 
the local levels. 
The provincial administration above the level of the chiefs consists mainly 
of young administrators who have received university training within the last 
fifteen years. Top officers at the provincial level, however, are often older 
men recruited by the British during the twilight of the colonial period in the 
1950s. The president presides over the entire system and works closely with 
the provincial commissioners, a practice not unlike that followed by the 
colonial governors who ruled Kenya in the past. 
Some writers have suggested that the provincial administration constitutes 
the "steel frame" of the Kenyan state, but, as suggested in chapter 1, the 
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network of officials is basically an instrument of the center to penetrate the 
periphery, not an agent to represent the periphery at the   enter.^ Kenyan 
M Ps, and to an increasing extent, members of the provincial administration, 
have become aware of this distinction-as did President Kenyatta and his 
sucessor, Daniel arap Moi. 
The result of this awareness is that since 1969 the provincial administra- 
tion, initially at Kenyatta's urging, has encouraged MPs to become more 
actively involved in community development. Such involvement has been 
largely limited to M Ps' constituencies, but many M Ps have taken advantage 
of this opportunity to build a local political following. As noted above, M Ps 
concentrate their efforts in the area of constituency service because it is the 
one arena in which they are given a relatively free hand to operate. Provincial 
administrators need M Ps to play such roles if they are to succeed in adminis- 
tering government policies at the local level, especially policies designed to 
stimulate grassroots development. 
In Korea the bureaucracy has traditionally exercised a paramount influ- 
ence in the political process, resulting in the executive dominance that we 
have referred to previously. Under the Park regime the bureaucracy became 
even more powerful than before, for the regime chose to use it as its main 
instrument of social change, charging it with primary responsibility for de- 
velopment and implementation of ambitious economic plans. This led to an 
unprecedented growth in bureaucratic functions and power. 
Korean bureaucrats, especially those occupying key positions in central 
government agencies, view themselves as more than administrators who 
implement policies formulated elsewhere; many define their roles in terms of 
active policymaking and planning. Among the 225 higher civil servants inter-* 
viewed in Korea, 56 percent defined their roles primarily in terms of policy- 
making rather than in terms of policy implementing. Of the 225 Turkish 
higher civil servants interviewed, 42 percent emphasized their policy making 
roles.5 In both countries the ranking bureaucrats appear to go beyond the 
classical conception of an administrator in defining their own roles. In Korea 
the bureaucracy is both powerful and exercises a broad control over scarce 
resources. Without working closely with the government officials MPs cannot 
hope to induce a fair share of such resources to their districts. 
Unlike Kenya and Korea, modern Turkey is the successor to a bureaucratic 
empire. Although the Ottoman Empire lost more than half of its territories 
during the First World War, 93 percent of the government officials of the 
Empire chose to remain in Turkey and serve as civil servants after the war's 
conclusion. The Republic's attempts to consolidate the new regime and intro- 
duce radical changes to modernize the country resulted in the expansion of 
the national bureaucracy. 
The distinction between government officials and the cadres of the Repub- 
lican People's Party was somewhat blurred during the single-party era, since 
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both perceived their mission to be converting Turkey into a modem society 
as defined by Kemal Atatiirk. 
The introduction of competitive politics in 1946 and the attendant ascen- 
sion to political power of the Democratic Party resulted in strained relations 
between the government and the bureaucracy which experienced a decline 
in influence. The 1960 Military Revolution has been attributed in part to 
bureaucratic reactions to a government which was willing to compromise 
values such as secularism in order to gain electoral support. Although the 
bureaucracy, its higher civil servants in particular, has tended to reflect the 
political divisions within Turkish society in recent years, a majority seems to 
hold views closer to those of the Republican People's Party. 
The existence of a competitive political system in Turkey for almost thirty 
years had made the bureaucracy more responsive to citizen demands. The 
rising expectations of the citizenry and the desires of the governments them- 
selves to achieve a social welfare state have served in recent years to increase 
political pressures on civil servants. Because the resources of government 
are not sufficient at any given time to meet a sizable proportion of citizen 
demands, both deputies and local party leaders intervene with administrators 
on behalf of their own supporters. 
While partisan pressures on Turkish bureaucrats have been increasing, 
many bureaucrats have clung to their tradition of professionalism and resisted 
the pressures to become partisan agents. A majority of Turkish citizens can 
distinguish the job of the civil servants from that of the deputies, and their 
interaction with what is essentially a well-developed, penetrating bureaucracy 
is more extensive than are their contacts with their legislators. 
THE NATURE OF POLlTlCAL lSSUES 
The legislature deals with issues of broader interest than the particular 
concerns of districts and constituents. This is not to deny that certain issues 
may be more relevant for some constituencies than for others, but legislatures 
tend to address themselves to issues of a larger scope than single district or 
individual constituent concerns. 
The nature of the issues before a legislature is one of the determinants of 
the role it will play in decision making. Broad or redistributive issues leave 
little room for the individual legislator to be influential and may help the 
government lead the legislative process. Sectorally fragmented issues, on the 
other hand, may broaden the scope of action for legislators to influence 
legislative outputs. It may also be suggested that the greater the need for 
rapid legislative action, the more likely it is that the government will lead the 
activities of the legislature. Urgency calls for expediency at the expense of 
legislative power. 
Predominance of national security issues also tends to reduce the role of 
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the legislature in decision making. Traditionally, political systems have been 
averse to the display of differing domestic opinions on issues involving exter- 
nal threats. The emphasis on internal unity vis-a-vis the external world 
promotes a concentration of power in the executive branch whose decisions 
the legislature is asked to support. A similar emphasis is called for by un- 
stable regimes that feel threatened domestically. The absence of conflicting 
viewpoints in the legislature and the support this accords national political 
leaders are perceived by the latter to be a vindication of their policies. 
DEFlNlNG LEGlSLATlVE ROLES 
The legislative institution and its members may play an important role 
in managing tensions and making innovations. The discussion and debate 
that occur in a legislature may in itself help reduce tensions in three ways. 
First, the ideas and interests represented by different factions and parties 
may lead to outputs pertinent to the needs and demands of different groups. 
Second, the behavior and actions of the executive and the bureaucracy may 
be prompted, modified, o r  restrained in response to views and sentiments 
expressed in the legislature. Third, thesimple fact that different interests and 
views get hearings in the legislature may provide symbolic gratification for 
those who fail to influence legislative outputs, or even more generally, the 
outputs of the political systems. 
In terms of innovation, new ideas and solutions may originate in the legis- 
lature, o r  the legislature may be oneof the first arenas where innovative ideas 
are expressed or adopted. The role of legislators in resource allocation is 
closely linked to the development of a capacity to deal with tensions and to 
innovate, and to manage change. 
THE LEGISLATORS AND GENERAL 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
At the beginning of this chapter, we drew a distinction between general 
and specific resource allocation. By general resource allocation, we refer to 
the process whereby the legislature produces outputs as a collectivity. These 
outputs may be allocations for services which a government provides or 
carries out on a regular basis or they may be intended to solve societal prob- 
lems which are new or which have not been dealt with before. Except in rare 
instances, such outputs do not address themselves to specific individuals, 
small groups, and geographical locations, but rather to national concerns. 
The rest of this chapter deals with the roles of legislators and legislative 
institutions in general resource allocation. We begin with the survey data 
from constituents, notables, and legislators concerning the major sources of 
conflict in the leeislature. Next we describe the ~ e r c e ~ t i o n s  of leeislators 
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about how the legislative process works: the most difficult job of the legisla- 
ture, the crucial problems it faces, and the ways in which these problems are 
handled. Then we turn to the M Ps'own participation in the process: the types 
of activities in which they engage and their satisfaction with the outcomes. 
PERCEPTlONS OF SOURCES OF CONFLICT IN THE LEGISLATURE 
Perceived sources of conflict play a role in the resource allocation because 
such perceptions of MPs, local notables, and constituents influence their 
beliefs and attitudes about who should get what and how much. Significant 
variations in such perceptions are expected by country and by population 
groups such as constituents, local notables, and legislators. 
Table 7.1 shows that the sources of conflict in a legislature were perceived 
differently in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey, but similarly among the different 
strata of the populations. Both in Kenya and Turkey, a high percentage of 
citizens have vague notions concerning the causes of conflict in the legislature. 
TABLE 7.1. 
Sources of ConlUet within Lcddature (percentages) 
Sourtn Kenya Korea Turkey 
Constituents 
Human nature 
Nature of job 
Party system 
Ideology 
Social conflict 
No answer 
Don't know 
Local notables 
Human nature 
Nature of job 
Party system 
Ideology 
Social conflict 
No answer 
Legislators 
Human nature 
Nature of job 
Party system 
Ideology 
Social conflict 
Legislative organization 
No answer 
Other 
Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 because responses 
containing less than 5% ot an8wen in all three countries have 
been eliminated. 
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Korea and Turkey have well-organized political parties represented in their 
national legislatures, so conflict was frequently attributed to them. In fact, 
party is the only source of conflict mentioned by more than a few notables 
and constituents in Korea. The Kenyan political party is more a label than 
an effective political organization in the eyes of citizens and the legislators. 
Intensity of political competition in Turkey, based on increasingly more divi- 
sive ideological issues, is reflected in citizen perceptions of sources of conflict 
in the legislature. Kenyan references to social conflict, on the other hand, can 
be understood in terms of ethnic and tribal differences which are absent in 
Turkey and Korea. 
The distribution pattern of the sources of legislative conflict does not differ 
among strata within each country. There was, however, a tendency to cite 
more frequently the organizational bases of conflict as one moves up the 
political strata from constituents to notables to legislators. Among both con- 
stituents and notables in Turkey, and among notables in Kenya, those from 
urban areas are more likely to stress ideology while those from rural areas 
more often mention human nature or the nature of the job as sources of 
conflict. It should also be noted that the "no response" category among the 
Kenyan and Korean constituents and notables was rather high, probably 
reflecting the reluctance of citizens in authoritarian political environments to 
offer opinions about conflict. 
MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
What kind of problems do legislatures deal with in Kenya, Korea, and 
Turkey? In an effort to probe the question, we asked the legislators in these 
three countries what they thought was the hardest job for the parliament as a 
TABLE 7.2 
Legislators' Perceptions of the Hardest Job for Parliament (percentages) 
Job Kenya Korea Turkey 
Getting membership to agree on sound 
policies 7.1 (39.3) 16.8 (36.1) 34.6 (17.3) 
Preventing adoption of government 
policies that would hurt people Not asked 52.1 (18.5) 25.0 (23.1) 
Preventing selfish interests from 
blocking policies 50.0 (10.7) 5.0 (8.4) 25.0 (7.7) 
Getting constituents to accept policies 
essential for economic development 10.7 (17.9) 22.7 (22.7) 2.9 (38.5) 
Don't know, no answer 32.2 (32.2) 3.1 (14.2) 12.5 (13.5) 
N =  (28) (119) (104) 
Note: Percentages of first and second choices are given. The numbers in parentheses indicate 
the second choices. 
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whole. Respondents were asked to rank the choices listed in table 7.2. Their 
responses provide an insight into the nature of the three political systems 
under study and the role of their legislatures in resource allocation. 
A majority of Korean legislators saw their job as protecting citizens from 
governmental excesses in an executivedominated authoritarian system of 
government. The Korean government became increasingly authoritarian 
during the nineteen seventies, despite the people's desire for greater political 
freedom. The Korean legislature also attempted to act as a mediator between 
the government and citizens. This conclusion is given support by the fact 
that the job which was second most frequently cited by legislators was getting 
constituents to accept policies essential for economic development. 
In Kenya the lack of a strong political party, coupled with the ability of 
legislators to influence government decisions through close personal ties to 
the president or higher ranking civil servants, resulted in a desire among 
many legislators "to prevent selfish interests from blocking policies." 
Turkish legislators, operating in a competitive environment, most fre- 
quently cited "getting membership to agree on sound policies" as their hardest 
job. During most of the nineteen seventies Turkey was ruled by coalitions. 
Frequent difficulties, even among members of the same coalition, in finding 
common ground for initiating policies may explain the emphasis on reaching 
a consensus on policies. 
It is useful to compare answers given by members of the government and 
opposition parties in Korea and Turkey. In Korea nearly 90 percent of the 
members of the opposition party were concerned with blocking government 
initiatives that they believed would hurt people. Korean government parties 
were more concerned with getting the membership to accept sound policies, 
and (particularly appointed members of the Yujonghoe) with propagating 
and legitimizing the decisions of the government by getting constituents to 
accept economic development policies. 
In Turkey government parties emphasized "preventing selfish interests 
from locking policies," a priority that probably reflects the frustation of gov- 
ernment parties with the tactics of the opposition parties. The opposition, on 
the other hand, was more likely to mention the difficulty of getting the 
membership to agree on sound policies, probably because it has not been 
able to get the government to accept its policies. When we examine the 
differences between the RPP (the major government party) and the Justice 
Party (the largest opposition party), we find marked differences, probably 
because these parties both have strong ideological orientations. 
MAJOR PROBLEMS FACING THE LEGISLATURE 
To identify the role of the legislature in the process of general resource 
allocation, we asked legislators what they thought were some of the major 
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problems their legislatures were dealing with during the term in which the 
survey was conducted, who had been instrumental in bringing these prob- 
lems to the legislature and where in the legislative system crucial decisions 
concerning these problems were made. An examination of table 7.3 shows 
that although the important problems legislators had to deal with at any 
given time varied, certain types of problems were predominant. Korean and 
Turkish legislators paid particular attention to problems concerning executive- 
legislative relationships. As previously mentioned, the main difficulty of the 
Korean legislature in the past was influencing the behavior of the executive, 
whereas in Turkey it was one of producing a viable coalition able to get a vote 
of confidence in the Grand National Assembly. 
Kenyan legislators cited most frequently their constituency services and 
representational problems. Apart from the problems concerning executive- 
legislative relationships, Turkish legislators alluded to a number of problems, 
without particular emphasis on any one of them. In Korea. internal legislative 
questions, constitutional-legal disputes, and foreign policy issues received 
frequent mention. These three sets of problems are, in one way or  another, 
tied to the uneasy relationship between government and opposition. The first 
two are concerned more directly with the rights of the opposition and the 
nature of the relationship between a government and its opposition. Foreign 
policy issues also constituted a major point of contention between political 
parties in Korea. The issues that the legislatures of Kenya, Korea, and Turkey 
had to deal with were issues of general concern, not specific to particular 
districts. 
TABLE 7.3. 
What Problems Legislature Had to Deal with (First Mentioned by MPs) 
(percentages) 
- -- - 
Kenya K o r u  Turkey 
Problems internal to the legislature 
Problems concerning executive-legislative relationships 
Party organization and partisan issues 
Problems of interest groups 
Constituency service and representative problems 
Foreign policy issues 
Problems of public opinion and mass media 
Constitutional, legal disputes, electoral system 
Other problems 
No important problems for legislature 
No answer, don't know 
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INITIATION OF lSSUES 
Table 7.4 shows who was instrumental in bringing problems to the atten- 
tion of the legislature. Not surprisingly, none of the legislators in our survey, 
except one Korean deputy, claimed responsibility for bringing an issue up. 
Neither were rank and file legislators often credited for having done so. In 
fact, again with the exception of Korean opposition parties, intraparliamen- 
tary sources were not even identified as a major source of issues taken up by 
the legislature. The percentage of legislators who failed to identify a specific 
source for the issues that were brought up before the legislature is high, 
further confirming that legislatures do not often define the issues they deal 
with, but rather respond to issues which are put before them by other organs 
of government such as the president, cabinet members, bureaucracy, and the 
media. It should be added that legislative leaders of the ruling party who 
often appear to be intraparliamentary sources of issues brought before the 
legislature, may in fact act merely as spokesmen for the president or the 
cabinet. 
The Korean exception, where legislative leaders of opposition parties were 
most frequently cited as those defining issues before the parliament, requires 
an explanation. A semiauthoritarian political system with competing parties 
may find itself on the defensive, responding to challenges from opposition 
leaders who may be the only group in a position to make them. The govern- 
ment, then, may be forced to meet these challenges in order to insure its 
dominance. 
TABLE 7.4. 
Who Brought Problem to Legislature (First Mentioned by MPs) 
(percentages) 
Konym K o m  Tuhmy 
Legislative leaders of government party 
Legislative leaders of opposition party 
Executive branch 
Party politicians outside of the legislature 
Committee chairman 
Rank and file legislators 
Professional staffs 
Public interest groups, mass media, voters 
Others 
No one 
I did 
No answer, don't know 
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Members of all parties in Korea cited legislative leaders of opposition 
parties more frequently than they mentioned legislative leaders of govern- 
ment parties, although opposition members mentioned opposition leaders as 
initiators more often than the others did. There were no other major partisan 
differences concerning who brought problems to the legislature. 
In Turkey members of the governing RPP party often mentioned the 
executive branch or their own legislative leaders; members of the opposition 
Justice party more often mentioned their own leaders. It is also interesting 
that the RPP members mentioned interest groups more often than did other 
members, reflecting the RPP's closer ties with such groups. 
LOCUS OF DEClSION MAKING 
Turning to the locus of decision on issues, we find that decisions were 
most frequently made not in the legislature or by legislators but by the gov- 
ernment or the party leadership. In all three countries, key decisions were 
mostly made in the cabinet or government, or by party leaders. Legislative 
committees were not centers of decision making. and floor debates often 
concerned decisions already made elsewhere. 
Some Kenyan legislators identified, however, the floor of the legislature as 
the center of decision making. Lack of a strong party organization in Kenya, 
coupled with the relative independence of its parliamentary members from 
government control, has encouraged competition between frontbenchers and 
backbenchers for public resources, and has made the floor a more salient 
arena of decision making in Kenya than it is in Korea or Turkey. 
In all three countries a large number of legislators failed to identify a 
single and preeminent center of decision making, which suggests that the 
process of key policy decisions involves a multitude of actors located in a 
variety of government agencies and that it is difficult to cite any one arena as 
more important than the others. The evidence also suggests that the legis- 
lature was not an important arena of decision making. 
ACTIVITIES OF LECISTATORS IN GENERAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
We have thus far examined legislators' perceptions about the legislature 
covering a number of topics pertinent to general resource allocation. We are 
also interested in the activities in which legislators engage and in their per- 
sonal satisfaction with the accomplishments of the legislature. We would 
expect these to vary by leadership position and by party. Party leaders should 
be more active than rank and file members. Those of the governing parties 
should be more satisfied with legislative performance than those in the oppo- 
sition. We would also expect members in the majority to engage in more, or 
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at least different, activities than would those in the minority. The key question 
in understanding the role of each legislator in the process of general resource 
allocation is to learn about the nature of his efforts to influence the outcome 
of the problem which he has cited as the most important one. Table 7.5 gives 
a summary of such activities. 
We first examine how legislators have utilized the formal channels open to 
them for participating in decision making. These include: authoring or spon- 
soring bills, speaking on the floor, working for a bill in committee, and 
offering amendments. Our data indicate that speaking on the floor appears 
to be the most frequent activity in Kenya and Turkey while working for bills 
in committee is the most common in Korea. Although many Turkish deputies 
cite authoring or sponsoring bills, frequently this does not reflect an impor- 
tant form of activity. On many occasions, party or government leaders en- 
courage their deputies to sponsor bills. In such cases, the deputy is responding 
to the wishes of the leadership rather than initiating an action on his own. 
On the more significant indicator of a legislator's participation in decision 
making, that of offering amendments, initiative is lacking uniformly in all 
three countries. 
A greater percentage of Kenyan legislators spoke on the floor than did 
Turkish or K~rean legislators. This is not surprising in light of our earlier 
observation that more Kenyans identified the parliament of that country as 
the center of decision making. It seems somewhat puzzling, on the other 
hand, that a fifth of the Turkish legislators interviewed emphasized speaking 
on the floor on major issues. Not a single Turkish deputy said that he could 
not do anything or just vote for bills when they come up; this suggests a 
general reluctance on the part of Turkish deputies to recognize their limits as 
parliamentary actors. 
TABLE 7.5. 
What the Legislator Has Done (First Mentioned by MPs) 
(percentages) 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
Authored or sponsored bills 
Spoken on the floor 
Sought support outside legislature 
Worked for bill in a committee 
Offered an amendment 
Convinced colleague in private 
Nothing, or voted on bill when it came 
Other 
No answer, don't know 
N =  
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We turn now to an examination of different levels of activity within each 
national legislature, to test our assumptions about the effects of leadership 
position and party. As we would expect, the Kenyan frontbenchers reported 
greater activity, primarily speeches on the floor, than did backbenchers, many 
of whom said that they did nothing except vote. 
In Korea we did not find substantial differences between elected members 
of the government and the opposition parties with regard to the total level of 
activity, but there were differences with regard to types of activity. Members 
of both parties spoke on the floor to a limited degree. Members of govern- 
ment parties were much more active in committees. a finding that supports 
the conclusions that the committees were used by the government to process 
legislation but that opposition members found them to be of little use in 
voicing their points of view. More Korean opposition members were active 
in committees than on the floor, however. Their most frequent activity was 
influencing colleagues in private. Presumably, some of these efforts were 
directed at members of the majority party, who may have been more influ- 
enced by such efforts than by more publicized criticisms of government policy 
and legislation. 
The most notable contrast in legislating activity in Korea was between 
elected members and appointed members. Appointed members were likely 
(almost 60 percent) to do nothing but vote on bills. They appeared to be an 
obedient and somewhat passive group, with little function except to follow 
their leaders. 
Finally, a comparison of party leaders and the rank and file showed that 
leaders, as would be expected, were more likely to speak on the floor, work 
in committees, and convince colleagues in private. 
In Turkey, members of the government parties, as expected, were more 
likely to sponsor bills and speak on the floor than those in the opposition 
party. Neither group spent much time on committee work. The differences 
between the opposition and governing parties were smaller than those found 
in Korea. 
SATISFACTION WITH LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES 
Legislators in the three countries were asked how satisfied they were with 
the legislative outcome on those issues that they considered to be most impor- 
tant. Levelsof satisfaction obviously may be affected by a number of factors. 
A legislator may be satisfied because his party has prevailed on an issue, 
because he thinks the outcome will benefit his district or the groups he repre- 
sents, or because he feels some personal sense of accomplishment. Answers 
to questions concerning satisfaction are impressionistic, of course. but they 
are one way of measuring legislators' perceptions of outcomes of issues they 
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consider important and that normally involve some aspect of general resource 
allocation. 
There are no striking differences in table 7.6 among the three countries in 
levels of satisfaction. Meaningful comparisons are difficult because only in 
Kenya did some M Ps respond "somewhat satisfied," and because in Turkey 
legislators often responded that the problems they had identified remained 
unresolved-probably because much of the interviewing was done at a time 
when the governing coalition was on the brink of dissolution. 
In Kenya we found that slightly more frontbench than backbench mem- 
bers were dissatisfied, but the difference was too small to be significant. 
Satisfaction differed by tribe in Kenya; members of the dominant Kikuyu 
tribe expressed higher levels of satisfaction than did those from the Luo tribe, 
the second largest. 
In Korea, satisfaction with legislative output was clearly dichotomized 
along government-opposition lines, as we would expect in a legislature where 
the government has had little difficulty in achieving its goals. These partisan 
differences were even greater when the views of party leaders were examined; 
75 percent of the leaders of the Democratic Republican Party expressed 
satisfaction. while 80 percent of the leaders of the opposition parties said 
they were dissatisfied. 
In Turkey almost two-thirds of the members of government parties be- 
lieved that the problems t hey had identified remained unsolved. And. oppo- 
sition members were the most dissatisfied. The members of the unstable 
majority coalition noted that the government's inability to produce major 
pieces of legislation resulted in many issues remaining unresolved. 
CONCLUSION 
What role do legislators play in the process of general resource allocation? 
Our examination of three countries suggests that the roles of different legis- 
TABLE 7.6. 
How Satisfied Legislator Is with Legislative Outcome 
(percentages) 
Kenya Komr 
Satisfied 21.4 37.0 
Somewhat satisfied 28.6 - 
Not satisfied 21.4 38.7 
Problem not solved - 7.6 
No answer. don't know, inapplicable 28.6 16.8 
Turkey 
12.5 
- 
18.3 
33.7 
35.6 
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latures in decision making are in many ways similar. More frequently than 
not, legislative problems and solutions are spawned outside of the represen- 
tational body. But legislatures are not merely institutions where only a seal 
of approval is placed on government policies; they are also places where 
disapproval or criticism is voiced. While our data do not permit us to measure 
whether such criticism is of consequence, it is plausible that governments try 
to preempt opposition by giving consideration to the possible reactions their 
proposals will face in the legislature. Leadership of parliamentary parties 
often serves as an important link in this process. Issues may be taken up in 
the caucus of the parliamentary parties as the Turkish example shows. Or, as 
is the case in Korea, the government may feel obliged to respond to problems 
which are initially introduced by opposition parties. 
This examination of the role of legislators and legislatures in the process 
of general resource allocation is suggestive of the ways in which both the 
institution and its members may help manage tension and introduce change. 
That many legislators have opportunities to speak on the floor, that both in- 
dividual members and parties may bring up issues for discussion and criti- 
cize the government, and that some proposals do in fact originate in the 
legislature are all examples of the ways in which the political system may 
acquire increasing capacity to cope with tension and to manage change 
through legislative institutions and representatives. 
Chapter 8 
SPECIFIC RESOURCE ALLOCATION: 
THE LEGISLATORS' ROLE 
This chapter examines the role of legislators in the process of specific 
resource allocation. By specific allocation we mean administrative decisions 
involving the commitment of public funds or services to a specific project or 
district. Legislators try to influence this process, for they regard it as one of 
their principal representative duties to secure goods and services for their 
constituents. In fact, it is vitally important for a legislator to be effective in 
this role because his constituents are likely to judge him On the basis of how 
well he performs this service role. 
Legislators' efforts to obtain public goods and services for their constitu- 
encies contribute in a significant way to the development of linkages between 
the political center and the peripheries. Such activities of legislators lead 
invariably to the creation of a close communications channel between the 
national government and the people at the periphery, promote active ex- 
changes of resources and support between the center and the grassroots, and 
help develop a sense of community among those who feel left out of the 
mainstream of national political life. Thus, legislators' participation in speci- 
fic resource allocation has important integrative effects in the developing 
political systems. 
There are several reasons why legislators are concerned with the process 
of specific resource allocation. First, since legislators are identified as repre- 
sentatives of geographical areas, electors of those areas tend to come to them 
for assistance. Electors may come as individuals or as representatives of par- 
ticular groups within the electoral district. Although the legislator may see it 
as part of his duty to give assistance to citizens who have asked for it, he is 
also strongly motivated by the fact that he is, in most cases, dependent on 
constituents for reelection. 
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Legislators are in a unique position to participate in the process of specific 
resource allocation. While opportunities in the process of legislative deci- 
sion making are limited, opportunities for performing constituency services 
abound. Bureaucrats are generally sensitive to the requests of deputies be- 
cause they need the good will of legislators to secure budgetary allocations 
and other benefits for civil servants. To cite an example from Turkey, it was 
alleged that the rector of a certain university in the capital could walk into 
the Grand National Assembly with a bill, and walk out the other door with a 
law. The secret of this success was that all the university hospitals allowed 
deputies to bring in constituents who needed medical attention not available 
in the provinces. 
The intervention of legislators on behalf of constituents can bring personal 
benefits as well as votes. The construction of a road may raise the value of 
real estate a deputy might own in his province: irrigation programs may 
benefit his own farmland. Declaring industrial enterprises worthy of develop 
ment credit may mean higher returns for legislators who happen also to be 
shareholders, or jobs for those who are not reelected. Again, an example 
from Kenya is instructive. Kenyan legislators often organize rural develop- 
ment projects to which they also make monetary contributions. After a 
certain percentage of the total cost has been collected in the locality, the 
deputy goes to the government and asks it to match the funds collected or 
make up the difference, which the government often does. in one case, local 
development projects organized by a deputy were contracted to a construc- 
tion company which he owned. 
IMPORTANCE OF CONSTITUENCY 
SERVICE 
We asked legislators in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey what types of problems 
and activities occupied most of their time, and to judge the importance of 
their constituency service. A majority of legislators in Kenya, Koka, and 
Turkey devoted most of their time to problems related to their districts. 
We also asked members more detailed questions about which activities 
took up most of their time. These data were reported in chapter 5 (table 5.2), 
and enabled us to classify legislators as internals and externals. We found 
that in both Kenya and Korea constituency services had priority over law- 
making and policy-related activities. In Kenya 59 percent of the members 
ranked "obtaining resources for my districtwas first or second in importance, 
and 44 percent gave similar ranking to "interceding with civil servants on 
behalf of constituents." In Korea the comparable figures were 43 percent and 
60 percent. in Turkey these activities were ranked a little lower than law- 
making and policy activities. An analysis of these data (table 5.4) resulted in 
a classification of 58 percent of the MPs in Kenya, 44 percent of those in 
Korea, and 24 percent of those in Turkey as externals. 
LEGISLATOR-CONSTITUENT COMMUNICATIONS 
Demands for services from constituents may be made in a number of 
ways, such as writing letters to a representative, visiting him in the capital, or 
trying to petition him when he is visiting the district. The legislator may 
promote such contacts when visiting his district in order to gain visibility, 
establish a good reputation, or gain electoral support. Constituency demands 
may also be referred to legislators by local notables or the leaders of local 
party branches. (Since we are concerned with constituents, we will from this 
point on include only elected members of the Korean legislature. excluding 
appointed members from the analysis.) 
In chapter 6 we reported data for each country on the frequency of legis- 
lators' visits to the constituency, the types of groups that visited members, 
and the topics that were discussed during these visits. We summarize the 
findings from that poll briefly here. 
We found that nearly all Kenyan MPs visited their constituency at least 
three or  four times a month; three-quarters of the Turkish legislators visited 
at least once or  twice a month; and almost half of the Korean legislators 
visited their districts less often than once a month, but only a few of them 
visited more than once or  twice a month. 
Kenyan legislators generally reported that they met constituents both in- 
dividually and in groups. Almost two-thirds of the Korean members met 
constituents individually rather than in groups. And most Turkish members 
preferred group meetings. When asked to specify types of persons or  groups 
they most regularly met in the district, both Korean and Turkish legislators 
cited local party officials, while Kenyan leaders were more likely to mention 
civil servants. 
Members were asked what kinds of interaction they had with constituents. 
Kenyan and Korean members most often said they talked to constituents 
about their problems, while those in Turkey were more likely to inform con- 
stituents about new laws and seek their opinions about legislation. Those 
in Kenya talked about district rather than national questions. Those in 
Korea also discussed district matters, but spent more time discussing partisan 
questions. Those in Turkey gave more attention to national issues, and less 
time to district and partisan questions. These priorities reflect the cross- 
national differences we have reported elsewhere. particularly in the chapters 
on representation. 
When the legislature is in session, legislators spend most of their time in 
the capital. There are many claims on the member's time when he is in the 
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capital. He must attend meetings of the legislature and, if a committee 
member, meetings of the committee. There are also partisan activities that 
take up his time. He pursues activities that are designed to serve the interest 
of his district o r  his constituents, and may receive personal visits and/or 
correspondence from constituents, most of whom seek some kind of service. 
Table 8.1 shows that legislators receive a sizable amount of correspondence 
and host many visitors. It is highly likely that the legislator constitutes a 
target for citizens who want to enlist his support for their business with 
government offices. Kenyan legislators appeared to receive fewer letters and 
slightly fewer visitors while in the capital than their Korean and Turkish 
counterparts. This is not unusual since Kenyan constituents have much 
greater access to their legislators in their district. Moreover, the Kenyan 
constituencies are smaller than those in other countries, and Kenya has a 
lower rate of literacy, thus fewer constituents who write. 
The typical letter or  visitor asks deputies for assistance in personal matters 
(83 percent in Kenya, 50 percent in Korea, and 78 percent in Turkey). In 
Turkey, since shifts of civil servants to different posts are decided by the 
ministries, many requests are concerned with the appointment of a bureau- 
crat to a particular position. In both Turkey and Kenya, constituents ask 
their deputies to help them find jobs. 
It Seems reasonable to expect constituents to go to the deputy who repre- 
sents their own district (which means a larger number of deputies in Turkey 
with its multimember districts). Yet, because many deputies have reported 
that they receive communications and visitors who are nonconstituents, it is 
plausible to infer that citizens can, to some degree, choose the legislator 
whose assistance they receive. Constituents who are asking for a legislator's 
intervention to achieve a personal or a public end would be inclined to go not 
only to a deputy with whom they are familiar but also to one who would be 
in a position to produce results. 
TABLE 8.1. 
Letters and Visitors per Week Received by Legislators 
(percentages) 
LeHen Vlrlton 
Range Kenya Korea Turkey Kenya Korea Turkey 
1-3 37.0 4.3 10.7 12.0 1.2 4.0 
4-10 22.2 15.7 27.2 16.0 12.0 21.0 
11 -30 14.8 43.4 38.8 24.0 31.3 28.0 
31 -50 18.5 14.5 8.7 12.0 19.3 22.0 
51 or more 7.4 20.5 14.6 32.0 33.7 25.0 
None 0.0 1.2 0.0 4.0 2.4 0.0 
N = (27) (83) (103) (25) (83) (100) 
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THE LEGISLATOR A N D  DISTRICT PROBLEMS 
There are two types of problems related to legislators' allocation of specific 
resources. The first concerns only individuals. For example, a constituent 
may want his son to be admitted to a military school and ask the deputy (or 
one of the deputies from his district) to intercede on his behalf. This is a 
demand for a personal service. Many requests made of legislators are of this 
nature and consume a significant amount of their time. To illustrate, we 
quote a Turkish deputy: 
They [constituents with personal grievances] come all the time. They may call you 
any time of the day or the night from the bus or the train station, tell you their 
problem and expect you to get on it immediately. They often don't know the 
capital, how to get around, how to do business. They want you to go and meet 
them, take them around and feed them. If their business cannot be taken care of 
in a day, you may have to find a bed for them. When all is done, you have to see 
them off and. on many an occasion buy their return ticket. 
While legislators may expend considerable resources in performing per- 
sonal services for their constituents, they are also concerned with problems 
of a broader scope. Villages may need roads, water, or school buildings. 
Towns may need hospitals. Districts or provinces may seek industrial invest- 
ment. Particular segments of the population, such as interest groups, may 
have other demands. Collectively, these requests may be called community 
demands. 
PERCEPTION OF COMMUNITY PROBLEMS 
A legislator's perceptions of his community problems influence both the 
type of resource allocation activities he will undertake, and where he will 
intervene. Similar problems were considered prominent by constituents, local 
notables, and legislators in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey. Most problems cited 
refer to some aspect of economic development or economic life as listed in 
table 8.2. 
Constituents and notables frequently cited social needs such as schools, 
roads, and water supplies. Economic, commercial, and industrial problems 
include inflation, unemployment, and demands for industrialization. 
Kenya deviates from Korea and Turkey in its emphasis on agricultural 
problems. Although agriculture accounts for a major portion of the GNP in 
all three countries, Korea and Turkey have engaged in rapid industrialization 
attempts, a policy supported by large segments of their populations. Our 
judgments from field experience in these countries also suggest to us that 
many peasants see industrialization, rather than improvements in agriculture, 
as the best avenue for their economic betterment. 
For the most part, legislators agreed with constituents and notables about 
TABLE 8.2. 
Perceptions of Most Important Community Problems (percentages) 
Political, partisan, or administrative 
Sociocultural 
Industrial-commercial 
Agricultural 
Educational 
Welfare related 
Social overhead 
Other 
Unspecific (Kenya) 
No problems 
No answer, don't know 
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the most important community problems, but there were some interesting 
differences of emphasis. While Turkish MPs gave less priority than did con- 
stituents and notables to social needs, Kenyan M Ps gave higher priority than 
did other groups to these needs. Except in Kenya, M Ps gave greater priority 
to industrial and commercial needs than did others in their district. Kenyan 
MPs were less interested in agricultural matters and more interested in 
education than were constituents and notables in that country. Legislators, 
because they represented many communities, cited problems at  the district 
and regional level (data not shown), in contrast to constituents and local 
notables who pointed to more specific problems. This may help explain why 
(except in Kenya) legislators appear to give more attention to industrial and 
commercial problems and less to social problems than do constituents and 
notables. 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
The ways in which personal and community demands are communicated 
to the legislator are similar. Both may be communicated to the legislator 
when he visits his district or by letters or visitors when he is in the capital. 
Some need not be communicated at  all, because the legislator may already 
be aware of them. Let us begin by examining how district problems get 
communicated to the legislators. 
It is apparent from table 8.3 that district problems, in most cases, were 
known to the legislators. Most were not related through specific channels, 
but rather were issues the legislator and the voters were familiar with. Only 
in Korea were the local notables and community leaders identified in some 
number as a source from which the legislator had learned about local prob- 
lems. While the reasons for this are not clear, it is probable that Korean 
legislators had fewer contacts with their constituencies, as some of our earlier 
TABLE 83. 
Legislators' Sources of Information on Diirict Problems (First 
Problem Mentioned) (percentages) 
Kmyr Kotw Turkey 
Nobody I knew 
Voters in general 
Leaders of social organizations 
Local officials 
Local notables 
Village leaders 
Party officials 
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observations also indicated, and relied more frequently on their political 
machines and their contacts with traditional holders of local political power 
for information. 
LEGISLATORS' ACTIVITIES 
A legislator will do different things, and intervene at different places in 
order to solve district problems. In Kenya we have data on what legislators 
have done to help solve district problems. While the data may not be typical 
of other countries, it provides useful information for Kenya. 
Of the twenty-five Kenyan M Ps responding, over one-third had organized 
self-help programs or raised money for the district; one-fourth had contacted 
a ministry, a provincial or district commissioner, or were themselves ministers 
who could provide direct help. A few said they had spoken in the National 
Assembly; one-fourth listed nothing they had done. 
It was not unusual to see Korean or Turkish legislators in the halls of 
government offices inquiring about when various projects in their districts 
would start or trying to convince officials that their district should be given 
priority in government investment. It was also possible to hear legislators 
speaking on the floor for their districts, but this was not done with great 
frequency because it was ineffective. As one Turkish deputy explained, "If 
you occupy the floor to talk about your district problems, your colleagues 
will say 'he is sending his regards to his electorate.'" 
Many legislators in all three countries felt that they were somewhat effec- 
tive in solving district problems. Almost two-thirds of MPs in Kenya said 
they had been very effective, and another 20 percent said they had been 
somewhat effective. In Turkey, almost one-third claimed to be very effective 
and an equal number somewhat effective. While only one-sixth of the Korean 
MPs said they were very effective, nearly half said somewhat effective. 
Few Kenyan legislators claimed to have been ineffective in solving the 
problem they have named as most important in their districts, while more 
Korean and Turkish legislators reported that they had been ineffective a t  this 
task. The greater satisfaction expressed by Kenyan MPs may reflect the 
higher flexibility of the Kenyan political system, but it should also be men- 
tioned that the Kenyan legislators, on an average, had been serving for longer 
periods of time at the time of the interviews than had other MPs. The Turkish 
and Korean surveys were conducted six to ten months after elections in those 
countries, whereas the Kenyan survey was carried out shortly before Kenya's 
elections. Thus, Kenyan legislators had had more time to become familiar 
with the legislative process and the methods of getting resources for their 
district. This advantage no doubt increased their effectiveness. 
What qualities distinguished legislators who claimed to have been effective 
from those who said they had been ineffective? Were backbenchers less effec- 
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tive than frontbenchers? Did the members of the government parties feel 
more effective than the members of the opposition? 
Both in Turkey and Kenya, M Ps from rural districts claimed to have been 
more effective than their colleagues from urban areas. Those from mixed 
districts fell between the two (gammas = 0.32 and 0.59, respectively). It is 
probable that the types of constituency service requests that originate in 
rural districts are more modest and as such may be easier to fulfill. It is 
equally probable that more government services reach the urban areas, thus 
diminishing the likelihood of requests for minor services in urban areas, and 
increasing the likelihood of more serious requests. A Turkish deputy from a 
province near Istanbul, conversing with a colleague from Eastern Turkey, 
expressed this occurrence well: "You know, I am quite lucky to be from X. 
Your people all come to you for any problems they have. Mine, well, they 
mostly don't get past Istanbul. It is like having a dam that holds a river 
back." 
In Korea and Turkey, party was an influential factor in determining legis- 
lators' ability to solve district problems. Members of the government party 
expressed greater effectiveness in solving district problems, both in Korea and 
Turkey (gammas = 0.52 and 0.18). This relationship was weaker in Turkey, 
suggesting that in a more competitive system, members of opposition parties 
may have satisfactory opportunities to perform services for their districts. 
Those legislators who held government or party positions prior to becom- 
ing representatives professed greater effectiveness in getting things done for 
their district in Turkey (gamma = 0.39). The same relationship was not evi- 
dent in Kenya or  Korea, mainly because in these countries there were very 
few legislators who had not held a government or a party position before. 
In summary, those legislators who represented rural districts, who held a 
party or government job prior to election, and who were members of the 
government party, were more likely to say they were successful in their efforts 
to provide services to their districts and to help solve district problems. 
WHO GETS WHAT AND HOW 
So far, we have examined the legislators'constituency service role. In this 
section we focus on a related question: who actually benefits from these 
services? Both constituents' access to and contact with an M P  are crucial 
preconditions to receiving such benefits, and so we begin with an analysis of 
these. We will also present data on the kind of services that legislators provide 
for their constituents and districts. 
Our data show that individual voters had differential access to their M Ps. 
Some voters saw their legislators more frequently than did others, talked 
with M Ps about community or personal problems more regularly, and ob- 
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tained more services. Comparing constituents and local notables, we discover 
a marked difference between the two groups in their contact with an MP. 
Local notables in all three countries interacted much more frequently with 
their M Ps than did constituents (table 8.4). Such interaction was highest in 
Kenya, and lowest in Korea. In Turkey constituents rarely saw their deputies, 
but local notables including provincial and subprovincial party chiefs and 
local interest group leaders maintained regular contacts with their M Ps. 
The differences in contact among the three nations cannot be explained 
by distance alone since we know that Korean MPs can reach their districts 
just as easily as can M Ps in other countries. Although it is true that each M P 
in both Korea and Turkey represents a larger constituency than does a 
Kenyan MP, it still does not provide an adequate explanation because the 
Turkish constituents had more extensive contact with their MPs than did 
Korean constituents. A more plausible explanation may be found in the 
peculiar nature of politics in Kenya. In comparison to the other two countries 
Kenya is the least industrialized, with the largest number of rural election 
districts. In these rural districts, as we have discussed earlier, a form of link- 
age institution that we call the patron-client system has evolved. Weak party 
organization and the lack of active voluntary interest groups in Kenya have 
contributed to the gradual emergence of this patronclient system as a prin- 
cipal political organization in many rural districts. Legislators play key roles 
in this organization, for they use it as their election machines. For rural 
voters it offers vital access to government. Competition for scarce govern- 
ment resources is therefore waged through such organizations, the results of 
which are the unusually frequent contacts between constituents and their 
M Ps in Kenya. 
More local notables than constituents had talked to their M Ps in all three 
countries, which is not surprising given the fact the notables were all com- 
munity leaders. Also, local notables had discussed problems of a public 
TABLE 8.4. 
How Many Times Legislator Seen in Last Six Months (percentages) 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
Conrltuent Notable Constituent Notable Conrtltuent Notable 
One time 12.6 15.2 5.3 14.1 8.8 15.7 
Two times 13.2 8.2 6.7 13.0 2.4 8.0 
Three times 6.7 8.6 0.8 6.8 1.9 11.5 
Four or more 
times 16.8 56.7 1.3 9.4 2.3 28.2 
None, no answer, 
don't know 50.7 21.4 85.9 56.6 84.6 36.6 
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nature more frequently with their M Ps than constituents did. Most constitu- 
ents talked to their MPs about personal problems or requests, when they 
had an opportunity to see their legislators (tables 8.5 and 8.6). It seems 
evident that the notables acted often as the spokesmen for their villages 
when they dealt with elected officials such as their M Ps. 
The contrasts between the countries were interesting. More constituents 
and local notables reported talking to legislators in Turkey than in Kenya or 
Korea. This is contrary to our expectation that more Kenyans should have 
talked to their MPs because more of them claimed to have seen their legis- 
lators within the six months preceding the survey than did the voters in the 
other two countries. Apparently, visibility of the legislator in his district in 
Kenya does not always translate into conversations with him, whereas in 
Turkey citizens and elites are likely to seek to see their legislators in order to 
communicate community problems to him. 
Again in Turkey, conversations with deputies appeared to deal almost 
exclusively with community problems, in sharp contrast to the situation in 
Kenya and Korea where requests are often personal in nature. The existence 
of strong party organizations which tend to the personal problems of citizens 
probably lessens the need of Turks to ask deputies for personal favors, but 
there is also a cultural bias operating against receiving personal favors from 
public persons. Many respondents in Turkey, when asked whether a legislator 
TABLE 8.5. 
Have You Ever Talked to an MP About Any Problem (percentages) 
Kenva Korea Turkev 
Conrtltuenta Notablr Conrtltuentr Notablw Conrtltuenta Notablw 
Yes 7.2 47.4 5.4 45.6 10.7 64.8 
NO 92.8 52.6 94.6 54.4 89.3 35.2 
N =  (3.381) (342) (1,724) (377) (1,950) (287) 
TABLE 8.6. 
What Problem Have You Talked About With Legislator (percentages) 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
Conaltwntr NotaMw Conatllwnta NolaMw Conatlluenta Nolablea 
Personal 
problems 59.1 37.7 54.2 58.8 13.2 3.5 
Public 
problems 39.7 61.1 32.5 39.9 66.5 67.8 
Both 0.0 0.0 13.3 1.3 20.3 28.7 
N =  (3.381) (342) (1.724) (377) (1,950) (287) 
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had done something for them personally, responded with expressions like 
"Heaven Forbid ! " or  "Thanks be to Allah, I have never had to do that! " 
While reluctance of Turks to admit that they received personal favors may 
cause them to exaggerate the public nature of the demands they make on 
legislators, this does not alter the basic emphasis they place on public matters 
when talking to their deputies. 
Only Korean local notables talked about personal problems to legislators 
as often or more often than did constituents. Such a difference lends further 
support to our earlier observation that Korean political parties a t  the local 
level tend to be personal political machines of legislators. Exchanges of 
personal favors for electoral support constitute the basis of a patronclient 
relationship. 
Needless to say, talking to a legislator does not in itself insure a favorable 
outcome. The legislator may not have enough time, influence, or information 
to produce a favorable result for each request that is made to him. Further, 
he is unlikely to attach equal importance to all the demands he receives for 
constituency service, but rather is apt to develop a set of priorities concerning 
which problems and which constituents will get his attention. In Turkey, for 
example, if a constituent asks an MP for assistance in finding a job, he is 
likely to receive a personal card expressing the M P's support and directions 
to a government office or a State Economic Enterprise, where his chances of 
finding a job are not high. However, if a request comes from someone whose 
support at election time is important, an MP will pay closer attention to it 
and work harder to produce results. On community or subdistrict problems, 
electoral supporters, friends, relatives, and hometown people may receive 
favorable consideration by a legislator. 
PERCEPTIONS OF SERVICE 
Legislators perform services for individual constituents as well as for the 
com'munity. They spend a great deal of their time attending to personal 
requests from constituents. However, a legislator can provide such services 
only for a small number of his constituents. The data presented in table 8.7 
show that very small percentages (0.9% in Korea and 4.5% in Kenya) of 
constituents in the three countries received personal favors from M Ps. 
Local notables did better than constituents in receiving personal services 
from MPs. The disparity in services received was the largest between con- 
stituents and local notables in Kenya, and the smallest in Turkey. Kenyan 
constituents received more assistance'from their M Ps than did the constitu- 
ents in Korea and Turkey. Also, Kenyan notables did significantly better in 
this respect than did either Korean or Turkish notables. The saliency of 
patronclient organizations in constituencies seems to be a key factor explain- 
ing the larger amount of personal services rendered by Kenyan legislators. 
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Looking at the types of services that constituents have received, we found 
varying patterns in each country. In Kenya legislators were involved most 
frequently in securing government loans or finding employment for their 
constituents. In Korea MPs most often performed ceremonial services such 
as attending a wedding, a funeral, or a clan meeting. In Turkey deputies 
spent a large part of their time trying to find jobs for their constituents or 
interceding with government agencies on behalf of individual voters. 
In addition to personal services, legislators also provide services which 
benefit the community as a whole. Most of the public projects they help bring 
to the district are of this type. We asked our respondents if they were aware of 
community services that their M Ps had performed in order to ascertain the 
amount of such services provided by MPs in each constituency. Kenyan 
constituents showed the highest awareness of such services, much more than 
did constituents in Korea or Turkey. There is, in fact, evidence to say that the 
Kenyan M Ps were actually far more active in providing this kind of services 
than were MPs in the other two countries. The difference in awareness be- 
tween constituents and local notables was also significant in all three coun- 
tries: local notables were more aware of M Ps' effort to provide community 
services. 
The type of community services that MPs tried to provide varied from 
country to country. In Kenya MPs worked hard to raise funds, both from 
government and private sources, to help local self-help projects (Harambee). 
They provided active assistance in creating local cooperatives and in con- 
struction projects such as roads, communication lines, primary schools, water 
and irrigation works. In Korea MPs played some limited role in the construc- 
tion of public facilities. In Turkey M Ps focused their efforts upon industrial 
and commercial projects such as getting factories built or new businesses 
opened in the district. 
The type of community services legislators are expected to perform is 
closely related to the economic structure and goals of a society. Kenya is 
basically a rural and agricultural society. The problems perceived, the solu- 
tions offered, and the services provided in Kenya tended to reflect this. In 
Korea and Turkey, both more developed than Kenya, problems and solutions 
TABLE 8.7. 
Has Your Legkiplator Done Something For You? (percentages) 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
Constituents Notables Conrtltwnts Notables Constltwnb Notables 
Yes 4.5 10.4 0.9 5.1 3.0 3.6 
No 95.5 89.6 99.1 94.9 97.0 96.4 
N =  (3,549) (413) (1,766) (390) (1,948) (280) 
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cited were usually related to industry and commerce. Once industrialization 
becomes a widespread phenomenon, even the more rural and agricultural 
segments of the population might begin to perceive their problems in com- 
mercial and industrial terms and, rather than expecting agricultural better- 
ment, seek economic betterment through industrial growth. 
SERVICES TO INDIVIDUALS 
The end result of the process of specific resource allocation is the benefit of 
an individual or community. While any citizen may request individual favors 
from a representative, we have already noted that, in fact, only a small per- 
centage of the population actually does so. Among those who make requests, 
some obtain a satisfactory result while others fail to receive any benefit. Who 
are the beneficiaries of a legislator's activities? To answer this question, we 
examined the social background and political characteristics of constituents 
and local notables to identify those who appeared to be likely candidates to 
enjoy personal services. 
Data analysis indicated that social background variables do not predict 
who among the constituents and local notables might be the recipients of 
such services. Political variables, on the other hand, were better, if somewhat 
modest, predictors of benefits received. 
The effects of political variables on the services received were quite evident 
in Kenya. Those constituents who knew their M Ps personally from before 
the election and those who helped their M Ps in election campaigns obtained 
a greater amount of services than other constituents. Campaign work would 
certainly obligate a winner to return the favor, usually in the form of con- 
stituency service, and that appears to be the situation in many rural districts 
in Kenya. Personal acquaintance with an M P was also a good predictor of 
services received in both Kenya and Turkey. However, the same variable 
failed to predict the services received among the Turkish local notables. This 
may be a result of the extremely high percentage of the Turkish notables who 
personally knew their M Ps well (82.3%), a case of invariance in the indepen- 
dent variable. 
In Korea two political variables showed some effects on the services re- 
ceived by constituents: the level of political interest and the experience of 
contacting officials. Those constituents who exhibited a high political interest 
reported having received more benefits than others did. Likewise, those who 
had experience in contacting and lobbying government officials obtained 
more services from their M Ps than those who did not have such experience. 
Our analysis fails to suggest a general conclusion regarding the determi- 
nants of personal services received by constituents. Although some political 
variables such as political interest, campaign work, acquaintance with an 
M P, and lobbying experience, showed some predictive powers in one or other 
country, none proved to be a consistent predictor across all three nations. 
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SERVICES TO COMMUNITIES 
Legislators provide a varying amount of community services, a type of 
services distinguishable from those provided for individual constituents. Some 
districts receive more benefits of this kind than other districts, largely due to 
the aggressive actions taken by their representatives. What factors might 
account for the varying levels of community services received by each con- 
stituency? We have no data to measure directly the amount of such benefits 
actually distributed in each district, but we do have some information from 
which we can assess roughly the amount of community services received by 
each district. We asked both the constituents and local notables if they could 
identify any community services that they attributed to the activities of their 
MPs. Although we cannot always assume a perfect correlation between the 
public's perceptions of community services and the actual amount of such 
services obtained by a district, the two variables must nevertheless be cor- 
related to some extent. 
We have examined the correlations between a set of fourteen variables, all 
relating to district characteristics, and the constituents' perception of com- 
munity services received. While we do not present the full results of this 
analysis here, it is useful to list some of these variables: percentage of urban 
population in each district, annual rates of in- and out-migration, age distri- 
bution of district population, the literacy rate, ethnic composition, level of 
electoral competition, voter turnout rates, distance from the nation's capital, 
and the level of communications and transportation development. The unit 
of analysis employed in this section is the data aggregated to the district 
level. 
The results of analysis produced no clear patterns across the three nations. 
Only two variables, the degree of electoral competition and age distribution 
in districts, showed modest positive associations with the constituents' per- 
ception of community services received. The correlations were the strongest 
in Kenya, and the weakest in Korea. It may be possible to interpret these 
results, with some caution, that those M Ps serving competitive districts must 
provide services more actively than other MPs who represent safer districts 
or, alternatively they must advertise more of what they are doing in order to 
remain a viable candidate in the next election. The effects of competition on 
community services were relatively weak in Turkey. This was because multi- 
member districts were used in Turkey, which diminishes both the visibility 
and role of individual deputies and enhances the role of political parties, in 
contrast to the system of a single-member district which would have the 
opposite effects. The average age of district population was moderately cor- 
related with constituents' perception of services received in all three countries, 
but the meaning of this is not altogether clear to us. All that can be said at 
this point of analysis is that electoral districts with older populations had 
done better in obtaining community services than other districts. 
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We discovered a few interesting facts in the analysis of the Kenyan data, 
although these cannot be generalized to the other two countries. First, rural 
districts received more community services than did urban ones. Second, 
electoral districts with stable populations, i.e., small in- or out-migration, ob- 
tained more community services. Third, the districts with a better developed 
transportation system, measured by paved road per square miles, benefited 
more from community services than did the districts with a poor transporta- 
tion network. Finally, the distance between a district and Nairobi, the capital 
city, also made a significant difference: districts closer to the capital received 
generally a greater amount of services. These findings suggest that there are 
identifiable factors that affect the allocation of community services in each 
country, but there are no such factors common to all nations. 
The question of who gets what and how is important to an understanding 
of political representation. This is also a question most difficult, if not impos- 
sible, to research. We have approached it from the viewpoints of all major 
participants in the resource allocation process: M Ps, constituents, and local 
notables. We have tried to show the interactions among these participants 
and how such interactions shaped the outcomes, i.e., who shares such benefits 
and who does not. Furthermore, we have tried to identify the correlates of 
personal and community services provided by MPs in their districts. The 
analysis produced no such correlates applicable to all three countries. 
Part IV 
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE LEGISLATURE 
Chaprer 9 
LEVELS AND SOURCES OF LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT 
Popular support is critically important to the persistence and the effective 
functioning of a legislative body. Without it the legislature cannot perform 
its functions in any effective manner. David Easton has formulated the con- 
cept of support as a key variable that explains the stability of a political 
system or subsystem.' Legislatures, like institutions of all kinds, require 
support to persist over time. The degree of support that a legislature receives 
indicates how firmly that institution is rooted in the mind of citizens and 
elites. Hence, both the durability and effectiveness of a legislature depend in 
a significant way on the amount of support manifested by the public and the 
elite strata. Patterson and his associates have offered a theoretical rationale 
for studying support: "Legislatures require support to persist, to deal effec- 
tively with public and organized group demands, and to make necessary 
political decisions. . . . But since legislatures, more than most public and 
private groups and more than the bureaucratic or judicial branches of the 
government, are representative political institutions, the generation of public 
support is an important prerequisite for successful decision making on public 
poli~y."~ 
In many countries, particularly in the non-Western world, legislatures are 
relatively fragile institutions. They have neither a firm foundation of repre- 
sentative tradition nor a widespread public attachment to a representative 
body. Often they are relegated to the periphery of power, playing a subser- 
vient role to the powerful executive, the military junta, the dominant political 
party, or a charismatic leader. They have frequently been abolished, sus- 
pended, or forced to relinquish their constitutional powers. But legislatures 
have also been resurrected on numerous occasions, demonstrating their re- 
markable resilience in the modern world. 
We have noted in the first chapter that students of political development, 
notably Huntington, have emphasized the central importance of institutional 
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differentiation. Legislatures in developing countries are not only fragile and 
vulnerable to attack, but are still in the process of becoming autonomous 
entities. The institutionalization of the legislature requires not only the devel- 
opment of internal norms and structures, but the growth of external support 
-from other national political elites, local elites, and ordinary citizens. Legis- 
latures lack the power that can be commanded by military leaders or the 
visibility and charismatic qualities of chief executives. Moreover, in develop 
ing societies, it may be very difficult for legislative leaders to make citizens 
aware of the fact that the legislature is a distinct institution. 
The relationship between public support for the legislature and support 
for the political system as a whole is important but it is difficult to measure. 
If there are sharp conflicts or intense rivalries between the legislature and 
other political institutions, those citizens who are aware of these differences 
may support one institution but not the others. Where these conflicts are 
either unimportant or unrecognized by many citizens, support for the legisla- 
ture may generate greater support for the political system as a whole because 
of the ability of the legislature to lend legitimacy to the actions of the govern- 
ment. If support for the legislature not only is strong but contributes to 
regime support, political or military leaders may recognize that it is risky to 
abolish or suspend that body. 
In many countries of Asia and Africa where legislatures have neither a long 
history nor a firmly established tradition, the foundation of mass support for 
such institutions, is, as a general rule, highly insecure. And, to use Easton's 
terminology, the "reservoir of good will" among the public is likely to be 
shallow. This is what makes the support of citizens and elites particularly 
important to the development of a strong legislature in new states. Without 
some strong attachment to the legislature on the part of the general public 
and certain more influential groups, it is likely that the legislature will remain 
a weak body, usually under the shadow of a predominant executive. There- 
fore, the question of support for the legislature as a distinct institution is an 
important one. The capacity of the legislature to survive or to gain political 
strength in the future, especially in the face of possible efforts by the executive 
branch to weaken or eliminate it, may depend in part on the level of support 
it receives from the public. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE 
SOURCES OF SUPPORT 
A variety of factors may influence the amount of support that citizens give 
to the legislature. It also seems likely that the factors which explain support 
in one country may not always explain support in another. In an effort to 
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bring as many relevant variables as possible into our crossnational study, we 
begin with a general conceptual mapping of the key variables we have identi- 
fied and their relationships to legislative support. Such variables and their 
relationships are depicted in schematic form in figure 9.1. The level of s u p  
port for the legislative institution is the dependent variable which we seek to 
explain. The independent variables include five distinct categories: personal 
characteristics, the frequency of contact with MPs from one's district, cogni- 
tive variables, evaluative attitudes, and finally, district level variables such as 
socioeconomic conditions and MPs' activism in the districts. 
Personal characteristics. We expect to find that those citizens who have 
the advantages of a higher social status would manifest higher levels of 
support for the legislature.' This includes such factors as higher education 
and higher prestige occupations. Younger citizens with the advantages of a 
greater opportunity for better education and a greater exposure to modern 
values should be more supportive of the legislature than are their older 
counterparts. In many developing countries women have traditionally been 
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A Conceptual Framework of the Diverse Sources of Legislative Support 
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assigned a lower social status than men, resulting in poorer education and 
lower political consciousness. Urban residents should be more supportive 
because of their greater access to the mass media and better information 
about politics; they might also have a higher feeling of political efficacy; all of 
these factors should contribute to legislative support. 
Studies have shown that legislative support is higher among citizens who 
are knowledgeable about and involved in  politic^.^ This leads us to hypothe- 
size that legislative support should be higher among constituents with more 
interest in political affairs, among those who are actively involved in politics, 
and among those with higher political efficacy. 
It seems plausible that some broader measure of knowledge and political 
awareness, not necessarily limited to purely political matters, might be related 
to legislative support. One such measure is the OM-12 scale, designed by 
lnkeles and his associates to indicate an individual's modern beliefs and 
attitudes5 We expect greater legislative support among those constituents 
with a higher level of individual modernity. We also expect local elites not 
only to have more knowledge of politics but also to have a greater stake in 
the political system, and thus be more supportive of the legislature. 
Scope of contacts with MPs. Those constituents who have the greatest 
contact with MPs and the highest awareness of what MPs have done for 
their district are expected to be more supportive of the legislature. We asked 
constituents questions about whether they were acquainted with their M Ps; 
how often they had seen them or talked to them; whether they could recall 
what the MPs had done for the district; and whether the MPs had helped 
them personally in any way. We anticipate that greater contact would lead to 
greater salience of both individual MPs and the legislative institution, and 
also to a greater satisfaction with legislators' performance, particularly in 
regard to constituent assistance. 
Cognitive variables. The extent to which constituents are aware of and 
familiar with various aspects of the legislature is what we call salience. There 
is institutional salience, related to the actions of the legislature as a collec- 
tivity; and there is individual salience, related to the roles and actions of 
individual legislators. We hypothesize that higher salience would produce 
greater support for the legislature and would also affect constituents' evalua- 
tion of the performance of the legislature and its members. The exact re- 
lationship between salience and evaluation is difficult to predict because those 
constituents most familiar with the legislature (and aware of its failings) 
might evaluate it less favorably. 
Evaluative attitudes. Positive evaluations of the performance of the legis- 
lature and its individual members are important sources of legislative support. 
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As in the case of salience, evaluative attitudes can be directed toward either 
the legislative institution or its members. We do not assume that these two 
types of evaluations would be the same, and the distinction between them is 
important in hypothesizing about the connection between satisfaction and 
legislative support. 
In most developing nations where the legislature is neither powerful nor 
highly visible, citizens are unlikely to have clear impressions of what the 
legislature does as a collective body. But these same citizens may have rea- 
sonably intimate knowledge about the actions of MPs from their own dis- 
tricts, as they are often the most visible figures in their communities. The 
relative importance of our two satisfaction variables might also vary with 
political strata. Those in the upper stratum and more politically aware and 
active are likely to base their support for the legislature on their satisfaction 
with its performance as an institution. Those in the lower stratum with less 
political knowledge might base support on their satisfaction with the per- 
formance of the individual M P s . ~  
District level variables. We expect that there would be variations in levels 
of support between districts, not only because of variations in socioeconomic 
conditions, but also because of the variety of activities and services that 
legislators provide for the district. We also expect satisfaction with the per- 
formance of individual MPs, as well as legislative support, to vary by district. 
Some legislators work harder to build an electoral organization in the district 
that reaches the grassroots level, and this should lead to variations in indi- 
vidual salience from one district to another. We expect higher levels of 
salience, satisfaction, and support to result not only from direct dealings 
with M Ps but also from the spillover effect of M P activities and organization 
in the district. 
Interrelationships among variables. The relationships depicted in figure 
9.1 are not intended to be a causal model of legislative support, but rather, a 
conceptual framework. Obviously, other variables not included may also 
affect support. Moreover, there might be other possible relationships among 
the variables which we have not specified. The conceptual framework we 
have presented will nevertheless help us clarify the possible relationships and 
their directions among the variables that we think important and for which 
we have data from our crossnational survey. Although we do not propose to 
test all causal relationships implied by our conceptual framework, we will try 
to test some of them in our analysis, going beyond simple bivariate analyses. 
THE LEGISLATIVE CONNECTION 
THE CONCEPT OF LEGISLATIVE 
SUPPORT A N D  ITS MEASUREMENT 
DEFINING SUPPORT 
David Easton has explicated his concept of support by an exemplification, 
instead of a clear formal stipulation. He has asserted that " A supports B, 
either when A acts on behalf of B or when he orienrs himself favorably 
toward B (emphasis added).' Perhaps he thought that the term "support" is 
too generic to require a formal definition. Or perhaps he believed that the 
meaning of the term is intuitively clear. Whatever the case, it remains that 
Easton has left us without a formal definition of his central concept. Even if 
we take his exemplifications such as the sentence italicized above, it still 
leaves the concept open to many varied interpretations.' 
In his discussion of support, Easton has distinguished between two differ- 
ent kinds of support: diffuse and spe~ i f i c .~  Support of a diffuse sort entails 
deep-seated sentiment or attachment to a political object. This kind of sup- 
port, Easton argues, does not depend on the specific output of a political 
object and therefore is relatively persistent over time. 
By contrast. specific support is based on short-term satisfaction with the 
performance or  specific outputs of an institution. From the perspective of the 
survival of an institution or  the system as a whole, Easton further argues that 
the diffuse support is far more important because it "enables a system to 
weather the many storms when outputs cannot be balanced off against inputs 
of demands." "' Empirical studies of support for various political institutions 
have employed this distinction in the past and many have concentrated, with 
good reason, on the diffuse support." 
Although conceptually pregnant as it may seem in its abstraction, the 
distinction will reveal, upon closer scrutiny, several insuperable difficulties 
for its application in empirical studies. Diffuse and specific support are still 
ambiguous analytic concepts which, as Gerhard Loewenberg has pointed 
out, present us with formidable measurement problems.12 Is it really possible 
to disentangle the supportive attitudes that we observe and separate empiri- 
cally that part of support based on a person's satisfaction with specific out- 
puts and another part which is independent of the effects of such outputs? 
We think not. 
For this and other reasons we have rejected the distinction between diffuse 
and specific support for the purposes of our study.I3 We conceive of support 
as an attitude that is learned over a period of time. If a person has developed 
a strongly supportive attitude for an institution as a result of early socializa- 
tion, his or her attitude is less likely to be changed by disapproval of recent 
actions taken by that institution. Nevertheless, the attitude of any individual 
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is likely to be a result of his or her beliefs and perceptions, ranging from the 
individual's earliest political memory to the newspaper headlines of the day. 
We will define legislative support in terms of the value or worth that con- 
stituentsattribute to the legislature. Do they consider it a worthy institution? 
To what extent do they value it as a key political institution? More to the 
point, are they willing to eliminate this institution? If not, what are they 
prepared to do to maintain it? Legislative support, as we define it, refers 
therefore to the attitudes of individual citizens reflective of their degree of 
willingness to uphold the legislature. 
MEASURING SUPPORT 
Our operational measure of legislative support is derived from several 
comparable survey questions employed in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey. Each 
of these questions was designed to determine whether constituents consider 
it both necessary and desirable to maintain a legislative body, whether they 
regard the legislature as one of the best things to be established since indepen- 
dence, whether they believe their country would be worse off if the legislature 
were abolished (or reduced in size), and whether they believe that it has 
played an important and useful role. In table 9.1 we list the support questions 
and the constituents' responses in the three countries. 
The data suggest several conclusions. First, the level of legislative support 
is generally high in all countries, perhaps surprisingly high for an institution 
that is neither highly institutionalized nor very powerful. In Korea and 
Turkey over four-fifths of those interviewed indicated that the legislature was 
a necessary institution. Similarly, at least three-fifths of the constituents in all 
three countries believed that they were better off because they had a legis- 
lature and that it has played a significant and useful role. Second, because 
only a small percentage of the constituents gave negative answers, the legis- 
lature is certainly not a target of public hostility in Kenya, Korea, or Turkey. 
The main line of division was between those who gave positive answers and 
those who had no opinions. Third, of the three countries, the Turkish con- 
stituents indicated the strongest support for their legislature, a result that 
might be expected given the long history of the legislature and its relatively 
strong political influence in the Turkish political system. 
For the purposes of measuring support, we have eliminated those respon- 
dents who answered "don't known to all of the questions on support. For the 
remaining respondents, all of whom have expressed views on some or all of 
the support questions, we have lumped together the negative and "don't 
know" responses. This overcomes the problem of a small number of negative 
responses. 
It also seems reasonable to analyze legislative support in positive terms, 
TABLE 9.1. 
Responses to Support Questions in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey (percentages) 
Support Items 
---- - - 
Suppottlve 
Do we really need a 
legislature? 81 
What difference has it 
made to this 
country? 67 
Are we better off 
because we have a 
legislature? 63 
Is the legislature one 
of the best things 
established since 
independence? 42 
Could we do just as 
well with half as 
many MPs? ("No" 
scored as support.) 20 
Korea 
No answer, 
Negative don't know 
3 16 
-- 
Suppottlve 
Turkey 
No answer, 
Negalrr don't know Suppoltlw 
-- - 
Kenya 
No anmer, 
Negative don't know 
not asked 
13 26 
8 28 
not asked 
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and to compare the number of positive responses given by various individuals 
and groups. Those who answered "don't known in response to some of the 
questions could be distinguished from those who were willing to assert posi- 
tively that the legislature was a necessary institution and one that benefited 
society. 
In an effort to obtain a single summary measure of legislative support, we 
employed the Guttman scaling technique and succeeded in constructing a 
scale based on five identical items for Korea and Turkey. The results of the 
scaling operation showed acceptable Coefficients of Reproducibility and of 
Scalability in Korea; 0.90 and 0.64 respectively. Similar results were obtain 
in Turkey (CR = 0.9 1 and CS = 0.60). We could not use the same procedure 
for Kenya simply because two of the five support items were not asked in the 
Kenyan survey.I4 Instead, we formed a simple three item additive index with 
scores ranging from a low of 0 to a high of 3. The scale positions and the 
distribution of the constituents on this scale are reported in table 9.2. In the 
analysis that follows we will use these scales and index as our operational 
measure of the level of support for the legislature. 
SOCIAL A N D  POLITICAL LOCATIONS OF 
LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT 
SOClAL STRATA 
Our task here is to identify the loci of legislative support in Kenya, Korea, 
TABLE 9.2. 
Level of Legislative Support Based on Scale Positions 
in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey (percentages) 
Korea Kenya Turkey 
Scale r c m s  N = 2015 N = 1958 Index rcom N = 3746 
0 
low 
1 
4 
high 
5 
2.0 0 5.8 
low 
4.5 1 18.5 
17.8 2 32.7 
high 
46.1 3 43.0 
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and Turkey. We will examine bivariate relationships rather briefly, because 
in subsequent chapters we will look at multivariate correlations of support. 
Several studies conducted in different nations have shown that support for 
an institution such as the legislature is lodged heavily in higher social strata.I5 
In an effort to determine social location of support we have examined 
several variables: sex, age, education, residence, and class. The results indi- 
cate that men are markedly more supportive of the legislature than are 
women in all three countries. (Gammas are 0. I5 for Kenya, 0.33 for Korea, 
and 0.34 for Turkey.) Of course, in most societies, and in these three countries 
in particular, politics has been and continues to be primarily the domain of 
men. With a more active interest in political affairs, it is not surprising that 
men are more supportive. 
We expected to find younger generations to be more supportive because of 
their higher education and the fact that they had grown up in the more 
modern period. But in all three countries, we found generally weak relation- 
ships between age and legislative support (the highest relationship being in 
Kenya where the Kendall's tau was only -0.06). 
As we expected, we found those with higher education to be consistently 
more supportive of the legislature in all three countries, but the relationship 
was curvilinear. In general, constituents with middle or high school education 
were the most supportive; college graduates ranked slightly behind them; 
and those with little or no education ranked lowest in support. The data 
seemed to indicate threshold point, beyond which the positive effects of 
education on support diminished. Thus, college graduates, with greater poli- 
tical knowledge and interest, may insist on a higher standard of performance 
for the legislature and therefore may easily become disillusioned with it. 
We expected higher levels of support from urban areas because urban 
residents were not only better educated but were closer to the center of poli- 
tics and more politically aware than their rural counterparts. Contrary to 
expectations, urban constituents in Kenya were slightly less supportive than 
were their rural counterparts; relationships in the other countries were too 
weak to draw any conclusion. 
We divided constituents into four groups on the basis of class in order to 
measure the effect of class on support. The evidence was both consistent and 
clear. Members of the upper and middle classes were considerably more 
supportive of the legislature than were members of lower classes. In Kenya, 
for example, nearly one-half of those in the upper classes gave the strongest 
support rating possible to the legislature, less than one-fourth in the lower 
classes did so. A similar pattern emerged in Korea. (The Kendall's taus for 
Kenya and Korea are -0.13 and -0.14.) In Turkey the tendency was less 
clear; but strongest support was found among constituents from middle and 
working class backgrounds. Support from the Turkish working class may 
have resulted from approval of pro-labor legislation passed by the Turkish 
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legislature, while support from the upper classes may have been weakened 
by elitist attitudes among those groups. 
POLlTlCAL STRATA 
We expected support to be uneven across political strata. Boynton and his 
collaborators have suggested that "support tends to come most strongly from 
the politically knowledgeable and participant segments of the population." l6 
In nations in Asia and Africa, the base of political stratum is usually narrow 
with much of their citizenry remaining politically uninvolved. There is even 
greater likelihood that legislative support is disproportionately concentrated 
in a small but politically active stratum. 
We used two measures of political stratification: efficacy and citizen par- 
ticipation. Efficacy indicates not only the self-perception of one's role in the 
political process, but also the degree of self-assertiveness of an individual 
citizen. A Cpoint index of efficacy was constructed from three standard items 
that we included in the survey." The specific items used were: (1) people like 
me don't have any say about what the government does; (2) government 
officials usually do not care a great deal about what people like me think; 
and (3) sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person 
like me can't really understand what's going on. Although on occasion the 
content directions of some questions were reversed (especially in Kenya 
because of the sensitivity of the regime there to these items), we later recoded 
them to be in the same direction before the construction of our index. 
Constituents with efficacious feelings were more supportive of the legis- 
lature than those without efficacious feelings in each of the three countries. 
In Kenya, nearly 50 percent of the most efficacious strata gave the highest 
possible support to the legislature, in contrast to only 38 percent of the least 
efficacious group (Kendall's tau = 0.10). The pattern was much the same in 
Korea and Turkey, with the strength of efficacy-support relationships reach- 
ing 0.19 and 0.10 respectively. There is evidence, therefore, to conclude that 
the legislature has its strongest advocates among the most politically assertive 
constituents. 
The second measure of political stratification we used was degree of citizen 
participation. To indicate the extent of such an involvement we have con- 
structed a simple &point index based on five survey items: (I) persuading 
other people to vote for a given candidate, (2) attending election rallies, (3) 
campaigning actively for candidates, (4) talking to government officials about 
local issues, and (5) talking to government officials about national issues. 
Responses to these queries served as the basis for the construction of the 
activism index.I8 Although there were some important variations in the level 
of political activism in the three countries, our expectation was upheld con- 
sistently in all of our research sites: the politically active stratum was dis- 
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tinctly more supportive than the inactive stratum in every country(Kendall's 
tau varied from 0. I0 to 0. I I ). 
MODERNITY A N D  SUPPORT 
Rapid modernization is taking place in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey just as 
in other countries of Asia and Africa. Different segments of these societies 
are being affected at different rates by modernization, causing a significant 
sociocultural gap between the most modern sectors, often consisting of well- 
educated, urban, middleclass citizens, and the vast sectors of tradition-bound 
rural populations. The varying impact of modernization leads to the creation 
of a bifurcated structure of political culture in some of these countries, one 
sector almost as modern as its counterparts in the industrialized west, and 
another barely beyond that of an agrarian society. In Seoul, Istanbul, and 
Nairobi, and especially among their more affluent and well-educated mem- 
bers, we find beliefs and attitudes almost identical to those held by citizens in 
industrialized nations. As we move from major urban centers to rural areas, 
beliefs and attitudes change rapidly.I9 
We have employed a measure to classify various population groups accord- 
ing to their levels of modernization. This measure has been designed and- 
used successfully by lnkeles and his research team in six developing coun- 
tries.20 The specific scale that we have employed in our study is what lnkeles 
calls the OM-12 (the overall modernity scale), which represents a briefest 
distillate from 1 19 survey items included in his project. We have made some 
minor modifications to the scale so as to make it relevant to our research 
countries. Our summary index of individual modernity was created from 
eleven questions. Scores ranged from a low of 0 to a high of 0. I 1 .2' 
In rapidly developing societies like Kenya, Korea. and Turkey stratification 
systems are closely enmeshed with modernization. As a general rule, those 
constituents who come from the most modernized sectors of society and 
therefore hold the most modern beliefs and attitudes are also likely to occupy 
higher ranks in social and political stratification systems. Indeed, this is the 
case in all of our three countries. Members of higher social and political 
strata in Kenya. Korea, and Turkey embrace distinctly more modern beliefs 
and values than others of lower strata. In table 9.3 we display the relationship 
between individual modernity and stratification variables. Almost without 
exception, our measure of modernity, the lnkeles OM-12 scale, shows strong 
correlations with all of our stratification variables. In all three countries, the 
most modern individuals are found disproportionately among the young, 
among males, among the better educated, among urban residents, and also 
among those with prestigious occupations and high SES status. Further, 
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those citizens who are politically active and feel efficacious have markedly 
more modern beliefs and attitudes than those who are inactive or  do not feel 
efficacious. Given such close connections between modernity and our strati- 
fication variables, it seems appropriate to use the modernity measure as a 
shorthand surrogate for the social and political location of a constitutent. 
We have found modest correlations between support and a number of 
personal characteristics that are indicative of social or political stratification. 
We have also found (see table 9.3) that most of these correlate positively with 
our measure of individual modernity. This suggests that modernity may be 
used as a convenient summary variable for the attitudes associated with high 
levels of stratification and determining what relationships exist between 
individual modernity and supportive attitudes. 
Although one should exercise caution in making direct crossnational com- 
parisons, it does seem apparent that constitutents in both Turkey and Korea 
are generally more modern in their beliefs and attitudes than are the citizens 
in Kenya. In spite of this variation, and in spite of other important socio- 
political differences among the three countries, there is a consistent and 
strongly positive correlation between the level of individual modernity and 
the level of legislative support in all countries. 
In Kenya the modern sectors are distinctly more supportive of the legis- 
lature than are the less modern sectors (Kendall's tau = 0.22). The same is 
true of modern constituents in Korea and Turkey. In Korea, the relationship 
is even stronger than in Kenya (Kendall's tau = 0.26). It is less strong in 
Turkey but still above the significant level (Kendall's tau = 0.10). Thus, the 
evidence suggests that the legislature draws its strongest support from the 
modern sectors of society. 
TABLE 9.3. 
Relationships between Modernity and StratiZiution Variables 
(Wendall's tau) 
Levd of lndlridrul Modernity 
Varkbka Kenya Korea Turkey 
Social stratification 
Age (young-old) -O.W -0.19. -0.09. 
Sex (malefemale) -0.25. -0.33. -0.13' 
Education (years of schooling) 0.34. 0.43' 0.33. 
Occupation (7-pt. prestige ranking) 0.22' 0.26' 0.23' 
Class status (high-low) -0.2v -0.33. -0.28. 
Place of residence (rural-urban) 0.1 1. 0.03 0.19' 
Political stratification 
Political activism (6pt. index) 0.19' 0.24' 0.24' 
Political efficacy (4-pt. index) 0.12. 0.36' 0.16. 
a. Significant at the level of 0.001. 
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THE SUPPORT OF LOCAL ELITES 
Table 9.4 compares the levels of legislative support from constituents 
(already reported in table 9.2) to those from local elites.22 In both Korea and 
Kenya the local elites were much more supportive of the legislature than 
were average constituents. In Turkey, however, differences between the two 
groups were significantly smaller. An examination of the answers to specific 
questions on support shows that in all three countries the elites were more 
likely to give positive answers and less likely to say they did not know than 
were constituents. However, a relatively small proportion of both constituents 
and elites gave negative answers. In other words, elites in all three countries 
were likely to respond favorably to questions that implied support. And, in 
Korea and Turkey. elites were more likely than constituents to believe that  
the country could do just as well with half as many M Ps (scored as a negative 
answer on the support scale). 
One reason for the higher levels of elite support, at least in Korea and 
Kenya, is that elites represent higher levels of social and political stratification 
than do constituents, and so, as we have shown previously, are more likely to 
support the legislature. There is much less variation in personal variables 
among elites than among constituents, and consequently we find that for 
elites the correlations between support and the individual variables reported 
in tables 9.3 and 9.4 are negligible. In Korea, however. there is a very modest 
correlation between support and political efficacy (0.14) and support and 
activism (0.10). The relationship between suppofl and modernism is very 
low among elites in Kenya (0.12) and Korea (0.10) and is nonexistent in 
Turkey. In analyzing support levels among elites. therefore, we have no need 
to be concerned with individual characteristics, but can treat the elites in 
each country as a group. 
TABLE 9.4. 
Elite Status and Legislative Support (percentages) 
Ellh Status 
Kenya Kona Turkey 
Local Mau Local M n r  ~oca l  M a u  
Supporl notables dtlzens notables citizens notablea clti20ns 
Levds (N = 448) (N  = 3,748) (N = 465) (N  = 2,015) (N = 288) (N  = 1,955) 
High 62 43 30 13 25 30 
Medium 31 33 57 56 72 63 
Low 7 31 3 
- 
24 
-
13 
- - -
7 
-
100 100 100 100 100 100 
Chapter 10 
SALIENCE, SATISFACTION, A N D  SUPPORT 
The first purpose of this chapter is to summarize what we have learned 
about constituents' knowledge concerning their representatives and their 
legislatures, and about their levels of satisfaction with the performance of 
MPs and legislative institutions. The second purpose is to determine what 
kinds of respondents have various levels of knowledge and satisfaction. The 
final purpose is to explore the relationships that exist between these variables 
and support for the legislature. We will try to determine whether constituents 
for whom the legislature is more salient are more supportive and satisfied 
with its performance, and whether salience of, and satisfaction with, the 
legislature is directly linked to legislative support. 
THE SALIENCE OF LEGISLATIVE 
INSTITUTIONS AND MEMBERS 
How much do the people of Kenya, Korea, and Turkey know about their 
representative and legislative institutions? Studies in the United States show 
relatively low levels of citizen familiarity with some basic facts about Con- 
gress and members of congress.' One might expect to find even less knowl- 
edge about the legislatures in the countries of our study, where legislative 
institutions have much briefer histories, less power, and less visibility in the 
media. Moreover, levels of education are lower and communications media 
less extensive in these countries. 
Within any country we would expect to find that legislative salience is 
greater for persons with social and political advantages. Salience is important 
because it is the sole basis on which citizens can make informed judgments 
about the legislature. Without the active support of the well-informed seg- 
ments of society, a legislature cannot function as a significant political insti- 
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tution. And well-informed citizens are not likely to give their support unless 
they are reasonably satisfied with the performance of the legislature and its 
members. 
LEVELS OF SALIENCE 
We have already reported data in chapter 6 that show how familiar con- 
stituents are with the legislature and with their own representatives, and the 
findings can be summarized briefly here. Turkish constituents were more 
familiar with the legislature and its history and were better able to distinguish 
it from other institutions than were citizens from Korea and Kenya (table 
6.1). This was probably not only because the Turkish legislature has a longer 
history than the legislature in the other two countries but also because it 
plays a more central role in Turkish government and politics. The strong 
executives in both Korea and Kenya tend to overshadow the legislative 
bodies, and this presumably has an impact on public perceptions. 
When we asked about individual MPs, we found that Kenyan constituents 
were better informed about their legislators than were constituents in the 
other two countries (table 6.2). An astonishing 84 percent of the Kenyan 
constituents could name their legislator, compared to 69 percent in Korea, 
and 53 percent in Turkey who could name at least one of their representa- 
tives. The single-member district system in Kenya and the relatively large 
amount of service work performed by Kenyan M Ps may help to explain this. 
However, Kenyan constituents were less likely than those in the other two 
countries to be able to distinguish the function of M Ps from that of civil 
servants. 
For our purposes in this chapter, it is desirable to combine several measures 
of familiarity or knowledge into two indexes of salience. An analysis of the 
responses shows that the questions can logically be divided into two groups. 
First are four questions that measure familiarity with the legislative institu- 
tion; the answers can be combined into an index of institutional salience. 
Answers to the other three questions, dealing with familiarity with and per- 
ceptions of individual members, form an index of the salience of individual 
MPsZ  Because there is a low correlation in each country between the indexes 
of individual and institutional salience, and because the two indexes have 
quite different relationships to other variables, we will treat them separately. 
SOME CORRELATES OF SALIENCE 
We have hypothesized that those constituents with social and political 
advantages would regard the legislature and its members as more salient 
than would other constituents. Table 10.1 shows the relationships between a 
number of independent variables and our two measures of salience. In all 
three countries, sex, education, occupation, and social class show strong 
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positive correlations with the salience of the legislative institution. Constitu- 
ents who are male, better educated, and who have high prestige occupations 
and high socioeconomic status are markedly more familiar with the legis- 
lature than are other constituents. 
The correlation between these variables and salience of individual M Ps is 
not consistent in all three countries. In Korea alone, all of the variables show 
significant correlations to salience, ranging from a low of 0.17 to a high of 
0.34. In Turkey, only two variables, sex and education, show moderately 
strong correlations. None of these variables is correlated with the salience of 
individual M Ps in Kenya. Thus, we cannot draw a conclusion that applies 
consistently to all three countries. 
Remarkably strong and consistent relationships exist between individual 
modernity and our two measures of salience. Without exception, the moder- 
nity variable correlates strongly with both salience of the legislature and 
salience of individual MPs in all three countries (Kendall's taus = 0.27 to 
0.51). However, the strength of the relationship between modernity and sali- 
ence of the legislature is consistently stronger than that between modernity 
and salience of individual MPs. 
TABLE 10.1. 
Correlates of institutional and Individual Salience 
in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey (Kendall's taus) 
Salknca of hgYatlw 8.llence d 
lnrtltutlon Indlvldual M Po 
Independent vuiables Kenya K m  Turlrey Kenya Korea Turkey 
Background 
Sex 0.26' 0.30' 0.49. 0.06 0.34. 0.45' 
Education 0.32. 0.39. 0.34' 0.10. 0.24' 0.22' 
Occupation 0.22' 0.21' 0.20. 0.08' 0.17' 0.08' 
Social class 0.23' 0.19' 0.22. 0.09' 0.19. 0.13' 
Individual modernity 
OM-12 scale 0.44' 0.51' 0.35' 0.27' 0.45 0.24' 
Political activity 
Talked to others about voting 
for candidate 0.16' 0.12' 0.28' 0.11' 0.16' 0.23. 
Attended election rallies 0.18' 0.11' 0.31' 0.13. 0.17' 0.28. 
Worked in campaign 0.07 0.06 0.13' 0.07 0.13' 0.23' 
Political interest 
Discussed politics with 
friends 0.14' 0.19' 0.21' 0.06 0.14' 0.21' 
Contact with MPs 
Saw MP in district 0.19' 0.15' 0.08. 0.28' 0.12. 0.15' 
Talked to MP personally O . w  0.06 0.15' 0.06 0.07 0.16' 
a. Significant at the level of 0.001. 
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We have also examined the relationships between salience and three groups 
of variables that indicate the political advantages of the constituent: political 
activity, political interest, and constituent contact with M Ps. The results of 
our analysis show neither strong positive relationships between salience and 
the three groups of variables nor consistent patterns across different countries 
(table 10.1). The activity variables show fairly strong correlations with both 
types of salience in Turkey (most between 0.23 and 0.3 I), but substantially 
weaker correlations in the other two countries. One reason for low correlation 
is that most constituents voted but relatively few engaged in the other types 
of political activities that are examined. The interest variable shows some 
positive correlation with individual and particularly institutional salience, 
notably in Turkey and Korea, but the correlations are not strong. There is 
some correlation, particularly for individual salience, with one measure of 
MP contact: seeing the MP in the district. The correlation with the other 
measure of M P contact-talking to M Ps-is weaker, partly because so few 
constituents have done so. 
What emerges from the data is the general impression that the salience of 
legislative institutions requires some measure of social and political aware- 
ness, while salience of individual MPs requires less. In order to have some 
knowledge of the legislature, one must have higher social position and more 
involvement in politics, while many of those in the lower social strata with 
little political participation seem to know something about their MPs and 
what they have done for the district, but seem to know very little about the 
legislature itself. 
SALIENCE A N D  LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT 
Does salience lead to support of the legislature? More specifically, does 
familiarity with the institution and with the individual MPs produce higher 
levels of support for the institution? We have seen that higher status, and 
more particularly a high level of modernity, are associated with higher sup- 
port. Is this because these high status, more modern citizens are more familiar 
with the legislature and its members? Or is it possible that familiarity breeds 
contempt, and undermines support? Later in this chapter, we will examine 
the causal links from salience to satisfaction and then to support. First, we 
examine the direct link between salience and support. 
Table 10.2 shows that in Korea and Turkey there was a moderately strong 
positive correlation between support and institutional salience and slightly 
lower correlation between support and MP salience. In Kenya both correla- 
tions were lower. Thus, the link between salience and support seemed visible, 
but hardly powerful. 
We should recognize that correlation between salience and support may 
result in part from the technique we have used in constructing the support 
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index. Because we are interested in positive manifestations of support, and 
because relatively few respondents gave negative answers, we have combined 
negative responses with "don't knowsw in constructing the support scale. We 
would expect those with lower salience levels to fail to answer support ques- 
tions more often than those with higher salience. It must be kept in mind, 
however, that those who failed to answer any of the questions that constitute 
the support scale have been eliminated from the analysis. All of those in the 
study expressed a positive or negative opinion in response to at least some of 
the support questions. 
SALIENCE AMONG LOCAL ELITES 
We would expect local elites to be more familiar than the average cltizen 
with both the legislative institution and with the individual MPs. Elites rank 
high in those personal qualities that we have found to be associated with 
salience (table 10.1). Moreover, they have much greater opportunity for per- 
sonal contact with MPs, and consequently should be familiar with them. In 
fact, we found the level of elite salience, by most of our measures, to be very 
high. Almost every elite respondent knew the name of one or more of his 
representatives, and in Kenya and Turkey from 85 to 95 percent of them 
expressed opinions about how well their MPs were doing their jobs and 
about the honesty of most legislators. Consequently, in those two countries 
TABLE 10.2. 
Salience and Legislative Support among Constituents (percentages) 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
Low Mdlum Hlah Low Mdlum Hlah Low Mdlum Hkh 
Level of MP 
Salience 
0 40 40 20 57 40 3 22 58 20 
1 35 31 34 38 56 6 7 68 25 
2 27 32 42 31 55 13 4 66 31 
3 19 34 48 16 61 24 3 59 38 
tau = 0.11' tau = 0.21. tau = 0.17' 
Level of legis- 
lative salience 
0 33 35 32 46 48 6 25 61 14 
1 23 30 47 29 59 12 10 64 26 
2 19 35 46 21 62 18 3 66 31 
3 14 29 57 21 60 19 2 62 37 
4 9 35 57 14 52 34 1 6 6 3 3  
tau = 0.14' tau = 0.22' tau = 0.20' 
a. Significant at the level of 0.001. 
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most elite respondents scored very high on the individual salience score. 
Korean elites have lower scores because many of them were unwilling to 
express opinions about the performance and honesty of M Ps. Turkish elites 
ranked very high in institutional questions; Korean elites were a little less 
accurate, particularly in distinguishing the legislature from other institutions; 
Kenyan elites ranked lower, partly for the same reason. With the exception 
of M P salience in Korea, the salience of elites on both scales in all three 
countries was substantially higher than that of average constituents. 
Because the level of M P salience was so high among elites, particularly in 
Kenya and Turkey, there was little reason to be concerned with variables 
that affected it or to expect that variations in salience would affect support 
for the legislature. 
There was greater variance in levels of elite familiarity with the legislative 
institution. Higher institutional salience was related to higher education and 
more political activity in Kenya and Turkey, and in all three countries it was 
related to higher levels of political efficacy, individual modernity, and more 
contact with M Ps (all these correlations ranging from 0.13 to 0.28). We can 
make some distinctions between the more active, politically involved, and 
modem elites and those who are less so, and these distinctions have some- 
thing to do with institutional support in Korea and Kenya and nothing to do 
with it in Turkey. 
CONSTITUENT SATISFACTION WITH 
THE LEGISLATURE 
How satisfied are constituents with the performance of the legislature and 
with the performance of individual MPs? Easton suggested that the level of 
citizens' support for a political institution depends partly upon citizen satis- 
faction with specific outputs of the legislature.' The performance of both the 
legislature and individual MPs may be considered to be specific outputs. 
Using this conceptual framework as a starting point, we will summarize 
what we know about levels of satisfaction, and then explore the sources of 
that satisfaction. 
DIMENSIONS AND LEVELS OF SATISFACTION 
Constituent satisfaction defies easy measurement. Instead of asking ques- 
tions about specific laws or actions of the legislature, which most respondents 
could not reasonably be expected to answer, we asked a very general question 
about the legislature: Had it performed reasonably well? 
To measure the image of the legislator, we asked respondents whether 
each of several characteristics, such as honesty and hard work, was important 
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for legislators to possess and whether they thought most or only a few legis- 
lators had this characteristic. Because there was considerable consensus about 
the qualities that were most important, we focused on these in measuring the 
image of legislators. It is very possible that many respondents have a clearer 
impression of the performance of legislators from their own districts than 
they do of the legislature as a whole. We asked respondents to evaluate the 
importance of seven jobs that legislators might perform, and asked how well 
their assemblyman was doing in each of these areas, paying particular atten- 
tion to the jobs generally perceived as most important. We also used an 
index evaluating the MP's performance of these jobs. 
Performance of the institution. The question about how well the legislature 
is performing has the advantage of being a simple, concise measure of per- 
formance satisfaction, but is so general that it is hard to interpret the meaning 
of differences found from one country to another. Both Turkish and Kenyan 
respondents reported very high levels of satisfaction. In Turkey, 78 percent 
of the constituents said the legislature performed well and only 8 percent 
said it did not. In Kenya 70 percent said the legislature performed well and 9 
percent said it did not. In Korea, only 36 percent said the legislature per- 
formed well, 24 percent said it did not, and an even larger group were un- 
willing or unable to make an evaluation. Perhaps because the Assembly in 
Korea has lost power to the president, or perhaps because it has become 
entangled in partisan controversies, little more than one-third of the constitu- 
ents articulated a positive evaluation of its general performance. 
Perceptions of MPs' characteristics. Respondents in the three countries 
were presented with a list of seven characteristics and asked whether each 
was important for an assemblyman to possess. The results of this poll were 
reported in an earlier chapter (table 6.3). but will be briefly summarized 
here. Constituents in all three countries ranked honesty at or very close to 
the top of the list, and also attached great importance to hard work, an 
understanding of the common people, and a good education, in that order. 
Three other characteristics assumed less importance: that an MP be an im- 
portant man in his community, that he be successful in his occupation, and 
that he be a long-term resident of the district. 
How well did legislators measure up to these expectations? As we reported 
in table 6.7, members in all three countries were judged to be least successful 
with respect to the qualifications that were most important, such as honesty, 
hard work, and understanding of the common people. 
Performance of individual MPs. When we turn to the constituents'expec- 
tations concerning their own legislators, we find some differences in the 
general importance they attach to these jobs. The highest priority jobs tend 
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to be described as very important more often in Kenya, and less important in 
Korea, and of very little importance in Turkey. Despite these differences, 
there was remarkable agreement among the three sets of constituents con- 
cerning the relative importance of tasks performed by MPs. These data were 
described in table 6.4 and can be very briefly summarized here. 
Constituents in all three countries emphasized those aspects of an MP's 
job that were directly concerned with articulating the needs of people in the 
district, getting projects and benefits for the district, staying in touch with the 
district, and helping people with their problems. In all countries the single 
most frequently emphasized activity was telling the government what con- 
stituents wanted. 
We should be cautious in interpreting these data. Respondents were not 
asked to list the MPS jobs they considered important, and most could prob- 
ably not have done so. Instead, they were given a list of jobs and asked to 
judge the importance of each. While many respondents ranked either all of 
the jobs or none of them as important, there were substantial differences in 
each country between the proportions ranking as important various jobs 
(from 55 to 84 percent in Kenya, from 25 to 52 percent in Korea, and from 
18 to 46 percent in Turkey). 
The next question was how well constituents thought legislators performed 
these jobs. These data, already reported in table 6.8, showed that levels of 
satisfaction were highest in Kenya. In Turkey and, particularly, in Korea, 
many respondents believe that their legislators were doing a poor job in 
getting projects for and visiting the district. In both countries legislators 
scored best on two less valued functions: participating in the debate and 
passage of bills, and explaining governmental policies to the people. In short, 
the level of satisfaction was low in Turkey and Korea. 
WHO IS SATISFIED WITH THE LEGISLATURE? 
In order to determine which respondents are most satisfied, we have looked 
at answers to the question about whether the legislature is performing well 
and also at the index of satisfaction with M P  performance derived from the 
seven survey questions described earlier. 
We will summarize the correlates of performance satisfaction only briefly 
because these relationships will be included in the subsequent multivariate 
analysis. Generally, personal characteristics had little effect on either measure 
of satisfaction, although males, better educated constituents, and those with 
higher class status were generally more satisfied. In Turkey urban residents 
were considerably more satisfied with individual M P performance than were 
rural residents. Individual modernity had a slightly stronger, more consistent 
positive correlation to both measures of satisfaction. Efficacy and activism 
had very modest correlations to performance satisfaction. Contact with the 
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MP had some effect on satisfaction (particularly with individual MP per- 
formance) in Kenya, but much less effect in the other two countries. In 
Turkey, of course, the use of multimember districts reduced the likelihood 
that there would be correlations between contact and performance satisfac- 
tion, particularly since respondents were not asked to specify which M P they 
had contacted or which one they were evaluating. 
There was a consistently positive relationship between both types of sali- 
ence and both types of satisfaction. The correlation beween institutional 
salience and both measures of performance was moderate, as was the cor- 
relation between individual salience and institutional performance satisfac- 
tion. The relationship between individual salience and satisfaction with MP 
performance was very strong (Kendall's tau ranging from 0.52 to 0.65 in the 
three countries). Those who knew most about their own MPs were most 
likely to be satisfied with their legislators' performance. 
SATlSFACTlON AND SUPPORT 
We have hypothesized that there will be a positive relationship between the 
level of support for the legislature and satisfaction with performance of both 
the institution and the MP. In fact, the correlation between support and 
satisfaction with institutional performance was positive in all three countries. 
(Kendall's tau is 0.20 in Kenya, 0.2 1 in Korea, and 0.09 in Turkey. The figure 
would be higher in Kenya except for the small number expressing dissatis- 
faction.) The question on institutional satisfaction was very general, asked in 
the middle of a series of questions on support, and some respondents may 
not have distinguished the questions as clearly in practice as we did in our 
theoretical formulations. We will pursue the question of relationships among 
salience, satisfaction, and support in more detail later. 
Our most detailed measure of performance is the one that summarizes the 
evaluation of the M P's performance of seven different jobs. A large propor- 
tion of Turkish and Kenyan respondents provided answers to these questions. 
Less than half did so in Korea. There was a positive relationship between 
this measure of MP job satisfaction and legislative support but it was weak 
(Kendall's tau ranged from 0.09 to 0.17). Despite our expectation, most citi- 
zens apparently did not see any particular connection between the actions of 
their M Ps and their own evaluations of the activities of the legislature in the 
national capital. 
ELITES' SATISFACTION WlTH LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE 
It is important to measure and analyze levels of elite satisfaction with 
legislative performance for several reasons. We would expect elites to be 
considerably more familiar with, and therefore able to judge, the accomplish- 
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ments of the legislature, the qualifications of members generally, and the 
performance of their own M Ps. It is also possible that elites, better informed 
and more perceptive than average citizens, will have different expectations 
and judgments about the legislature than do other citizens. 
In both Kenya and Korea, elites are much more favorably impressed with 
the legislature's performance than are average citizens. In Kenya, 93 percent 
of the elites said that the legislature was performing well and only 3 percent 
said that it was not (compared to 70 percent positive and 9 percent negative 
responses among average citizens). In Korea, the margin of satisfaction was 
53 to 32 among elites (and 36 to 24 among citizens). (In both countries far 
fewer elites than citizens gave no response.) In Turkey, however, there was 
more criticism from elites than from citizens; elites give a 74 to 22 favorable 
judgment to the legislature, compared to 78 to 8 among citizens. 
In table 6.3, we showed that elites agree with constitutents about what 
qualities legislators should have. Honesty and hard work were consistently 
ranked highest, with understanding of the common people and good educa- 
tion close behind. In Kenya and Korea, the elites agreed with the constituents 
in their judgment about how well M Ps met those qualifications. In Turkey 
the elites were more favorably impressed by the qualification of MPs than 
were average citizens, and made greater distinctions among the various quali- 
ties on the list. 
In table 6.4, we compared the priorities ascribed by constituents and 
elites to the various jobs of MPs, and found few differences. Although the 
elites tended to attribute more importance to lawmaking and explaining gov- 
ernment policies than constituents did, both groups generally gave highest 
priority to jobs related to the district. In table 6.8, we showed that Kenyan 
and Korean elites gave a somewhat more favorable evaluation of jobs being 
done by M Ps than did citizens-particularly with regard to lawmaking func- 
tions. Turkish elites, however, were consistently critical of their MPs, and 
roughly half of them evaluated job performance on a number of specific 
tasks as poor. 
Can we pinpoint the independent variables that are associated with higher 
satisfaction among elites? None of the social or political variables was cor- 
related with satisfaction with legislative performance in all three countries, 
nor were contact with M Ps or  either of the salience indices. 
Several independent variables were correlated, however, with the scale of 
MP job satisfaction. The correlation between contact with the MP and 
evaluation of the M P's job performance was 0.23,O. 14, and 0.24 in Kenya, 
Korea, and Turkey, respectively. Those for MP salience and job evaluation 
were very high: 0.57, 0.44, and 0.42 in the three countries. It is significant 
that the elites, who were most familiar and had most contact with the M Ps, 
and were most willing to make judgments about them, were also much more 
favorably impressed by their job performance. 
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In Korea, the correlation between elite support and elites'satisfaction with 
the legislature and also between elite support and satisfaction with individual 
MPs'performance was a modest 0.21. In Turkey, there was a 0.14 correlation 
between support and satisfaction with the legislature, but insignificant cor- 
relation between MP job performance and support. In Kenya, the levels of 
elite satisfaction and support were both too high for there to be much vari- 
ance to explain with correlations. In none of these countries could elite 
support for the legislature be explained by satisfaction with performance to 
the extent that it could be so explained among constituents. 
Chapter 1 I 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT 
Constituent support for the legislative institution arises from many diverse 
sources. In our conceptual framework (outlined in figure 9.1) we have listed 
some of the variables that we believe have the greatest direct or  indirect 
effects on support, and we have suggested how these variables are related. In 
chapter 9 we measured the effects of personal variables on support. In 
chapter 10 we measured the salience of and satisfaction with the legislature, 
and we identified variables related to salience and satisfaction and the effects 
of these two factors on support. Obviously, if we are correct in assuming that 
a number of variables directly and indirectly affect the levels of support for 
the legislature, we need to use multivariate techniques in measuring their 
effects in order to get a better understanding of legislative support and its 
causes. 
We will begin by employing multiple regression analysis. The next step is 
to use path analysis in an attempt to develop a parsimonious model of the 
causes of legislative support. Then we will seek to determine whether the 
causes of support can be explained differently for particular subgroups in 
the three countries, comparing modern and traditional constituents and mass 
constituents and elites. Throughout this analysis we will be primarily con- 
cerned with identifying patterns related to support that are common to all 
three countries. We will also look briefly at the differences among the three 
countries in the factors influencing support, and at variations from district to 
district within the three countries. 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The first step in evaluating the importance of these variables is to employ a 
multiple regression analysis. The selection of specific variables to be entered 
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into the regression equation is based on our conceptual framework and on 
the results of our bivariate analyses in chapters 9 and 10. We will use nine 
variables in the analysis. These include the index of modernity (which we 
have found correlates highly with several background variables); indices of 
political efficacy and activism used in previous chapters; the four indices of 
salience and satisfaction; the expectation-performance differential for the 
job performance of M Ps; and the differential between expected and perceived 
qualifications of M Ps. 
In table 1 1.1 we report the results of the regression analysis. The table 
shows the zero-order correlations; the unstandardized regression coefficients 
(B), which help us to determine the impact of a given variable on legislative 
support; the standardized Betas, which indicate the predictive power of each 
independent variable; and the multiple correlations to show the combined 
explanatory power of the independent variables. 
The nine independent variables were collectively capable of explaining 
a sizable amount of variance in legislative support in all three countries. 
In Kenya, nearly one-half of the variance in constituent support could be 
accounted for by these variables (R = 0.68, R2 = 0.46). The proportion of 
TABLE 11.1. 
The Results of Regression Analysis on 
Legislative Support in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey 
Kenya Korea Turkey 
Independent varlablw r B Beta r B Beta r B Beta 
Modernity: OM-12 
scale 0.37 0.08 0.18 0.44 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.59 0.01 
Political efficacy: dpt. 
index 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.33 0.12 0.08 -0.13 0.29 0.02 
Political activitism: 6-pt. 
index 0.19 0.04 0.05 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.14 -0.47 -0.01 
Salience of individual 
M Ps 0.22 0.09 0.07 0.38 0.15 0.09 0.24 0.12 0.09 
Salience of the legis- 
lative institution 0.30 0.11 0.11 0.38 0.20 0.16 0.32 0.20 0.21 
Expectation-perform- 
ance differential -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.14 -0.01 -0.01 
Qualification differential -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.13 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.03 
Satisfaction with the 
performance of MPs 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.31 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.16 0.03 
Satisfaction with the 
performance of 
legislature 0.63 1.26 0.54 0.43 1.03 0.31 0.32 0.82 0.26 
R = 0.68 R = 0.61 R = 0.42 
R2 = 0.46 R2 = 0.37 R2 = 0.18 
Note: For the purpose of emphasis the Betas for the vanaMes that appear important in all three 
countries are underlined. 
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variance explained was smaller in the other two countries: 37 percent in 
Korea and only 18 percent in Turkey. Despite the differences, it is noteworthy 
that the same set of variables had so much explanatory power in countries 
that are so diverse. 
The degree of constituent satisfaction with the performance of the legis- 
lative institution had the strongest independent effect on support in all three 
countries. In Kenya this variable showed a Beta value of 0.54, with other 
independent variables all showing very modest Betas. The pattern was similar 
in the other two countries. The Beta value for satisfaction with legislative 
performance was 0.31 in Korea and 0.26 in Turkey, in both cases the highest 
value found among the variables that were included in this analysis. In all 
three countries the salience of the legislative institution was also important, 
with either the second or third highest Beta value among the independent 
variables. In all three countries both the salience of the legislative institution 
and satisfaction with its performance contributed heavily to the level of legis- 
lative support. On the other hand, in none of the countries did either the 
salience of the individual MP or satisfaction with his performance have much 
of an impact. Also, the two measures of differential had virtually no con- 
sistent impact in the three countries on legislative support. 
There is one other variable that was of substantial importance: the index 
of individual modernity, which was used in lieu of several social and political 
stratification variables with which it was rather highly correlated. Modernity 
had a predictive capacity of some magnitude in both Kenya (Beta 0.18) and 
Korea (Beta 0.20). but not at all in Turkey (Beta 0.0 I). We concluded from 
this that in Kenya and Korea constituents with more modern attitudes and 
values were supportive of the legislature, and that this modernity had an 
effect on support beyond the effect that was mediated through salience and 
satisfaction with performance. We will present a more detailed study of the 
differences between modern and traditional constituents later in this chapter. 
Among a large number of variables that we thought would have some 
influence on the constituent support for the legislature, we were able to iden- 
tify two key determinants that are common to all three countries: the degree 
of satisfaction with institutional performance and the salience with which 
constituents regarded the legislative institution. 
MODELS O F  LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT: 
PATH ANALYSIS 
In order to carry this analysis a step further we will examine causal link- 
ages among the variables that exert either direct or indirect effects upon 
legislative support. To begin with, we already know that in all threecountries 
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the cognitive and evaluative variables, i.e., the perceived salience of the legis- 
lature and satisfaction with legislative performance, had the greatest direct 
effect on support. How much of the variance in support was due to the direct 
effects of these cognitive and evaluative variables and how much of it could 
be explained by the indirect effects of other variables that operated through 
them? Path analysis was particularly useful in determining the simple and 
compound paths between the variables included in a causal model.' The 
path coefficients that indicated strengths of linkages could be obtained by 
regressing all antecedent variables on each of the endogenous variables in- 
cluded in the path model. Thus, the path coefficients were in effect the stan- 
dardized regression coefficients produced by a series of regression analyses. 
Although not explicitly specified in our conceptual framework (see chapter 
9), there was an implicit causal ordering of the independent variables in it. 
We postulated that personal factors such as age and education, and other 
political orientation variables such as the sense of efficacy and the level of 
activism, would affect the degree of constituents'contact with their MPs and 
that these contact variables would in turn affect the various aspects of con- 
stituent cognitions about the legislature and its members. 
Further, such cognitions were postulated to act upon the evaluative atti- 
tudes of the constituents regarding the performance of the legislative institu- 
tion as well as its individual members. It was posited that these evaluative 
attitudes, that is, the extent to which the constituents are satisfied with the 
Salience of MPs , Satisfaction with 
Salience of Satisfaction with 
ie~islature performance of 
legislature 
(X,) 
Note: A heavy line indicates a path coefficient greater than 0.20 in all three countries. A light 
line indicatesa path coefficient greater than 0.10 but less than 0.20 in at least two countries. No 
line is drawn where path coefficients are not significant in two or more countries. 
FIGURE 11.1. Minimal Path Model for Three-country Data 
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legislative performance, would have direct effects upon their support for the 
legislature. This initial model was revised as we moved through both simple 
and multivariate analyses, because some of the postulated links proved to be 
very weak. The revised path model, with all weak links removed, is more 
parsimonious in terms of the number of variables included, and yet, retains a 
substantial explanatory power. 
Figure 1 I. I describes the general pattern of the linkages in the three coun- 
tries for a parsimonious, or minimal, path model involving only five indepen- 
dent variables. The full results of path analysis in each country are also 
reported in table 1 1.2. Furthermore, in figure 1 1.2, for the purpose of illus- 
tration, we depict the path linkages in Korea, a pattern very much typical of 
the other two countries. It should be stressed that the performance of our 
minimal model is quite impressive. The five variables explain collectively 33 
percent of the total variance in Kenya, 26 percent in Korea, and 18 percent 
in Turkey. 
We identified two principal chains of influence on constituent support for 
the legislature in all three countries (see figure I I. I). The first chain consisted 
of the steps from individual modernity to the perceived salience of individual 
MPs, from the salience of MPs to the constituent satisfaction with MPs' 
performance, from the satisfaction with M Ps' performance to the satisfaction 
with the performance of the legislative institution. and finally, from the satis- 
0.61 (x,) 
~ i l i ence  of ) Satisfaction with 
performance of 
(X,) M Ps 
Modernity 0.19 o(J ) Level of 
support 
Salience of Satisfaction with 
legislature performance of 
legislature 
d= .15 I 
,pF 
Total number of cases = 2014 
Multiple R = 0.51 
2 R = 0.26 
FIGURE 11.2. Six-variable Path Model: A Typical Case (Korea) 
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faction with the legislature to support. The second chain of influence passed 
from individual modernity to the salience of individual MPs and the legis- 
lature as a collective body, and from the salience of M Ps and the legislature 
to the salience of the legislative institution, and finally, from the salience of 
the institution to the constituent support for the legislature. (The final link in 
this last chain was weak in Turkey.) 
There was a modest direct link between individual modernity and support 
for the legislature (see figure 11.1). However, this link was observed only in 
Korea and Kenya. The stength of the linkage between modernity and legis- 
lative support was 0.19 (path coefficient) in Korea and 0.17 in Kenya, indi- 
cating that in these two countries individual modernity had a direct effect on 
support for the legislature. The absence of such a direct effect in Turkey 
suggested the impact of modernity on support there was mediated through 
both cognitive and evaluative variables. Perhaps the lack of any direct effect 
for modernity results from the fact that Turkey was the most modernized of 
the three countries studied. 
In chapter 9, we developed a conceptual framework of the sources of legis- 
lative support (figure 9.1). A revision of that figure, based on our multi- 
variate analysis, and particularly on our path model, would look like figure 
11.3. In most respects the models are very similar. We have eliminated the 
TABLE 11 3. 
Minimal (&Variable) Path Model: Path Coefficients (Betas) for Support 
in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey (XI = Individual Modernity Score) 
Depndent vrrlabler Country 4 4 4 B4 BS 
X, Salience of MPs 
X, Salience of the 
legislature 
X4 Satisfaction with MPs' 
performance 
X, Satisfaction with 
performance of the 
legislature 
X, Support for the 
legislature 
Kenya 
Korea 
Turkey 
Kenya 
Korea 
Turkey 
Kenya 
Korea 
Turkey 
Kenya 
Korea 
Turkey 
Kenya 
Korea 
Turkey 
Note: Multiple correlations for support in each country are: 
Kenya (N = 3,747): R = 0.57 and R' = 0.33 
Korea (N = 2.014): R = 0.51 and R' = 0.26 
Turkey (N = 1,854): R = 0.42 and RZ = 0.18 
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contacts with M Ps because they seem to have no major effect on salience, 
satisfaction, or support, probably because (except in Kenya) very few con- 
stituents have even a minimum amount of contact with M Ps. We experi- 
mented with a more elaborate path model including qualification differentials 
and expectation-performance differentials, but abandoned it because it added 
very little to the predictive power of the model. (Note that the district vari- 
ables, shown in figure 9.1, are discussed later in this chapter.) 
A careful examination of figure 1 I .  I and table 1 1.2 leads to several con- 
clusions. The first is that there was remarkable similarity among the three 
countries in the strength of linkages; most linkages in the model were either 
relatively high in all three countries or very low in all three. The greatest 
variations generally occurred in some of the linkages with moderate strength, 
such as that between institutional salience and support for the legislature. 
It should be kept in mind that our modernity index, which measures a 
variety of attitudes and values, was used in this model because it has a rather 
high correlation with numerous background variables and correlates better 
with salience and with support than do any of those variables. In that sense, 
it is a summary variable, distinguishing high status, better educated, more 
'modern" constituents from others. 
It is clear that modernity directly affected the salience of individual legis- 
lators and of the legislative institution; the relationship was strong and con- 
sistent in all three countries. But the only other direct linkage of modernity 
with the dependent variable was a modest link to support in Kenya and 
Korea. 
The salience of MPs had a very strong impact on satisfaction with the 
performance of M Ps. But salience of the legislature had virtually no effect 
on satisfaction with that institution's performance; it did, however, have a 
direct effect on legislative support. The path coefficient was 0.21 in Turkey, 
0.15 in Korea. and 0.08 in Kenya. 
Although there was a strong linkage from modernity to MP salience, and 
satisfaction with MP performance, there was virtually no direct connection 
Personal 
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between the latter and legislative support. The path model did not support 
the hypothesis that support depended directly on the performance of indi- 
vidual legislators. Instead, the model demonstrated that support depended 
very heavily on satisfaction with performance by the legislature. In some 
respects that is an important finding, but it leaves some unanswered ques- 
tions. We know that satisfaction with the performance of the legislative insti- 
tution was measured only by a single question, but we want to know which 
variables caused such satisfaction. Path coefficients did not supply a very 
clear or comprehensive answer; the only linkage of any importance was that 
running from satisfaction with the MPs' performance to satisfaction with 
performance of the legislature. That linkage varied from a low path coeffi- 
cient of 0. I0 in Turkey to a moderate 0.17 in Kenya and 0.23 in Korea. 
We hypothesized that many constituents would be more familiar with the 
work of individual MPs than with the work of the legislature, and that, as a 
consequence, those who were most satisfied with what their own MPs were 
accomplishing would be most supportive of the legislature. The path model, 
and the accompanying path coefficients, do not fully support that hypothesis. 
Perhaps the legislature is such a distant institution that many constituents 
probably do not make a clear connection between what their MP is doing in 
the district and the need to maintain and support the legislature. The path 
model suggests another answer. one that is somewhat more complicated. It 
appears that there was a weak relationship (much stronger in Turkey) be- 
tween M P and institutional salience; and a modest relationship (particularly 
in Kenya and Korea) between satisfaction with individual M P performance 
and satisfaction with institutional performance. It seems reasonable that the 
salience of and satisfaction with the legislative institution might have derived 
in part from knowledge of and satisfaction with an individual M P  rather 
than the other way around. This would explain why the arrows in figure I 1.1 
go from the MP to the institution, and would suggest that the role of the MP 
in building legislative support was of some importance. Those constitutents 
who knew something about the M P were likely to know something about the 
legislature and thus to support it more (a correlation that was strongest in 
Turkey). Likewise, those constitutents who were most satisfied with an M P's 
performance were most likely to be satisfied with the legislative institution's 
performance and thus supported it more. This was more true in Korea and 
Kenya than in Turkey. 
SECTORAL VARIANCE IN 
DETERMINANTS OF SUPPORT 
Our analysis of the determinants of legislative support, up to this point. 
has been based on the implicit assumption that the perceptions and attitudes 
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about the legislature held by diverse groups are affected by the same types of 
forces. That assumption is open to question, however. We have discovered 
that modernity affects the salience of, and to some degree the support for, 
the legislature. It is also very possible that modernity affects the relationships 
among salience, satisfaction, and support. 
We know that modern constituents i r e  more familiar with the legislature 
and the activities of MPs than are nonmodern constituents. We would expect 
modern constituents to base their support-or lack of it-for the legislature 
on more specific perceptions about it, including their satisfaction with its 
performance. For the more traditional respondents, we would expect less 
informed and perceptive and more traditional bases of support. We would 
also expect to find somewhat similar differences between the elites, who are 
best informed about the legislature and its members, and constituents. To 
test these assumptions, we will compare first the most modern and the most 
traditional respondents, and second the local elite and citizen respondents. 
MODERN A N D  TRADITIONAL PATTERNS OF SUPPORT 
To compare the sources of support in the modern and traditional sectors, 
we divided constituents in the three countries into two groups on the basis of 
individual modernity scores. Those who had modernity scores of less than 3 
were classified as members of the traditional sector, and those with modernity 
scores greater than 8 were classified as members of the modern ~ e c t o r . ~  We
did not include constituents who were neither very modern nor very tradi- 
tional in their attitudes because we were primarily interested in discerning 
the differences between the most modern and the most traditional sectors in 
these societies. 
In the modern sector, where political knowledge and interest were most 
heavily concentrated, we expected to find the following contrasts with the 
more traditional sectors: (1) Modern constituents' support for the legislature 
would derive from more complex bases because of their political sophistica- 
tion. (2) Modern constituents' perceptions of the salience of individual MPs 
and the legislature and their satisfaction with the performance of M Ps and 
the institution would not be closely interrelated due to their ability to differ- 
entiate different components of the legislative process. (3) Modern citizens 
would base their levels of support more heavily on satisfaction with the per- 
formance of the legislature. In contrast, traditionalists either do not relate 
performance satisfaction to support at all, or base support solely on their per- 
ception of individual MPs, who are more visible than the distant legislature. 
In figure 1 1.4 we display the results of the analysis of the Kenyan data; we 
conducted similar analyses for the other countries which produced similar 
results (data not shown). We generally found substantial differences in many 
of the path coefficients between traditional and modern constituents, but 
there were relatively few in which the pattern was the same for all three 
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countries. In fact, in only one of the ten sets of path coefficients calculated 
were there consistent differences between modern and traditional constituents 
in all three countries: the relationship between salience of the legislature and 
satisfaction with its performance. In four other cases, one or two countries 
had higher path coefficients for traditional respondents, with little differences 
in the other countries. In the other five cases some countries had higher path 
coefficients for traditional and some for modern respondents. These differ- 
ences make generalization difficult. In Turkey almost all of the path coeffi- 
cients were higher for traditional constituents; in Kenya most were higher or 
about the same for traditional constituents; in Korea there was no consistent 
pattern. 
Despite these differences, in all three countries the four independent vari- 
ables in the model explained more variance in support among traditional than 
(A) Among modern Kenyan Constituents N =636 R = O S  
Salience of MPs 0.80 Satisfaction with 
MPS' performance 
Constituent 
0.20 0.53 )Isupport for the 
\ / leaislature 
4 0' - (X,) 
Salience of the -0.13 Satisfaction with 
leaisiature --+ the oerformance 
of the legislature 
(X,) 
(8) Among traditional Kenyan constituents N =866 R =0.56 
Salience of MPs 0.78 Satisfaction with 
I MPs performance 
Constituent 
0.17 support for the 
legislature 
Salience of the 0.12 Satisfaction with 
legislature the performance 
05) of the legislature 
(X,l 
Note: Only path coefficients greater than 0.10 are reported in the figure. 
FIGURE 11.4. Sectorial Variations in kgislative Support 
between Modern and Tradltional Sectors in Kenya (path coefficients) 
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among modern respondents. The contrast was greatest in Turkey (37 percent 
of the variance explained for traditional respondents and 10 percent for 
modern ones). The comparable figures were 27 percent and 18 percent in 
Korea and 32 percent and 28 percent in Kenya. These findings support our 
hypothesis that the structure of sources of support is more complex and 
varied for modern constituents, and thus less predictable by a simple model. 
We speculated that traditional citizens would be less likely to distinguish 
between their salience of MPs and the legislature and between their satis- 
faction with MPs and with the legislature. This was true in Turkey and in 
Kenya for the measures of satisfaction, but was not true in Korea. Con- 
sequently, we cannot generalize about such relationships. 
We also speculated that modern constituents would base their support 
more heavily on satisfaction with the legislature than would traditional re- 
spondents. This was not the case; the reverse was true in Korea and Turkey, 
and in Kenya there was little difference between the groups. In Korea and 
Turkey, modern respondents did base their support for the legislature more 
heavily on satisfaction with M P performance, the reverse was true in Kenya, 
but in none of the three countries was the difference very great. 
Clearly we were incorrect in speculating that satisfaction with the per- 
formance of MPs would have more influence on support than satisfaction 
with the legislature for traditional respondents. In all countries and for both 
types of respondents, the links between support and satisfaction with legis- 
lative performance were very high, and stronger than the links between 
support and satisfaction with individual M Ps. 
The most consistent patterns of differences between traditional and modern 
constituents involved the effects of legislative salience on other variables. 
These findings are not easily explained and do not fit our explanations. In 
Kenya and Korea there was a negative path coefficient (-0.10 and -0.18 
respectively) between legislative salience and satisfaction with MPs' perform- 
ance for traditional respondents. but virtually no relationship for modern 
respondents. There is no good theoretical reason for this occurrence. 
In all three countries, there was a positive path coefficient for traditional 
constituents between legislative salience and satisfaction with legislative per- 
formance. The coefficients ranged from 0.10 to 0.19. This relationship was 
not duplicated for modern constituents, perhaps because few traditional 
respondents knew much about the legislature. In short, differences in salience 
have the most impact on satisfaction with and support for the legislature for 
traditional citizens in all countries, particularly Turkey and Korea. 
LOCAL ELITES AND MASS CITIZENS 
We would expect a greater complexity in the structure of legislative support 
among the local notables than among constituents. One aspect of this com- 
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plexity would be the number of independent variables required to account 
for local notables' support of the legislature. And indeed, we found that in 
all three countries the five variables included in the path model accounted 
for less of the variance in legislative support from local notables than from 
constituents. 
The data in table 11.3 show multiple correlations of 0.36,0.37, and 0.19 
for the local notables in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey, respectively. Each of 
these is markedly lower than the multiple correlations reported for constitu- 
ents (see table 1 1.2). This suggests that local notables, because of their greater 
political involvement and more sophisticated view of the legislature, were 
unlikely to- base their support on just a few simple factors. Their support for 
the legislature seemed to derive from more complex sources than did the 
support given to the legislature by constituents. 
A comparison of tables 11.3 and 1 1.2 shows that most of the path coeffi- 
cients for constituents were larger than the path coefficients for local notables. 
For example, linkages between modernity and both types of salience were 
much weaker among local notables than among constituents-presumably 
because there was less variation among the notables in both modernity and 
salience levels. 
TABLE 11.3. 
Path Coefficients for Legislative Support in Local Elite Strata 
in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey (Xl = Individual Modernity Score) 
Dependent varlablu Country 4 4 4 B, 8, 
X, Salience of MPs 
X, Salience of the 
legislature 
X, satidaction with MPs' 
performance 
X, Satisfaction with 
performance of the 
legislature 
X, Constituent support 
for legislature 
Kenya 
Korea 
Turkey 
Kenya 
Korea 
Turkey 
Kenya 
Korea 
Turkey 
Kenya 
Korea 
Turkey 
Kenya 
Korea 
Turkey 
Note: Multiple correlations for support in each country are as follows: 
Kenya (N = 477): R = 0.36 and R2 = 0.13 
Korea (N = 464): R = 0.37 and R' = 0.14 
Turkey (N = 278): R = 0.19 and R2 = 0.04 
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However, path coefficients between salience of M Ps and satisfaction with 
M Ps' performance were very high for both constituents and elites. Legislative 
salience had less effect on elite support, particularly in Turkey, where the 
relationship was highest for constituents. The linkage between satisfaction 
with the M P  and satisfaction with the legislature was much weaker among 
elites. Finally, the strong linkage between satisfaction with the legislature 
and support for it among constituents (ranging from 0.16 to 0.48) fell to a 
modest 0.14 to 0.27 in the case of elites. In short, elites' support of the legis- 
lature was based less on our measures of salience and satisfaction than was 
the support of constituents. 
NATIONAL VARIATIONS IN THE 
DETERMINANTS OF SUPPORT 
Are there any important differences in the structure of legislative support 
in the three countries? In figure 1 1.5 we present path diagrams of legislative 
support for the three countries. What emerges in the data, despite all of the 
country variations noted earlier, is an unmistakably striking similarity in the 
patterns of path linkages in all three countries, a subject which we have 
already treated in some detail. There are nevertheless some notable differ- 
ences in terms of the sources of legislative support that merit further con- 
sideration. The first of these differences, rather obvious in the data, has 
something to do with the performance of our path model in the three coun- 
tries. The model showed the best performance in Kenya, accounting for 33 
percent of the variance in legislative support. It was less efficient in the other 
countries, explaining 26 percent of the variance in Korea and only 18 percent 
in Turkey. 
This difference may be due to the different political sophistication levels of 
the populations in the three countries. In Turkey, which has attained the 
highest socioeconomic development of the three, and which has a parliamen- 
tary history extending more than half a century, citizens have acquired a 
good deal of political sophistication, especially in comparison to those in 
Kenya whose history of political independence spans less than two decades. 
Politically aware and sophisticated citizens are likely to extend or withdraw 
their support for political institutions for reasons which are both complex 
and carefully thought out. Those who are poorly informed and have little 
political experience are likely to give support, if they do it at  all, for much 
simpler reasons. They may extend their support for the legislature because 
their MPs have perhaps brought some direct and tangible personal benefits 
to them, or  may develop habitually deferential attitudes toward any institu- 
tion of authority, a general tendency often observed in highly traditional 
societies. 
Kenya N = 3747 
of 0.77 Satlsfactlon wlth 
MPs lndlvldual MPs 7, 0.12 0.17 0.17 
lndivldual 
V 
legislature with legislature 
'P 0.12 
&o.se) R = 0.57 R~ = 0.33 
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lndividual 
modernity 
e2(0.75) e,(O.w 
2014 \L 
Salience of 0.61 Satlsfaction wlth 
MPs * individual MPs > 0.11 0.19 0.23 Constituent 
support for 
legislature 
4 
legislature with legislature 
'T'I 0.15 'P 
e2(o.97) e6(0.9l) 
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FIGURE 11.5. Path Model for Legislative Support 
Based on Six Variables in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey 
11 981 THE LEGISLATIVE CONNECTION 
Another difference relates to the relative effect of individual modernity on 
support. We have used the modernity variable here as a summary indicator 
of various positions that one occupies in social and political stratification 
systems. The individual modernity factor showed a direct effect of some 
magnitude in both Korea and Kenya. The direct path linkages between 
modernity and legislative support in these two countries were 0.19 and 0.17, 
respectively, compared to 0.01 in Turkey. This suggests that the level of 
modernity has only an indirect effect on support in Turkey. What might 
account for this variation? We believe that the relative importance of the 
modernity variable is determined by the particular stage of modernization in 
which a society is currently located. As a society becomes more advanced, 
more of its citizens will acquire a degree of individual modernity, and that 
variable will have less utility in explaining support. 
The effect of constituent satisfaction with MP performance on their satis- 
faction with the institutional performance was smallest in Turkey (0.10). In 
Kenya and Korea the effects were substantially larger (0.17 and 0.23, respec- 
tively). These differences also appear to be rooted in the different stages of 
modernization in which the three countries were located at the time of our 
survey. Further, they indicate that many Turkish citizens were able to dis- 
tinguish the performance of individual MPs from the performance of the 
legislature. This capacity to make a clear distinction may explain the weak 
path linkage between the two variables in Turkey. 
It is noteworthy that the linkage between satisfaction with the legislature 
and support for that institution was much higher in Kenya than in the other 
two countries. There was, however, no important direct link between satis- 
faction with M Ps' performance and support for the legislature. 
In this section we have attempted to identify country variations in the 
structure of legislative support. What variations existed between Kenya, 
Korea, and Turkey were largely accounted for by the different levels of poli- 
tical sophistication which characterized the populations of those countries at 
the time of our survey. Furthermore, the levels of political sophistication 
appeared to be a product of both the socioeconomic and the political mod- 
ernization of a country. Although we have stressed the differences between 
countries here, we should nevertheless not overlook the striking similarities 
in the basic structure of legislative support across the three nations with 
different histories, cultures, and parliamentary experiences. 
DISTRICT VARIATIONS IN SUPPORT 
We turn now to an examination of the differences in levels of legislative 
salience, satisfaction, and support in legislative districts. If such differences 
did exist, could they be explained by characteristics of the districts or activi- 
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ties of the M Ps in those districts? We hypothesized that in districts where 
legislators were more active and concerned with constituency needs, constitu- 
ents would be more familiar with representatives (higher salience), would be 
more satisfied with their performance, and would be more supportive of the 
legislature. 
The importance of interdistrict analysis lies in its potential for measuring 
the impact individual M Ps can have on the attitudes of constituents toward 
the legislative system. We asked constituents whether they had seen or  talked 
to their M P recently. We asked M Ps how often they visited their constitu- 
ency, whom they contacted there, what they talked about, and what priority 
they attached to serving constituency needs. We have summarized our find- 
ings about these questions in earlier chapters, and we can rank MPs from 
more to less active in, and concerned about, their constituency. 
We expected that activities of M Ps would affect perceptions and attitudes 
in their districts both directly and indirectly. Some constituents might deal 
directly with the M P, making requests of him and listening to reports of his 
accomplishments. Others might lack direct contact with the M P, but gain a 
favorable impression of him from others. In short, we expected a spillover 
effect; in districts with more active MPs we expected to find higher levels of 
salience and satisfaction with performance of both the MP and the legisla- 
ture. We looked at the attitudes and perceptions of both elites and constitu- 
ents, although there were so few elites interviewed in each district that statis- 
tical analysis of their responses was unreliable. 
We can summarize briefly the findings concerning district variations before 
looking at each country in more detail. There were differences, sometimes 
considerable, from one district to another on the variables of salience, satis- 
faction, and support. There were also differences among some of the variables 
that we might expect to be explanatory. But we did not find the same districts 
consistently high in salience, satisfaction, and support, nor in the variables 
that were supposed to be explanatory. Even more discouraging to any clear 
and simple explanation of interdistrict variations was the fact that constitu- 
ents and elites in a district very often disagreed on their perceptions of M Ps 
and on their levels of salience, satisfaction, and support. 
KENYA 
Although levels of M P salience and familiarity with the M P's name were 
very high among Kenyan constituents, there were a few districts in which 
both measures were low, and several others that showed moderate MP 
salience. There was a rough correlation between measure of contact with the 
M P and M P salience, particularly at the top and bottom of the ranks. In a 
few districts, the MP was highly visible and well known; in a few he was 
seldom seen and little was known about him. 
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Elite responses regarding MP salience and contact with MPs had no 
relationship at all to constituent responses. This suggests that some MPs 
spent more time with elites when visiting the district, and others had more 
contact with constituents. 
We asked MPs a number of questions about their activities in the district, 
but there was not enough variation in their answers to provide important 
clues to differences in constituent responses. In-depth interviewing of the 
M Ps, however, provided more clues to their impact on the district. The M Ps 
in three districts-Laikipia, Embu, and Githunguri--were ranked high in 
salience and in measures of contact by both constituents and elites, and also 
were given very high job performance evaluations by both groups. All three 
M Ps were excellent examples of service-oriented legislators. They devoted a 
great deal of time to their districts, helping to organize local development 
projects, and demonstrating unusual skill in taking care of needs of their 
districts. 
Among the MPs who received low performance ratings was a national 
labor union leader who paid little attention to his district. Another M P got 
higher evaluations from elites than from constituents because he was closely 
tied to the power elite but was less well known to constituents. In the district 
incorporating the capital city of Nairobi, the local MP was not well known, 
probably because many residents of the city came from other districts. 
In Kenya, the most visible and salient MPs were ranked high in satisfaction 
with job performance. But there was a wide range in the evaluation of MPs 
by both elites and constituents which could not be attributed to differences 
in salience or contact. The M P in Kenya has a chance to be an organizer and 
entrepreneur in his district. Some MPs in our study took advantage of this 
opportunity and were evaluated favorably. Others did not work very hard, 
were judged harshly by constituents and elites. and often were defeated or 
did not seek reelection. 
We hypothesized that when an MP was salient and perceived to be per- 
forming well, his constituents would have a more favorable impression of the 
legislature and be more supportive of it. In Kenya this was not the case. For 
neither constituents nor elites did we find consistent relationships between 
high MP performance evaluation on the one hand, and high institutional 
performance evaluation or high support for the legislature on the other. 
KOREA 
lnterdistrict analysis in Korea was complicated by the fact that each 
district elected two legislators. Some respondents were familiar with both, 
others with only one, and others with neither. When we asked questions 
about salience, satisfaction, and contact, we did not ask respondents to 
specify which M P they were referring to. Where our data show that one M P 
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was more active in the district than the other, it was impossible to tell which 
of the two had the greater effect on respondents. Therefore, we did not 
expect to find any strong relationship between M P reports of activity and 
the perceptions of constituents and elites. 
There was some variation among districts in the salience of M Ps and in 
the proportion of constituents who could name one or both MPs. Elite re- 
sponses on these items were quite different from those of constituents in all 
districts. With the exception of three districts that ranked high in salience, 
knowledge of MP's name, and contact, we could not explain salience by 
frequency of contact. We did not find that MPs were consistently better 
known and more visible in rural districts, as we had expected to. Nor did we 
find any clear relationship between the reported activities and priorities of 
M Ps and the meausure of contact, visibility, and salience given them by 
constituents and elites. 
Constituents and elites did not consistently agree in their evaluation of 
M P's job performance. Among constituents, we found at the top and bottom 
of the scale some relationship between salience and evaluation. There were 
not very large interdistrict variations in the levels of legislative support among 
constituents. However, what modest differences there were did run roughly 
parallel to satisfaction with M P job evaluation, at least at the top and bottom 
of the scale. 
There was also some relationship between constituents' evaluation of the 
legislature's performance and support for it. A similar pattern emerged for 
elites: small interdistrict differences in support that roughly parallelled differ- 
ences in evaluation of M P job performance. Despite the problems caused by 
there being two M Ps from each district, we have some reason to believe that 
a more positive evaluation of  the M P was associated with higher support for 
the legislature.' 
TURKEY 
District level analysis in Turkey was seriously handicapped by the fact 
that legislators were elected at large in each province, and so numbers in our 
sample provinces ranged from 3 to 38. While we might expect that in a large 
province with many legislators most constituents would have less direct con- 
tact and less familiarity with any legislator, this is not inevitable. Legislators 
may concentrate their efforts within particular sections of the province, per- 
haps where they live, and become well known in those areas. Our question- 
naire did not ask respondents to identify MPs they recognized; in a large 
province a few prominent M Ps might be well known and all the rest totally 
unknown. 
In Turkey, there was substantial interdistrict variation in the proportion of 
constituents who knew the MP and scored high in MP salience. Relatively 
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few Turkish constituents had seen one or more MPs lately, but in districts 
where a substantial number had done so, the level of salience was relatively 
high. Elites, on the other hand, had much more contact with MPs, and this 
contact was highest in districts where direct constituent-MP contact was 
lowest. 
Among constituents, knowledge of the MP's name, salience, and contact 
with the MP were all higher in provinces that were primarily rural and that 
had fewer M Ps. The larger, more urban the province, the more distant M Ps 
were from constituents. lstanbul and Ankara ranked near the bottom of the 
contact and salience scales. Although lstanbul had 38 MPs (or because it 
had that many), less than one-fourth of the constituents knew the name of an 
MP and only 6 percent had seen a representative in recent months. These 
were the lowest percentages for these items recorded in any of the provinces. 
The low levels of contact and salience among constituents in large urban 
provinces suggested that few of the M Ps in these areas devoted much of their 
time and effort to providing services for, and maintaining contacts with, 
their constituents. They appeared to work through the local elites, who were 
familiar with them. 
If rural constituents knew more about their MPs and had more contact 
with them, we might expect them to be more satisfied with M P performance 
than would constituents in urban provinces. This was not the case. Roughly 
half of the Turkish constituents gave a reasonably high evaluation of M Ps; 
but the variations in evaluation did not correlate positively to variations in 
salience. In fact, the highest levels of satisfaction with MP performance were 
found in lstanbul and Ankara, where MPs were least known. Perhaps con- 
stituents in large urban areas were more easily satisfied because they expect 
fewer services and less personal attention from their M Ps. This view is s u p  
ported by the fact that in lstanbul and Ankara (though not in all urban 
provinces) fewer constituents ranked M P's district duties as very important. 
In rural districts we found all MP duties to be ranked high in importance. 
Support for the legislature among Turkish constituents was modest, with 
some moderate district variations not related in any consistent way to contact, 
salience, or satisfaction, or urban-rural differences. Elite support was some- 
what lower, with district variations that had no obvious explanation. We 
concluded that in Turkey the most significant differences were between urban 
and rural areas: the more rural the district, the more expected of MPs and 
the greater their visibility and salience. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we have tried to examine the principal sources of public 
support for the legislative institution. Despite the vast differences that obvi- 
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ously existed in the three political systems under examination, our findings 
were strikingly similar across the three nations. Two important variables 
emerged in the multivariate analysis: constituent satisfaction with perform- 
ance of the legislature and salience of the legislative institution. It was con- 
stituent satisfaction with the legislative institution rather than satisfaction 
with the job of the individual MP that proved to be crucial to support. 
Similarly, it was salience of the institution rather than salience of the indi- 
vidual M P that had the greatest effect on support. 
Our path analysis produced remarkably consistent patterns in the three 
countries. There were two primary path linkages to constituent support for 
the legislature. The first ran from individual modernity to salience of M Ps, 
to satisfaction with individual MPs' performance, to satisfaction with insti- 
tutional performance, to support. The second also started with individual 
modernity and ran to salience of the institution and then directly to support. 
For a variety of reasons we expected to find sectoral variations in the 
causal structure of legislative ~ u p p o r t . ~  In all three nations modernization 
had penetrated different segments of society to varying degrees, and we 
expected to find somewhat different causal structures of legislative support 
for modern and traditional citizens. Our analysis indicated that support 
among modern citizens in all three countries derived from much more com- 
plex sources than did support among traditional'citizens. Our four-variable 
model could predict a greater amount of variance in support among the 
more traditional citizens than among modern ones. 
There was no consistent support for our speculation that modern citizens 
would rely on satisfaction with the institution and traditional citizens would 
rely on appraisal of the individual MP for their support of the legislature. 
However, in both Kenya and Turkey the linkages between the two measures of 
performance satisfaction were greater for traditional than fbr modern respon- 
dents. In general, the lack of strong consistent patterns in the three countries 
for these relationships suggests the need for caution in our interpretations. 
The analysis also revealed some differences between elites and average 
constituents. Local elites were consistently more supportive of the legislature, 
and more modern in their beliefs and attitudes. We expected that the local 
elites, with greater political sophistication and involvement in politics, would 
base their support on a greater variety of sources. This proved to be the case 
in all three countries. The explanatory capacity of our path model was 
consistently smaller for the support from local elites than for support from 
constituents. A different, more complex model is needed to explain variations 
in elites' support of legislative institutions. 
Part V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Chaprer I2 
THE LEGISLATURE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
IN LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH 
The principal objective of our study was to draw some general conclusions 
about the linkage functions of legislatures. We analyzed the data collected in 
Kenya, Korea, and Turkey with a view toward developing a theory that was 
valid crossnationally not only for the countries in our studies, but for other 
countries as well. 
We make no claim that the nations we studied were in any precise sense a 
sample of all those in the non-Western world. Nevertheless, where we found 
consistent empirical support for our hypotheses in all three countries, there 
is, we believe, good reason to suggest that these hypotheses are  applicable 
elsewhere. This belief is based on two considerations. First, many of the 
hypotheses tested in the study were developed from the findings of previous 
studies in other countries. Second, any confirmatory evidence from nations 
as disparate in sociopolitical character as Kenya, Korea, and Turkey may 
provide an additional basis for broader applicability. 
Rather than a study of individual countries, we sought to conduct a com- 
parative study of the type described by Przeworski and Teune: 
"Comparative" studies were defined as those in which the influence of larger sys- 
tems upon the characteristics of units within them is examined at some stage of 
analysis. Consequently comparative studies involve at least two levels of analysis. 
In this sense not all of the studies conducted across systems or nations are corn- 
parative, but all studies that are comparative are cross-systemic. If national social, 
political, or economic systems constitute one of the levels of analysis, the study is a 
cross-national comparative study. If, however, the analysis is conducted exclusively 
at the level of nations, then according to this definition it is not comparative.' 
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Moreover, the authors further note that "systems differ not when the 
frequency of particular characteristics differ, but when the patterns of the 
relationships among variables differ."* We have sought to examine and 
explain these differing patterns, and not merely differences in frequencies. 
It was desirable for comparative purposes not merely to describe the dif- 
ferences among Kenya, Korea, and Turkey, but to show which characteristics 
in each of these systems explained the differences. This was difficult to do 
with any confidence since only three nations were studied and they differed 
in many respects. 
The differences that we found among Kenya, Korea, and Turkey may be 
attributable to many variations, particularly those that Przeworski and Teune 
called differences in "settings." The three countries displayed differences in 
the following characteristics: the level of economic and social development, 
the nature of the ruling regime, the patterns of political culture, the party 
and electoral systems, and the character and history of the legislature. It was 
difficult and often impossible to determine which one or ones explained the 
differences we found. As Przeworski and Teune suggest, "most system-level 
variables will equally well account for the same differences of within-system 
 relationship^.^ 
There are many pitfalls involved in attempting to use more than a single 
level of analysis. It is important to distinguish clearly between those relation- 
ships that exist within countries and those that exist between them. One 
might, for example, be seeking to make generalizations about the relationship 
between modernity and the salience of legislators, or between modernity and 
support for the legislature. We found that an index of individual modernity 
was a good summary variable for a number of socioeconomic variables, and 
that individuals scoring high on the modernity index were both more familiar 
with legislators and more supportive of the legislature. We also found that 
the reasons for their support of the legislature differed from those of less 
modern individuals. But it was not true that constituents in the more modern 
parts of a country, or in the most modern, developed countries know more 
about their representatives than do traditional citizens. 
Similarly, we found that legislators from less developed parts of countries 
were more likely to be externals, but that the frequency of external MPs 
from country to country varied only imperfectly with the level of national 
development. This suggests that variables other than development contribute 
to legislative role. 
In the United States, which has a much higher level of development, most 
legislators perform both internal and external roles. This illustrates a problem 
raised by Przeworski and Teune: relations that may be linear within a small 
range of observations (in this case a range in the level of development) may 
be curvilinear when a larger range of observations is e m p l ~ y e d . ~  In other 
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words, it is risky to make generalizations about differences between systems 
based on observations of only three systems. 
There is another fundamental problem associated with our hypotheses 
about political developments. We believe that legislators may play a critical 
role in representation and resource allocations, contributing to the creation 
of public support for the regime and linkages between the center and the 
periphery. This process would be dynamic rather than static. A full test of this 
hypothesis would require comparisons over a long period of time of systems 
in which legislators played a variety of roles with varying degrees of success. 
As we were unable to do this, we conducted surveys at a single point in time. 
Although this enabled us to identify some differences in the way representa- 
tion and resource allocation occurred in the three countries. we were unable 
to measure the success of these functions in any systematic way. Moreover, 
though political development is clearly a dynamic process. we could not trace 
it over time. 
Our study relied on surveys of legislators. local elites. and constituents. 
rather than on written records of bills passed, committee hearings. debates. 
or question periods. The problems inherent in survey research are familiar 
ones, and in chapter 2 we outlined the steps we took to avoid these problems. 
Although great care was taken when constructingand translatingour survey 
instruments to maintain crossnational equivalence in context. we cannot be 
sure that we were completely successful. In the more rural parts of these 
countries. we were interviewing constituents who were unfamiliar with the 
concept of public opinion polls. some of whom may have been intimidated 
by the procedure and unwilling to provide frank answers. We took steps to 
minimize these problems but obviously could not completely eliminate them.6 
Specialists in comparative research are particularly concerned about the 
problems of establishing equivalence in measurement.' We are familiar with 
these problems. and sought to deal with them as carefully as possible through- 
out the course of the project. As noted in chapter 2. we developed common 
survey instruments-with only slight variations in a few questions-through 
joint efforts of experts from the three countries. 
There are obvious difficulties in measuring urban/ rural aspects of districts, 
or in measuring education simply by counting the number of years of school- 
ing. However. since we were not so much interested in comparing the knowl- 
edge and attitudes of persons in each country indicated by their education 
as in determining whether levels of education have the same effects on 
knowledge and attitudes in each country, it was not really necessary to find 
measures of education or other characteristics that were equivalent in the 
three countries. 
It was even more difficult to find common measures for such concepts as 
modernity, participation, salience. and representation. Fortunately, we were 
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able to use an index of modernity that was developed for and tested in 
crossnational r e sea r~h .~  We used the same questions in each country to 
measure political participation, but recognized that participation in political 
campaigns or voting in elections probably had different meanings in the 
three countries. 
Some of the problems of equivalence were inherent in our research. We did 
not assume that such concepts as representation and support meant the same 
thing in each country. Actually, one of the goals of our research was to find 
out what M Ps, elites. and constituents believed were the essential ingredients 
of the representative process. We were able to show which jobs of the legis- 
lator were considered most important by various groups we interviewed, and 
were impressed by the similarity of viewpoints. For example, constituents in 
each country said that telling the government what constituents want was 
the most important job of the MP, but constituents in the three countries 
may have had different things in mind when they responded positively to 
that phrase. Similarly, when M Ps were asked what their most important job 
was, the answers that were coded as representing the voters or other groups 
may have had different meanings to legislators in different countries, or even 
among legislators in the same country. 
Mass surveys require almost complete reliance on structured questions 
because the interviews are conducted and coded by many individuals and 
because it is important to be able to make comparisons within and among 
countries. Thus, we were not able to probe the attitudes and perceptions of 
legislators in any detail in order to find out more about how and why they 
differed in their performance of representative functions. Nor were we able 
to find out much about how legislators perceived their districts or about the 
factors which may have affected the way they represented their districts. 
Moreover, our research design did not permit us to observe the M P in his 
district? We could compare his role perceptions and his reported activity in 
the district with the perceptions and reactions of his constituents, but we had 
no detailed account of what the MP actually did in his district when he 
visited. 
The analysis of resource allocation would have been much stronger if we 
could have measured what the MP actually accomplished: how many new 
schools, improved roads, the jobs he gained for his constituents, and how 
often and with what success he intervened in disputes between individual 
constituents and bureaucrats. Similarly, we had no information about the 
existence and effectiveness of other channels that might have been available to 
constituents in specific districts: local officials, party leaders, or bureaucrats. 
Finally, there was a vexing problem in analyzing the role of the legislator 
in the multimember districts of Turkey, particularly in the provinces that had 
a large number of members. We did not ask constituents or  elites to specify 
the particular legislator whose name they knew, or whom they had seen or 
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talked to. Nor did we ask them to be specific in evaluating the performance 
of their districts' MPs. Consequently. it was very difficult to evaluate the 
effectiveness or representational linkages in Turkey. This was not a mechani- 
cal breakdown in our interviewing procedure; it would not have been realistic 
to expect constituents to identify and discuss a large number of MPs in the 
interview. Instead, it illustrates a more basic methodological problem-that 
of analyzing and comparing the process of representation in multimember 
and single-member districts. 
LINKAGE FUNCTIONS OF 
LEGISLATURES 
Our principal research interest was directed to the role of legislative insti- 
tutions in the political system. a perspective which required us to look closely 
at the external linkages of a legislative body. We have selected three aspects 
of such linkages for analysis: representation. resource allocation. and public 
support for the legislature. What emerged from our crossnational compara- 
tive study is briefly summarized below. 
REPRESENTATIONS 
Studies of the characteristics of legislators in other countries have con- 
sistently shown that members are better educated and are drawn from higher 
occupational. income. and social levels than those of the average person. The 
legislators of Kenya, Korea. and Turkey obviously fit this pattern. Although 
we did not examine trends over time. there was little evidence of a broadening 
of the base from which MPs weredrawn in these countries-a trend that has 
been found in some non-Western countries in recent years.'O 
We found relatively high levels of turnover-particularly in Kenya and 
Turkey. In Kenya the turnover resulted in part from the frequent electoral 
defeat of M Ps. often for failure to serve constituency needs. In Turkey, the 
turnover was partly voluntary, but was also caused by the failure of some 
MPs to win party renomination and by the emergence of new parties and 
factions in recent years. 
Representation has many dimensions, and it is useful for our purposes to 
use the categories delineated by Eulau and Karps: 
I .  policy responsiveness, involving issues of public policy, generally related 
to the passage of legislation; 
2. allocation responsiveness, "the representative's efforts to obtain benefits 
for his constituency through pork-barrel exchanges in the appropriations 
process or through administrative interventions"; 
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3. service responsiveness, "the efforts of the representative to secure particu- 
larized benefits for individuals or groups in his constituency"; 
4. symbolic responsiveness. "public gestures of a sort that create a sense 
of trust and support in the relationship between representative and 
represented." I '  
In our surveys of legislators, we found considerable awareness of the im- 
portance of symbolic responsiveness, though it was difficult to tell how often 
MPs practiced the public gestures Eulau and Karps talk about. We found 
that some members, whom we labeled internals, devoted more of their time 
to policy responsiveness. while others, the externals, were more concerned 
with allocation and service responsiveness. This difference in priorities can 
be explained by a number of factors. Some are personal, such as age and 
experience. But the more important differences relate to the character of the 
constituency and its needs, as well as the nature of the regime. the operation 
of the legislature, and electoral necessities. 
The level of social and economic development in a society, and within a 
constituency, affect the issues confronting the legislature. We found that the 
Turkish legislator, particularly one representing an urban constituency, was 
more likely to represent-through his party-certain classes and groups that 
were seeking particular policies and programs. The Kenyan M P represented 
a geographic entity that was seeking certain direct benefits from the govern- 
ment. Moreover, in Kenya the domination of the executive over the policy- 
making process led members to work behind the scenes to gain benefits from 
executive agencies while they worked within their districts to develop projects 
eligible for aid. 
The importance attached to allocation and service responsiveness by M Ps 
in our study-particularly in Kenya but to some extent in Korea and Turkey 
-was comparable to what has been found in studies of a number of non- 
Western legislatures. Mohapatra found that in the Indian state of Orissa, 
four-fifths of the members of the state legislature believed that the role of 
ombudsman was a proper one, and an even larger proportion actually prac- 
ticed it.I2 In the Indian state of Rajasthan. Narain and Puri found that legis- 
lators reported that problems of local development were the ones most often 
stressed by constituents, those most often emphasized in legislators' cam- 
paigns, and those to which they devoted the largest share of their time.I3 
Maheshwari reported that a sample of M Ps in the lndian national parliament 
said that a high proportion of the problems brought to them by constitu- 
ents were individual in character. and that these members believed that 
trying to deal with these requests was a matter of high priority.I4 Several 
studies of Malaysian and Singaporean legislators have documented the strong 
constituency orientation of most legislators and have described in some 
detail the procedures they use to maintain allocation, service, and symbolic 
responsiveness. l 5  
12. The Legislature and Development Dl31 
Two surveys of legislators have been conducted in recent years using many 
of the questions that we devised for our study; they were in Malaysia and in 
Papua New Guinea. Musolf and Springer found that the activities which 
occupied most of Malaysian MPs' time were resolving local conflicts (29 
percent). explaining government policy to voters (25 percent), interceding 
with civil servants (21 percent), and seeking resources for the district (15 
percent); only a few emphasized debate and expressing the views of constitu- 
ents. Most members said that they would like to spend more time on getting 
resources for the district and expressing the views of the district on policy. 
The high priority given to resolving local conflicts probably reflects the ethnic 
conflicts between Malays and Chinese that have plagued that c ~ u n t r y . ' ~  
A study by Gadbois, Jewell. and Sylvester in Papua New Guinea shows 
that legislators are much more likely to emphasize purposive roles related to 
representing their constituents and getting projects for them than they are to 
stress policymaking (17 to 52 percent of first-mentioned roles). More than 
three-fourths of the legislators in this study said they devoted more time 
to problems in the electorate than to national problems. Most legislators 
claimed to spend a great deal of time in their electorate, and most believed 
that their constituents expected them to provide benefits for the district as a 
whole as well as for individual constituents." 
Several studies suggest that constituency services are also important to 
legislators in Western countries, although there is more attention given 
to policy matters in Western legislatures than in non-Western legislatures. 
Several studies in recent years have stressed the service responsibilities of 
British M Ps.'%ornberg and Mishler, in their study of the Canadian parlia- 
ment, suggest that while most M Ps have a strong interest in policy matters, a 
high proportion believe that it is important to deal with the problems of 
individual constituents and in fact Is essential for winning reelection. l 9  Clarke 
has found that Canadian provincial legislators devote a substantial amount 
of their time to constituency service. and has measured the variables that 
lead to differences in the amount of time spent.20 Scholars of the United 
States Congress in recent years have emphasized that. despite their heavy 
involvement in policy, almost all members devote time and attention, and a 
large proportion of their staff resources. to service and allocation responsi- 
bilities; the growing importance of these activities is responsible, some say, 
for the increasing success of House members in winning reelecti~n.~' 
Britain, Canada. and the United States, of course. all have national legis- 
lators elected from single-member districts, and that probably accounts for 
the importance of both service and allocation responsiveness among these 
legislators. Loewenberg has reported on a study of MPs in Belgium. Italy, 
and Switzerland, countries in which multimember districts are used. When 
asked to define their constituency. most M Ps answered in terms of interest 
groups, social classes, or political groups. and relatively few emphasized a 
geographic constituency. even when asked specifically about that category. 
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Loewenberg also found some differences among the countries and within 
them in symbolic, service, and policy responsi~eness.~~ 
Symbolic responsiveness may be the most important aspect of represen- 
tation. It is likely that the demand of the constituency for resources and the 
demands of constituents for services will exceed the ability of the legislator 
to provide them, in most districts at least. The success of the legislator as 
an individual. and his contribution to the linkage function, may depend on 
his skill in symbolic responsiveness. To represent his district well, the MP 
must not only come from the district and understand its needs, but must 
develop and maintain contacts, spend time in the district, and be visible and 
accessible. 
Our data show that most legislators recognize this in principle and claim 
to devote time and skills to their district. The way they do this job-the 
people they see and the things they discuss-differs in particular cases. The 
techniques of representation that work well in one political culture, or in 
certain types of districts, may not be effective elsewhere. We know that legis- 
lators follow different patterns of activity in their districts, but we cannot tell 
with our data how much of their diversity reflects local preference and how 
much reflects variations in personal styles and devotion to the job. 
Our research design enabled us to measure the congruence between M Ps' 
roles and the expectations of their constituents. We could determine whether 
legislators shared the goals and focused on the problems considered important 
by constituents. We used the term "legislative culture" to describe constituent 
cognitions, role expectations, and evaluations concerning the legislature and 
its members. We did not, of course, expect to find perfect congruence, but 
the fundamental differences we did find suggest that the system of represen- 
tation was not working well. 
We began with cognitions, and found a rather high level of constituent 
familiarity with their legislators. This was highest in Kenya, where many 
M Ps appeared to be important local leaders, and lowest in Turkey, where the 
legislators in multimember districts were more responsive to parties and 
organized groups than to individual constituents. We found, particularly in 
Turkey and Korea. more widespread knowledge about legislative institutions 
than we might have expected. The legislature and its members were salient 
enough to make it possible for us to query the constituents about the qualities 
that legislators should have and the jobs that they should do. We found 
remarkable consensus in the three countries that honesty, hard work, and an 
understanding of the common people were most important. These qualifi- 
cations overshadowed educational achievement. occupational success, and 
long residence in the district. 
We found considerable agreement that the most important jobs of the M P 
were those directly related to his constituency: expressing the people's views, 
getting resources and projects for the district. and visiting the district. Gen- 
12. The Legislature and Development [215I 
erally, the legislators recognized the importance of these activities, but not 
surprisingly, many of them gave greater priority to policymaking activities 
than their constituents did. Kenyan MPs seemed to be most in tune with their 
constituents; they spent the most time on district activities and would like to 
have spent even more time on them. Turkish M Ps spent less time on district 
activities but said that they would have liked to devote more time to these 
duties. Korean MPs, who spent somewhat more time on district matters. 
wanted to become more involved in policymaking, a preference that is close 
to that of the local elites in that country. Regarding the focus of representa- 
tion, Kenyan legislators agreed with constituents and elites that top priority 
should be given to constituent views. Korean MPs, however, gave much 
greater priority to party than did constituents and elites, while Turkish M Ps 
emphasized their personal convictions much more than other groups did. 
If we consider role congruence between legislators and the local elites and 
constituents in their districts as  a measure of symbolic responsiveness, we 
can conclude that Kenyan MPs were more responsive than those in Korea 
and Turkey. In Kenya, there seemed to be a widely shared perception that 
the legislator's major responsibility was to gain resources for his district and 
help his constituents. Korean legislators were more loyal to their party, and 
much more interested in policymaking (however limited their actual input) 
than their constituents wished. But local elites in Korea agreed with the 
priorities of their legislators. The differences in role expectations between 
Turkish MPs and constituents probably resulted from the fact that Turkish 
MPs were directly responsive to partisan and interest groups and only in- 
directly responsive to constituents, although both elites and constituents 
emphasized party loyalty more than MPs did. It may be that the demands 
made on legislators are more varied in Korea and Turkey than in Kenya, and 
that this is one reason why there was less congruence concerning role expec- 
tations in those countries. We would expect that the greater diversity of 
demands in Korea and Turkey is a result of the higher level of socioeconomic 
development in these countries. 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
In all three countries in our study, the executive branch dominated the 
process of general resource allocation. The executive introduced most suc- 
cessful legislation, including the budget, and M Ps reported that the executive 
and party leaders (including opposition leaders in Korea) initiated most legis- 
lative proposals. The committee systems in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey pro- 
vided few opportunities for ordinary legislators to influence general resource 
allocation, although in Turkey there were some chances to affect specific 
allocations. Strong party discipline in Turkey and in the majority party in 
Korea placed further limits on the ability of rank and file legislators to 
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influence policy. Legislators generally reported that most key decisions were 
made in the cabinet or by government leaders. Most MPs also reported that 
their own legislative activities were rather modest, limited to some speech- 
making on the floor or some committee work. Even those MPs-mostly in 
Turkey and Korea-who claimed to have a strong interest and an active role 
in legislative matters did not appear to have much impact on the general 
allocation of resources. 
When we looked at specific resource allocation, the MPs' role appeared to 
be larger. We found that constituents expected legislators to participate in 
specific resource allocation, and that many members considered it important 
and devoted a large portion of their time to it. Although we did not have data 
on the attitudes of bureaucrats, it appeared that many of them were respon- 
sive to pressures from legislators. While MPs devoted attention both to the 
needs of individuals and the problems of their districts, we were primarily 
concerned with the latter in our study of resource allocation. Obviously, the 
ability of legislators to gain specific benefits for their districts affected both 
economic and political development. 
Our data suggest that there was considerable agreement between constitu- 
ents and their legislators about the most important problems in the districts, 
most of which related to gaining resources for such projects as roads, schools, 
health facilities, and promotion of local industry and agriculture. There were 
many ways in which legislators generated resources for their districts. These 
included fund raising and initiation of projects in the district. They also 
included a variety of efforts, both publicized and behind the scenes, in the 
capital to get funds allocated to the district. Apparently, the most effective 
efforts were carried out through bargaining with government ministers and 
civil servants, although at times the push for resources was made in speeches 
and questions on the floor. Some two-thirds of the MPs in Korea and 
Turkey, and more in Kenya, believed that they had been effective in getting 
resources for their districts. It was, however, difficult to tell whether these 
self-evaluations were realistic. 
Relatively few constituents (except local elites) reported having been in 
contact with a legislator or reported that an MP had done something for 
them. Except in Kenya. fewer than half of the constituents could mention 
anything specific that the MP had done for the district. This awareness 
tended to be higher in rural districts where the visibility of the MP was 
greatest, and the existence of other political actors and institutions, especially 
interest groups and various government agencies, was limited. 
It was no easy task to evaluate the effectiveness of legislators in specific 
resource allocation or the impact of such activities on economic and political 
development. We knew the importance attached to this function by constitu- 
ents and MPs, but we could not measure, either quantitatively or qualita- 
tively, the consequences of these activities for individuals or communities in 
the district. 
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What are the consequences for economic development if legislators are 
able to affect the specific allocation of resources? Obviously, one effect is to 
allocate more funds to those districts represented by legislators who are 
politically powerful, industrious. and skillful. Because the executive controls 
the resources sought by legislators, it can maintain support for its legislative 
program, and perhaps can coopt members of opposition parties. These are 
political techniques not unfamiliar in Western legislative bodies. Obviously, 
one consequence of this process is that resources may be allocated, not to the 
districts with the greatest need, or to those that can utilize them most effec- 
tively, but to districts whose representatives are most influential and skillful. 
Districts already rich or more developed than others are likely to benefit 
disproportionately where the opportunities for legislators to influence the 
process of specific resource allocation are greatest. Where this occurs, the 
activities of legislators may contribute to unbalanced and uneven develop- 
ment between regions, and to increased competition between regions for 
scarce resources. These activities by legislators may also undermine the effec- 
tiveness of national planning for the effective distribution of resources. The 
negative consequences of active involvement by legislators in the process of 
specific resource allocation were already.perceptible in Kenya at the time of 
our study. where the proportion of MPs concerned with this aspect of repre- 
sentation was particularly high. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
local political leaders. and legislators, understand local needs better than 
central planners do. Legislators may be in a unique position to encourage the 
initiation of local projects, and even to raise funds for local projects. that are 
compatible with national programs. 
These arguments about the advantages and disadvantages of legislators' 
involvement in specific resourceallocations are not new. Our data shed some 
light on the ways in which MPs affect economic development. But. there is 
very little useful information from studies in other countries on the role of 
legislators in specific resource all~cation.~' We were more concerned with the 
effects on political development. and argued that where legislators play an 
effective role in specific resource allocation they may affect local attitudes 
and increase public support for the government and its policies. We turn 
next to this question of support. 
LEGISLATIVE S U P P O R T  
We have hypothesized that legislators, by performing effectively as a link- 
age between the national government and local communities. can help to 
build public support not only for the legislature but for other political insti- 
tutions in the regime. They may help to develop public support for the policies 
of the government. thus enhancing its capacity for governing. Ideally. we 
should have data on public support for the entire regime, including the execu- 
tive leadership, but we judged that questions of this kind were too sensitive 
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to ask and were not likely to produce consistently honest answers. We did, 
however. ask several questions designed to tap support for the legislature, 
and were able to measure such support on a scale and correlate support with 
other variables. We anticipated that knowledge, and a favorable evaluation, 
of the legislature would lead to its support. Moreover, we thought that many 
constituents would be more familiar with individual M Ps than with the legis- 
lature. and that favorable evaluations of the representatives would lead to 
support of the legislature. 
We found what seem to us to be impressive overall levels of support. 
We also found that most respondents were favorably impressed with the 
legislature's performance. This satisfaction correlated strongly with support, 
although it is not clear that all respondents distinguished between the two 
concepts. We found that most respondents were favorably impressed with 
the performance in those parts of the M P's job that they were most familiar 
with and considered most important: those related to constituency service. 
We found considerable variation in the degree of familiarity and satisfaction 
with MPs from one district to another, suggesting that respondents were in 
fact reacting to variations in visibility and performance by the legislators. We 
did not find as much relationship between satisfaction with the MP's job 
performance and legislative support as we had anticipated, nor did these two 
covary from district to district as much as we had expected. 
We used a variety of approaches. including multiple regression and path 
analysis. in an effort to uncover the sources of legislative support. The results 
showed complex bases of support across nations and across social groups. 
rather than single uniform and consistent patterns across nations and across 
different social strata. We discovered modest causal linkages from salience of 
M Ps and/or satisfaction with M Ps' performance to salience of the legislative 
institution and satisfaction with institutional performance. and finally, to 
legislative support. Moreover. we uncovered fairly strong causal links running 
from modernity, an efficient summary variable for a large number of socio- 
economic attributes of an individual, to the salience and satisfaction variables. 
A more detailed analysis revealed that support rested on different founda- 
tions for different types of respondents. The more traditional constituents 
supported the legislature. probably along with other political institutions, 
out of a sense of basic loyalty or a deeply ingrained deferential attitude to the 
authority system. On the other hand, those who were modern in their per- 
spectives and attitudes were directly affected, in extending or withholding 
their support, by their evaluation of the job done by the legislature or by 
individual legislators. In this respect, support grew out of fundamentally 
different kinds of bases for different types of constituents. Interestingly, we 
found a weak relationship between the evaluation of the legislator's job and 
support for the legislature. We anticipated. on theoretical grounds. a strong 
connection between evaluation and support: we thought that a favorable 
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evaluation would lead to a higher satisfaction with an M P's job performance, 
and that a high satisfaction would lead to a higher support. Our evidence 
failed to support this anticipation. This may be due to the failure among 
many of our respondents to form an integrated conception of the whole 
legislative system. Many did not recognize any relationship between the 
accomplishments of their own MP and the utility and contributions of the 
legislature as a political institution; this was especially true among members 
of the less modernized sectors of society. It may be expected that as these 
developing societies attain a higher level of political maturity. citizens will 
acquire a more integrated conception of the legislature. 
On balance, we concluded that the level of knowledge, approval, and 
support for the legislative institutions was quite high, given the limited role 
that legislatures have played in these countries, particularly in Kenya and 
Korea. Also noteworthy was the perceived role of the legislator. While many 
respondents had little firsthand contact with MPs and many did not know 
much about their MPs'functions, we found surprisingly high name recogni- 
tion of MPs, a strong belief in the principle of representation, a clear desire 
that MPs should serve constituency needs, and some willingness to pass 
judgment on the accomplishments of MPs. In Kenya and Korea, at least, 
there was clearly a potential for M Ps to serve a major linkage role, and many 
of them seemed to be filling it with some success. In Turkey the pattern was 
more complicated; the linkage role was clearer in rural provinces, while in 
urban ones the MP worked through the party and various social and eco- 
nomic groups. 
NEXT STEPS IN COMPARATIVE 
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH 
Our crossnational research effort, as one of the few studies of this kind 
to date, must of necessity be considered exploratory. We have provided 
some tentative answers to the questions, but at the same time have con- 
fronted several puzzling aspects of crossnational data that require further 
investigation. 
From the viewpoint of research strategy. it would be valuable if research 
projects in other countries could include parallel surveys with key actors in 
the legislative process, such as MPs, their constituents. local notables, gov- 
ernment bureaucrats, leaders of interest groups, and party politicians. Such 
a strategy is essential if we are to understand the legislature in its interactive 
context. Studies that focus upon MPs, constituents, or any other activist 
groups alone can provide only a partial picture of the linkage functions of 
the legislature. One drawback of this suggestion is the almost prohibitively 
[m THE LEGISLATIVE CONNECTION 
high research cost involved. The problem could be solved. however, by means 
of carefully coordinated collaborative research among scholars of different 
countries. 
A more modest. and therefore more practical. step may involve the use of 
similar questions by individual scholars in their surveys of legislators or of 
constituents. As noted earlier, very similar survey instruments were employed 
for studies of legislators in Malaysia and Papua New Guinea. We have found 
that there is great value in using not only the same research instruments, but 
also common conceptual and methodological approaches in studying these 
nations. We have also found that such coordination and collaboration require 
time, patience, and substantial resources, but the experience is highly reward- 
ing because it makes possible the cumulative development of knowledge. 
Another methodological approach that deserves greater attention is the 
indepth study of legislators' activities in their districts. along the lines that 
Fenno followed in the United  state^?^ or that Ong employed on a small scale 
in Malay~ia.?~ Such a study could be combined with surveys of constituents 
and elites in those districts, or perhaps surveys of individuals who have had 
contact with the legislators. In addition, it would be valuable to study the 
consequences of legislators' activities: what benefits are actually gained for 
individuals and what projects are obtained for the district? 
We recognize the impact that variations in national political culture have 
on legislative systems, but in our study of three countries we were more 
impressed by the similarities we found than by the differences. The underly- 
ing problems of representative government are universal. and need to be 
studied in a wide variety of settings. 
Some of the differences in representation that we found seemed to be 
related to the differences between single- and multimemberdistricting, but it 
is difficult to draw conclusions because so little is known about the effects of 
districting. Most studies of representation have been done in legislatures 
with single-member districts; consequently, we know very little about how 
legislators perform the representative function in nations with large. multi- 
member  district^.?^ 
There is a growing awareness and knowledge of the allocation and service 
roles played by legislators in many countries. The consequences of these roles 
for both economic and political development need to be followed by much 
more systematic analysis. In order to understand the importanceof symbolic 
representation, we need to learn more about what constituents expect from 
their representatives and how this influences what the legislator does. 
In the area of resource allocation, the list of research needs encompasses 
almost every facet of the topic because we know so little. What types of 
resources are being allocated? What criteria do legislators use in responding 
to demands, and what tactics do they use in seeking to get resources for their 
districts? How do administrators perceive the activities of legislators, and 
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what criteria do they use in determining their response? What differences do 
legislative activities make? What are the consequences of resource allocation 
for economic development? Are resources allocated in a significantly different 
pattern from what would occur if there were no legislators or if legislators 
were not involved in the allocation process? 
Similarly, in the area of political support, very little is known with cer- 
tainty. A continuing challenge for researchers is to develop more sensitive 
questions for measuring supportive attitudes. It is equally difficult to find 
ways of measuring supportive behavior. In those parts of the world where 
legislatures have been abolished or suspended. those who oppose the govern- 
ment and demand reform usually focus attention on the need for restoring 
the legislature. We need to learn more about why there is such persistent 
support for a latent or nonexistent institution. why the legislature is so often 
perceived as a vehicle for reform. The research problems related to public 
support are inherently difficult, and in those nations where they are more 
interesting-because support is weak or changing or because there is more 
support for some political institutions than for others-it is difficult. and 
sometimes impossible. to ask blunt questions and get honest answers from 
the public about support. 
The fundamental questions addressed in this volume are under what con- 
ditions and in what ways does a legislature contribute to resolving conflict, 
developing national integration. bridging the gap between the center and the 
periphery. and enhancing both the capability of the government and the 
equal treatment of citizens. We have found that the answers to these questions 
are elusive and not readily provided by a study conducted at one point in 
time among three nations. however comparative in spirit and in methodology. 
The basic question-what difference does the legislature make-is the most 
important question that can be asked about legislative institutions. and the 
most difficult to answer. Both because it is important and because it is diffi- 
cult, the question deserves the continuing attention of legislative scholars 
devoted to comparative research. 
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